Problems of COMMUNISM

Struggle in the Kremlin?

RICHARD LOWENTHAL
ROBERT CONQUEST

Worker and Peasant in the USSR

PAUL BARTON
ARCADIUS KAHAN

SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT SOVIET AGGRESSION

A review by Alfred G. Meyer

Other reviews by

Stephen Spender
Bertram D. Wolfe
George Denicke
Myron Weiner
Paul Willen
Cyril E. Black

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The Soviet Leadership: Trends and Portents

EDITORS' NOTE: Seldom in recent years has any single event engendered so much speculation about the locus of power in the Kremlin as the abortive "summit meeting" in Paris in May of this year. Reporters and analysts rushed into print with sundry stories—some more sensational than others—about the ostensible decline of Khrushchev's authority, the emergence of a victorious "left faction" in the party presidium, the role of Peking in influencing Soviet foreign policy, and so on.

*What—in the light of conflicting evidence, rumors, solid facts, and above all of our general knowledge about the mechanics of Soviet power—*can *be said about the position of Khrushchev and about the struggle for power in the Kremlin? This is the question posed in Mr. Lowenthal's article. His conclusion, based as much on logical deduction as on an examination of the relevant data at our disposal, is that the question of Stalin's succession has definitely been settled, that Khrushchev is firmly in control (though still lacking the "moral" authority of either Stalin or Lenin), and that the struggle for power—to the extent that it exists—concerns not so much Khrushchev's personal position, as that of his subordinates, and the degree of their influence upon him.*

Mr. Conquest, on the other hand, advances a different thesis. While agreeing with Mr. Lowenthal on the continued strength of Khrushchev's position, he is nevertheless of the opinion that a real struggle for power is still in progress. His article is an attempt to depict the alignments within the Soviet ruling circle, and to identify the protagonists of the perennial Soviet game of kto kavo?—*who [against] whom—the outcome of which, in his opinion, is not yet in sight.*

The Nature of Khrushchev's Power

By Richard Lowenthal

WHEN KHRUSHCHEV BROKE UP the summit conference for which he had been working hard for more than two years, the question was raised as to how much of a free agent he had been in doing so. Basing their conjectures on a combination of explicit facts about Peking's opposition to Khrushchev's foreign policy and indications (or mere rumors) of dissatisfaction in the top echelons of the Soviet hierarchy itself, a number of observers concluded that Khrushchev was either on his way out, or at least had been forced to yield control over policy to a hostile majority in the Presidium of the Central Committee. Accordingly, those who had come to hold this view proceeded to search all the records of recent domestic developments in the USSR for clues to this presumed shift of power, and to the composition of the new majority.

In following these speculations, this author must confess that he has not found them particularly persuasive on the subject of the scope and nature of foreign policy disagreements in the Kremlin; if anything, they have

Well-known political analyst and frequent contributor to this journal, Mr. Lowenthal is now at work on a book to be entitled Totalitarianism and Social Change.

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served to underscore the wide divergencies of opinion among Western commentators on the present nature of the Soviet regime. The following remarks, therefore, are concerned with the latter rather than with the former. In other words, the purpose of this article is not to reopen the controversy on the motives of Khrushchev's *volte-face* and its likely sequel, but to examine—in the light of what we know about the structure and evolution of the Soviet Communist regime—the contradictory assumptions about the nature and the limits to Khrushchev's power. Such an examination may help us in establishing some standards for drawing distinctions between legitimate hypotheses about internal Soviet developments (based, as they inevitably must be, on insufficient data), and what is properly called "demonology"—*i.e.*, the attempt to establish *unproven* policy shifts by reference to *unproven* conspiracies.

Historical Parallels

In what sense does a single-party dictatorship require a personal dictator? Official Communist (as distinct from fascist) doctrine has never admitted that need; according to the official formula, party dictatorship rests upon "democratic centralism"—the determination of party policy by elected congresses and central organs after democratic discussion, followed by their disciplined and unanimous execution under central control. In practice, Stalin in the late years of his rule largely dispensed with this fictitious formula, and ruled fairly openly as a despot; but Khrushchev, in denouncing Stalin's "abuses", pledged a return to Leninist observance of party rules—*i.e.*, to "democratic centralism." He has in fact called regular meetings of the full Central Committee, and has asserted that in the intervals decisions of the CC Presidium are taken by majority vote.

But while this clearly suggests that the possibility of frank discussion and temporary disagreement without serious risk has been restored in the leading party organs, it does not affect the ban on organized "factions," introduced by Lenin at the 10th CPSU Congress in 1921. Under this ban the minority of a leading party organ is not entitled to carry any dispute to the next broader organ and ultimately to the party congress; if it tries to do so, it automatically becomes guilty of "factionalism"—that is, of "anti-party" activity. By the same token, party members who disagree with the Central Committee's policy between congresses do not have the right to draw up a counterplatform for discussion at the next congress and to collect support for it. It follows, therefore, that all policy initiative is concentrated at the top, that the Central Committee is presented with prepared decisions by its Presidium, and the party congress by the Central Committee.

Any other practice would indeed spell deadly danger for a one-party regime: for once a monopolistic party permits the growth of a plurality of organized groups or wings in its own ranks, it becomes, in fact, a democratic multi-party regime under another name, and the advantages of its monopoly are gone. But any regime that wishes to mold society in a predetermined pattern into which it would not grow of its own accord—and that is the essence of both Leninism and Stalinism—must insist on the totalitarian principle of concentrating all power and initiative at a single point.

Soviet practice has consistently corresponded to this principle—in the last years of Lenin, during most of Stalin's reign, and also under Khrushchev—except in the two crises of succession. For it turned out that the kind of collective discipline which enables disagreements to remain confined within a small leading group depends on the concentration of power and authority in a single, undisputed leader. As soon as such a leader is lacking, every policy disagreement becomes linked with a struggle for his position among rival aspirants; and rivals in a struggle for dictatorial power do not keep to the rules of the party statutes. Hence the ban on factions was in fact wholly or partly ignored between 1923, when the struggle for Lenin's succession came into the open still in his lifetime, and 1928-29, when Stalin defeated the last openly organized group opposed to his policies and his leadership—the so-called "right opposition," led by Bukharin and Rykov. Only after each oppositional faction had been defeated was it condemned for its "factionalism."

Similarly, the death of Stalin was followed by several years of half-open factional maneuverings among the rival members of the "collective leadership," culminating in the First Secretary's successful appeal from a "factional" Presidium majority hostile to his policies to a plenary session of the Central Committee in June-July 1957. Until Khrushchev emerged as undisputed leader with the defeat of the "anti-party group" and the subsequent removal of Zhukov, the fundamental question of the party machine's supremacy over the police, the government and economic bureaucracy, and the army had itself been in doubt. The domination of a single political will over the potential pluralism of these power machines could not be ensured without its embodiment in a single leader, any more than could the party's own freedom from "factionalism."

In both succession crises the head of the party Secretariat—that is, the head of the executive machinery of

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the organization which embodies legitimate authority in the single-party state—emerged victorious. The reason for both victories is simple: as head of the Secretariat, Khrushchev is favored not only by the prestige of his office, but more importantly by the fact that the Secretariat is charged with preparing the meetings of the Presidium and presenting the facts to its members, with executing its decisions, and above all with the powers of appointment and publicity. Within the Secretariat, an executive organ, no voting takes place; there is only subordination and division of labor; he who dominates it is in a position—by virtue of his control of the press and radio—to influence the outcome of any factional struggle, to appoint regional and republican secretaries who will pack the next party congress with his supporters, and to arrange the composition of the next Central Committee according to his wishes. But once he has won the succession struggle and, by the aid of these organizational techniques, has emerged publicly as the new and acclaimed political leader, his power becomes both more vast and secure.

Khrushchev's Climb to Power

It is worth recalling the most important stages of this process in the case of Khrushchev. On March 14, 1953, when the collective of Stalin's heirs forced Malenkov to yield his position as secretary of the Central Committe, Khrushchev became the only representative of the Secretariat in the Presidium. During that year Khrushchev emerged as the policy-maker in the field of agriculture, as well as the power behind several key appointments in the party organization, and by the summer of 1954 he became strong enough to cause the party to be listed first in all pronouncements issued jointly with the government. In the autumn of 1954, Khrushchev went to Peking, taking along with him Bulganin and Mikoyan—but not Malenkov; and in February 1955, Malenkov was ousted from the premiership, following open attacks on his policies in the Soviet press.

At the 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956), Khrushchev felt strong enough to attack the dogma of Stalin's infallibility, and to influence decisively the composition of the new Central Committee. Nevertheless, the position of his rivals in the other segments of the bureaucracy—notably in the economic administration—was substantial enough to force the inclusion of their representatives in the party Presidium, thus confronting Khrushchev with a continuous opposition to his policies as well as to his drive for supreme power. It was only in the wake of the serious setback suffered by Khrushchev as a result of the Polish and Hungarian events that he managed (with the support of the party machine) to break the resistance of the economic bureaucracy, to win the decisive showdown against the majority in the Presidium, and—after defeating Marshal Zhukov's bid for greater army autonomy—to emerge finally as the supreme and unchallenged leader.

Until that time—*i.e.*, until the second half of 1957—Khrushchev's rise to one-man-leadership had been closely linked with the restoration of the preeminence of the party machine in all areas of Soviet life. Now, however, matters took a new turn as Khrushchev began to expand his direct influence in other power machines, and as his personal appointees increasingly took over top positions in the army, police, and the government apparatus. After the defeat of the "anti-party" group in the summer of 1957, the government under the untrustworthy Bulganin had almost ceased to function, with the inner cabinet of deputy prime ministers reduced to rudimentary proportions; by December, the supremacy of the party machine was visibly expressed in the numerical domination of the party Presidium by members of the Secretariat. In the spring of 1958, however, Khrushchev took over as premier and began rebuilding the "inner cabinet" to a point where it was no longer necessary to have all economic life controlled by the Secretariat. Accordingly, the Secretariat's numerical domination of the party Presidium was also reduced; moreover, the frequently absent leader has decided not to entrust all his varied powers to any single deputy, and has increasingly divorced his own creation, the Party Bureau for the RSFSR, from the Central Committee Secretariat.

The result of all these changes is that, following the latest reshuffle announced on May 4, 1960, the majority of the seats on the party Presidium are no longer held by the CC Secretariat alone, but by Khrushchev and three completely separate groups of his subordinates: four members from the Secretariat [1] (or five if Brezhnev, the new chief of state, is still counted); two members and two candidates from the RSFSR Party Bureau;[2] and four members from the government [3]—a total (with Khrushchev) of 11 out of 15 full Presidium members, not counting Brezhnev. This singular concentration of personal power in Khrushchev's hands—foreshadowed by the steady chorus of public eulogies for the "leader and teacher," the "continuator of Lenin," the "foremost

[1] Suslov, Kozlov, Mukhitdinov, Kuusinen.
[2] Aristov, Polyansky, Pospelov, Kirilenko.
[3] Mikoyan, Kosygin, Ignato, Furtseva.

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shockworker of the Soviet Union," and culminating in Kuusinen's recent (and quite unconstitutional) reference to Khrushchev as "head of the Soviet State"—would indicate that the simultaneous changes in the high command of the Soviet armed forces were part of the same process, outwardly symbolized by Khrushchev's affixing of his personal signature to the decree promoting 300 officers to the rank of general.

This record of Khrushchev's unremitting consolidation of power seems quite incompatible with the assumption that his leadership could still be seriously challenged at the present stage by any "neo-Stalinist" or "pro-Chinese" faction. Such a faction would have to start with an incomparably weaker base than the "anti-party group" which Khrushchev defeated in 1957—without control of any one of the great power machines, without the nationwide prestige of any of the old leaders, and with the whole accumulated force of the "Khrushchev cult" against it. In fact, assumptions about the formation of such a faction and its success in gaining a majority simply reflect a failure to distinguish between the conditions of an unresolved succession crisis, in which such developments may and indeed have occurred, and the conditions of firmly re-established one-man-leadership, which is the normal rule of life in the one-party state.

Pressures—Direct and Indirect

Yet if we make the opposite assumption—namely, that Khrushchev is the unchallenged successor of Lenin and Stalin as head of the party and state—it does not follow that his power is subject to no limitations whatsoever. If he is not in danger of being overthrown or put under tutelage by a majority of the Presidium, he still has to take account of the weight of social forces and the movement of opinion in the leading strata of society upon which his power is based.

It is by now a commonplace that any attempt to run the Soviet Union at its present stage of economic development by the methods of mass terrorism, an army of labor slaves, and so on, would be vastly more irrational than it was when Stalin first introduced these methods, and that Khrushchev is fully aware of this. But any regime that does not wish, or is unable, to achieve its aim by methods of mass terrorism has to take some account of the needs and desires of all the forces whose cooperation it requires. This is not necessarily—and in the Soviet Union not normally—a matter of conscious political pressure. The Soviet government grants wage increases not chiefly because it has reason to fear that the workers might go on strike, but because it wants to give them an incentive to work harder; it grants better prices to the *kolkhoz* peasants not because the latter have either made representations through party channels or formed secret organizations for sabotaging the harvest, but because it recognizes that this is a precondition for raising agricultural productivity after a quarter century of Stalinist stagnation. In just the same way, it must take into account the discontent in the officer corps, not because the high command sends ultimatums to Khrushchev or concludes an alliance with the alleged "neo-Stalinists" in the Presidium, but simply because the existence of high morale in the armed forces is of utmost concern to the regime.

The above distinction between the organized pressures which may be exercised on policy in a pluralistic society, or during a temporary crisis in a totalitarian society, and the social facts of life which the government of any modern society, however totalitarian and secure, must take into account, is not a mere conceptual nuance; the effects in each case are likely to be of a different order. Other things being equal, a working class organized in independent trade unions will be able to extract higher wages than those granted—as an incentive—by an all-powerful state to its state-controlled workers. Similarly, an army not subject to effective civilian control, either of a constitutional or of a totalitarian kind, may be able to dictate policy by threats; an army subordinated to the all-pervading control of a totalitarian party, if seriously discontented, may obtain an extra round of promotions and welfare measures combined with a liberal dose of rhetoric on matters affecting military prestige, but hardly more.

Recent developments in the USSR suggest the latter pattern rather than the former. There is no sign that the cuts in the armed forces, announced in January of this year, will be abandoned, despite the uneasiness they may well have caused in the officer corps. In addition, an increased stress on consumer goods was announced at the same session of the Supreme Soviet at which the U-2 incident was disclosed. Marshal Malinovsky, far from trying to exert pressure to reverse these policies by turning against their originator, has publicly praised both the policies and the man. All of which still would not exclude the possibility that the latest round of promotions, as well as Khrushchev's repeated threats *after* the U-2 flights had been stopped, may have been prompted by due concern about military morale.

But there may indeed be more direct limitations on Khrushchev's power. It is worth recalling that in the early days of the Soviet regime even Lenin occasionally found himself in the minority in his Central Committee

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—sometimes on vital questions such as the peace treaty with Germany in 1918—and chose temporarily to bow to the majority, even when he foresaw how heavy the cost would be, rather than risk forcing through policies before he could carry an overwhelmingly united leadership with him. Stalin, too, met effective delaying resistance to the expansion of his blood purge in the Central Committee as late as the autumn of 1936, after all opponents of his major policies had long disappeared from its ranks; only in the following spring did he feel ready to drive ahead ruthlessly and kill the resisters along with those they had tried to protect. Such temporary concessions to majorities, which express not a systematic opposition to the leader but a temporary climate of opinion in the leading party organs, are the inevitable price for maintaining the fiction of "democratic centralism," or in more realistic terms, for wishing to maintain a genuine exchange of opinions within the leading circle: when Stalin decided to do away with such concessions in principle, he also ended both the possibility of such discussion and the "democratic" fiction—and he became an undisguised despot, except in the eyes of some naive outsiders.

Power and Authority

Khrushchev, having restored the climate of top-level discussion among his supporters, must thus be prepared to be put into a minority occasionally—at least in matters of detail. For though he has prompted a "personality" cult at once vaster and more servile than Lenin would have tolerated, his real authority—as distinct from his power—is nevertheless still far inferior to that of the founder of the Soviet state, or for that matter, to that of the man who led Russia through the bitter years of forced collectivization and World War II. In short, Khrushchev disposes of all the levers of command, but he is not yet regarded as infallible within the inner circle.

This distinction between what may be termed mechanical power and moral authority is, in this author's opinion, as crucial to an understanding of the present stage in the evolution of the Soviet regime as the previous distinction drawn between the direct political pressures of social forces and their indirectly felt weight. One aspect of the present situation is Khrushchev's lack of historical achievement; ergo, his hunt for spectacular prestige successes abroad, or his proneness to a quick sequence of extravagant promises at home. If he fails to make good on any particular promise, whether in regard to overtaking the USA in meat consumption per head or to running the Western powers out of Berlin, he is not yet strong enough simply to drop the subject "down the memory hole," or to silence criticism by liquidating the critics. He is compelled instead to initiate a new and equally exciting venture, thus diverting attention from his previous failures.

Khrushchev *is* strong enough, however, to be beyond a serious challenge to his position. There is all the difference in the world between the hypothesis of an angry, disappointed mood in the Soviet leadership following the decline of prospects for a summit victory on Berlin, the U-2 incident, and President Eisenhower's assumption of responsibility for it—a mood to which Khrushchev would have had to pay attention in handling the situation—and the hypothesis of a hostile faction using that mood to send the leader who for years has acted as exclusive and plenipotentiary Soviet spokesman on world affairs to a crucial negotiation with detailed "instructions" removing his freedom of action, or having the power to reverse such instructions or to withdraw his negotiating powers after his back was turned. The first hypothesis assumes a common embarrassment of Khrushchev and his team at having been made to look foolish in their dispute with the Chinese Communists; the second assumes a majority of his team turning on him to tell him that the Chinese had been right and he had better admit it and adopt their policy. Both hypotheses might explain some aspects of Khrushchev's behavior during the critical days, but the first is compatible with what we know of the power situation in Russia, and the second is not. The latter amounts to assuming a head-on, deliberate challenge to Khrushchev's leadership which could only end either with his downfall or with the purging of his critics; and for the reasons indicated above such a reopening of the power struggle would be extremely difficult to conceive at the present stage.

Moreover, there is not a shred of real evidence to indicate a challenge on this scale. The record of recent events, and indeed of recent years, shows many illustrations of Khrushchev's eagerness to solidify his domestic authority and popularity by quick adjustments to changing situations; it shows none which prove uncertainty in his position. The two things should not be confused.

Some Methodological Questions

A final word on the canons for judging evidence about conflicts within the Soviet leadership. If we wish to interpret events as they are unfolding, it is clearly impossible to confine ourselves to documentation which is both official and explicit: none such will be forthcoming until a particular conflict is decided, and even

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then it most likely will be one-sided as well as fragmentary. This is particularly true insofar as the struggles among the aspirants for the next succession are concerned: there is no doubt that in Stalin's lifetime keen rivalry existed first between Zhdanov and Malenkov, and later between Malenkov and Khrushchev, but even today our knowledge of the issues and turning points is tenuous at best. Today, we may guess that the fall of Kirichenko, once Khrushchev's favorite within the party Secretariat, has been connected with similar rivalries—perhaps with a defeated attempt to extend his and his Ukrainian "clan's" influence to the RFSFR Party Bureau; but there is no direct documentation for that.

But while there is an extreme dearth of official and explicit documentation, one must be on guard against supplementing it liberally with information based on the private statements made by Soviet officials to Westerners, or even to Poles and Yugoslavs. Most, though of course not all, of these private statements are made for an immediate tactical purpose; while the official documents are studied inside the Soviet Communist party and government apparatus, the private statements can be made deliberately for their effect on Western opinion and policy. It follows, therefore, as an elementary rule of thumb, that official Soviet party documents, if read with due regard to the known element of ideological and propagandist distortion, are more trustworthy than almost all of the so-called "inside information" available to the West.

This means that if analysts wish to learn more than they are told, they must concentrate their attention above all on official documents, including public speeches, debates, resolutions, appointments, *etc.*, and study them for their hidden implications—as would, indeed, a trained Soviet Communist. There are, of course, risks in such a method, but they are smaller than the risks of believing in "confidential information" which may have been planted for outside consumption; also, they can be diminished by using the "decoding" method, not in isolation, but by relating it to known facts and general criteria of plausibility.

There is, however, one more rule: no serious struggle, however secret, can take place for any length of time without leaving identifiable traces in *some* public statement or political act of the protagonists. Thus, the prediction of a possible clash between Malenkov and Khrushchev was based on Malenkov's slighting remarks about Khrushchev's "agrotown" project at the 19th Party Congress in October 1952, and on Khrushchev's personal participation in the removal of Malenkov's Leningrad appointee, Andrianov, in the autumn of 1953. Similarly, the final clash between Khrushchev and his opponents in the party Presidium in the summer of 1957 was foreshadowed by the puzzling fact that in all the prior public discussions of Khrushchev's proposals for the reorganization of industrial planning, the Presidium and government members hitherto in charge of these matters had kept a solid front of silence.

Where such positive or negative evidence of conflict is wholly lacking, one is entitled to regard speculation as "demonology" in the proper sense of the term—namely, the construction of theories about invisible agents, theories which in their nature are not open to verification. This seems to apply to an extraordinary extent to the cycle of legends that in the past two years has grown around the person of Mikhail Suslov, who is widely described as the last identifiable "Stalinist" in the Presidium and Secretariat of the Central Committee and the presumed rallying point of the "neo-Stalinist"—or "pro-Chinese"—opposition to Khrushchev. Now there is some evidence that Suslov, who performed the same functions of ideological coordination under Zhdanov and Malenkov in Stalin's lifetime as he is performing now, has been less in a hurry than some younger Presidium members to join in public eulogies for Khrushchev. But it is also a documented fact that he was among the first of the leaders to make a public criticism of Stalin at the 20th Congress, and that he belonged to the minority of Presidium members who stood by Khrushchev against the "Old Stalinists" in the crisis of June 1957, in fact presiding over the Central Committee meeting that expelled them. His reputation as a "neo-Stalinist" appears to have stemmed from Yugoslav accounts of the international conference of Communist parties in Moscow in November 1957, at which gathering Suslov was responsible for pushing through the new doctrinaire theses that the Poles found difficult and the Yugoslavs found impossible to accept. Yet there has never been any evidence at all that this was not also Khrushchev's policy; and there is to this day not a single policy speech or article by Suslov which shows disagreement with Khrushchev. That he is a man of very different character and temper from the First Secretary, and has a very different way of doing things, may readily be granted; but surely this is hardly enough reason for imagining him to be the center of an opposing group in the absence of any proof of policy differences.

It is not the purpose of these remarks to discourage speculation on Soviet internal politics, which is inevitable owing to the insufficiency of direct documentation, and

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in many cases highly legitimate. Rather, the author would like to see some of this speculation directed into more fruitful and promising channels. If Khrushchev's position is reasonably secure, then the struggle for influence over him and for his eventual succession must be in process. The fall of Kirichenko and the signs of a general decline of Ukrainian influence at Moscow headquarters may be part of this struggle; so may be the stricter separation of the Central Committee Secretariat and the RSFSR Party Bureau, as well as the simultaneous rise of a number of men with shorter or longer backgrounds in the Leningrad party organization, including Kozlov, Kosygin, and Ignatov. These moves do not lend themselves easily to dramatic assumptions about implications for foreign policy, but they are facts; and they may well be the sort of facts that will determine the lineup for the next *real* power struggle in Russia—the struggle for Khrushchev's eventual succession.

The Struggle Goes On

By Robert Conquest

IT HAS VERY WIDELY and plausibly been reported that Khrushchev's break-up of the summit meeting was in some way connected with a struggle within the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. That some such struggle is going on had already been indicated by the dismissal of Alexei Kirichenko, until January the second most powerful man in the country, and one of Khrushchev's oldest and closest associates. What has, on the whole, been missing is a rational consideration of who is struggling with whom. There seems good reason to believe that in the last two or three years the fight in the Kremlin has focussed on an attempt by Khrushchev to attain complete freedom of action by destroying the last center of power opposed to him—the group of permanent party officials who were his allies against his previous rivals, but who are not his personal appointees and are not willing to serve him blindly.

References to "Stalinists" in positions of power have been both vague and unconvincing, particularly in view of the defeat of the main "Stalinist" enemies in 1957; for if Khrushchev was capable of dealing with giants like Malenkov and Molotov, why would he find it so difficult to remove their less powerful cohorts? If we are to believe that Khrushchev is in fact having great difficulties, we must assume that the common view is wrong, and that he never did succeed in imposing himself completely. There is considerable evidence for this. But how did the other view arise?

In the first place, Khrushchev was seen as First Secretary and leader of the party apparatus in its struggle in turn against representatives of all the other sources of power: the police (in the person of Lavrenti Beria), the state and economic leadership (in the persons of Vyacheslav Molotov, Georgi Malenkov, and others), and the army (in the person of Marshal Georgi Zhukov). He was thus seen as rising to supreme power, like Stalin, as as result of his leadership of and grip on the party machine. When party officials such as Averky Aristov or Nikolai G. Ignatov were promoted and finally brought into the Presidium itself, they were almost always referred to as Khrushchev appointees.

But such a view neglected one important aspect of Stalin's attainment of supremacy—namely, the fact that

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he not only had mastered all the other sources of power, but had also reduced the party apparatus itself to a mere appendage of his personal secretariat. Khrushchev, on the other hand, used the party apparatus to destroy the others but he has not yet imposed his personal control on the *apparatchiks* themselves. From the organizational point of view, therefore, we can identify the major factor in the struggle that has evidently been going on over the past few years as an attempt by Khrushchev himself to impose his own personal following upon the party machine, against the strong and frequently effective resistance by the regular *apparatchiks*.

Policies and Personalities

If we are to accept this interpretation, we must conclude that policy disputes in the ordinary sense, however important, play only a secondary role in the struggle for power. When Stalin was fighting for final victory against his opponents in the early 1930's, Vasil Kolarov, the Bulgarian Secretary of the Comintern, told Palmiro Togliatti and Ignazio Silone, then leading delegates of the Italian CP, who were arguing the merits of certain policies, that the question of whether this or that policy should be adopted was basically irrelevant. The real question, he said, was who was for, and who against Stalin. (In this connection, it is also worthwhile to remember that Stalin adopted many of Trotsky's policies *after* the latter had been politically destroyed, partly on grounds of having defended these very policies.)

And as in the past, so in the present: the implication that the struggle is waged between people representing "Stalinist" policies on the one hand, and those representing "liberal" policies on the other, simply does not stand under close inspection. Indeed, the entire leadership seems equally committed to the view expressed by the Soviet Assistant Procurator General to Professor Harold Berman of Harvard University: "If it becomes necessary, we shall restore the old methods. But I think it will not be necessary." [1] To be sure, "liberal" policies may often result in fiascos, and then the faction responsible for them will be blamed by its opponents. For example, Khrushchev, who did more than anyone else to bring "destalinization" to fruition, contrived to place a good deal of the responsibility for the excesses of the cultural "thaw" period (1956-57) on Dmitry Shepilov, who fell with Malenkov. Such examples are legion.

What, then, are the essential points at issue within the Soviet leadership? We may assume that the logic of Khrushchev's position impels him to undertake certain courses. First of all, as the leading figure, he must try to insure his irremovability and the adoption of his policies. This, in turn, is bound to produce resistance from secondary leaders who wish to retain the power to influence policy. It would perhaps not be going too far to see such considerations as the main dynamic of Soviet politics.

What Is in a Label?

An issue which came to the fore immediately after Khrushchev's victory over the "anti-party group" in June 1957 makes this clear. For the victors were not united and did not put through a truly "Khrushchevite" policy. Even the decree expelling the fallen leaders from the Central Committee was a compromise: though referring to the possibility of their expulsion from the party, it did not go as far as to impose it. Nor were all those who had opposed Khrushchev removed. Nikolai Bulganin kept his position, and two others of the anti-Khrushchev majority in the Presidium, Mikhail Pervukhin and Maxim Saburov, were only slightly demoted.

Khrushchev's speeches in the two months following are even more indicative. Several times he referred publicly to the responsibility of Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich for criminal activities in the 1930's and 1940's, in connection with the various purges. Apart from one speech by Nikolai Shvernik, however, he was supported by no other member of the Presidium except Zhukov. Such accusations had evidently been made within the Central Committee, but without a decision that legal action be taken. Khrushchev's public attacks can scarcely be interpreted as anything but an attempt to agitate for the arrest of his rivals in spite of the decision to the contrary. Here again, his position had its logic: "Stone dead hath no fellow."

In March 1958 Bulganin was removed from the premiership. Yet between this event and his final expulsion from the Presidium two plenary sessions of the Central Committee took place. During the first few weeks in November he was publicly named as a member of the "anti-party group"; however, his confession (which was judged inadequate by a number of Khrushchev's supporters) did not come until a month later. This long, drawn-out struggle seems to show that a stubborn defense was being put up. In fact, Bulganin's accomplices, Pervukhin and Saburov, were publicly denounced for the first time at the 21st Congress of the party, held in January-February 1959. And even *then* their denunciation was abortive: although calls were

[1] *Yale Law Journal*, New Haven, Conn., July 1957.

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made by junior adherents of the First Secretary for the expulsion of Bulganin, Pervukhin and Saburov from the Central Committee, they all remained in their positions. (Pervukhin, indeed, is still—as of May 1960—a candidate member of the Presidium.)

During this same period—November 1958-February 1960—there were further attacks on the original members of the "anti-party group," some of which contained references to "criminal activities." [2] Khrushchev himself spoke in December of the inappropriateness of calling the members of the group by the party-title "Comrade." Similarly, in January 1959, on the eve of the Congress, Spiridonov, the party's first secretary in Leningrad, referred to Malenkov's "crimes."

This leads us to another very striking question. Spiridonov, holding one of the most important posts of the party, had not been advanced even to the position of candidate member of the Central Committee. The same could be said of others among Khrushchev's recent appointees, such as I. I. Kuzmin, then head of the State Planning Commission. There were a number of vacancies in the Central Committee and under the party statutes these can be filled by co-option. That they were not filled points to an active policy on the part of a majority of the Central Committee of resisting further intrusions of "Khrushchevites." This is further reflected by the nature of the 21st Congress, which was neither regular nor "Extraordinary," but a type not provided for in the statutes, called "Special." The only way it differed from the two legitimate types was that there was no provision for it to elect a new Central Committee.

At the Congress itself the main area of dispute was evidently around the fate of the "anti-party group." At the December 1958 plenum of the Central Committee, Bulganin's confession was publicly attacked as inadequate by a junior adherent of Khrushchev's, Kolushchinsky. According to Kolushchinsky, Bulganin's grievous error consisted in saying no worse of Molotov and Kaganovich than that they were ignorant and incompetent, and of Malenkov that he was an intriguer capable of any vileness: it was necessary to state, said Kolushchinsky, that the group was also "treacherous" and "conspiratorial." A similar differentiation was made in the journal *Voprosy Filosofii* (Problems of Philosophy).[3]

Yet the majority of speakers at the 21st Congress contented themselves with the milder line—indeed, some of them used no adjectives at all, simply referring to the "anti-party group" and its political mistakes. It seems clear that the congress was the climax of an attempt to proceed further against the group and that this attempt was blocked. Who contrived to block it?

Khrushchev's Opponents

Who, in fact, were the powerful figures able to prevent Khrushchev from proceeding further with the attempt to extend his power? As was noted above, a number of leading figures in the party apparatus cannot be regarded as "Khrushchevites" pure and simple, even though they had allied themselves with the First Secretary in the struggle against Malenkov. Here we can begin to differentiate. It is impossible to say, of course, that any given figure has not, in spite of his previous career, become a devoted supporter of the First Secretary, but reasons may be adduced why a number of them may not have done this. The only members of the party Presidium of 1957-1960 whose careers had been really closely bound up with Khrushchev's for a number of years were Alexei Kirichenko, Leonid Brezhnev, and Ekaterina Furtseva. Their rise to positions of importance had taken place entirely under the auspices of their patron. On the other hand, Mikhail Suslov, Averky Aristov, Frol Kozlov, Nikolai G. Ignatov, Otto Kuusinen, and others had reached high positions independently of his sponsorship. Nikolai Belyaev and Nuritdin Mukhitdinov were in a more or less intermediate position, having attained membership in the Central Committee independently of Khrushchev but reaching posts of real importance under his aegis. In addition to these *apparatchiks,* the Presidium also included figures without access to real sources of power but at least disposing of the votes and voices, like Anastas Mikoyan, Kliment Voroshilov, and Shvernik. It is impossible at present to translate these backgrounds into a definite up-to-date alignment but it is clear that some alignment must exist —even though, as in the past, the alignment may be subject to frequent and dramatic changes.

In fact, throughout Soviet postwar politics one can distinguish between minor careers closely tied up with the rise and fall of major figures and those who seem to have carried on virtually unaffected by decisive events at the top. The loyalties of this latter group seem to have been not to Andrei Zhdanov, or Malenkov, or Khrushchev, but to the party apparatus in general, and perhaps to some basic ideas of Stalin.

In 1959 the struggle apparently entered an intensive phase. The first blow appears to have been struck in March when the Moscow first secretary, Ivan Kapitonov,

[2] For instance, Rudenko, the Procurator General, attacked the anti-party group for its "criminal violations of Soviet legality": *Pravda,* December 26, 1958.

[3] No. 2, 1959.

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head of a delegation to the Congress which had been particularly moderate in its attitude toward the "anti-party group," was removed together with a member of his bureau, N. F. Ignatov. In the same month, one of Khrushchev's Ukrainian supporters, V. Semichastny, was made head of the important Party Organs Department of the Central Committee, which controls appointments throughout the country. In April, N. G. Ignatov was transferred to the decorative post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. During this time, it may be added, the issue of the "anti-party group" and its activities was kept before the party membership by various articles in papers and magazines.

The autumn and winter saw a remarkable change. Semichastny was replaced. Kapitonov and N. F. Ignatov reappeared in fairly important positions (as provincial first secretaries). In November, N. G. Ignatov gave up his RSFSR position allegedly to devote himself to his duties in the Central Committee. In December Belyaev was publicly attacked by Khrushchev for agricultural troubles in Kazakhstan (where there had also been strikes and other unpublicized upsets). In January he was demoted to the local party secretaryship at Stavropol, and very recently it was announced that he had been dismissed even from that insignificant post.

IN JANUARY another, much more striking event took place: Kirichenko was appointed first secretary in the provincial town of Rostov. This implied the political destruction of Khrushchev's closest and most powerful associate. Though technically ranking fourth (after Khrushchev, Voroshilov, and Mikoyan) in most honorary listings, Kirichenko was undoubtedly the second most powerful man in the land. He had risen under Khrushchev during the latter's long tenure as party secretary in the Ukraine, and, already a member of the party Presidium, had become the second senior member of the Secretariat in December 1957, thus eclipsing Suslov. At the 21st Congress he alone of all the party figures had made a speech not confined to a particular area of responsibility but touching on all of the important political issues. It is impossible to determine the reason, or even the pretext for his fall. It seems possible that he may have been blamed in one way or another for inadequate supervision of a number of peripheral republics, where purges for bourgeois nationalism had been taking place since about mid-1959. The fact remains, however, that he had been a steadfast supporter of Khrushchev, and that his downfall very likely signified a setback for the latter.

On May 4, 1960 *Pravda* briefly announced the results of a Central Committee Plenum convened for the purpose of dealing with organizational questions. The removal of Kirichenko and Belyaev from the Presidium and Secretariat was announced. At the same time, Furtseva was transferred from the Secretariat to the Ministry of Culture and shortly afterwards Brezhnev was appointed President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, replacing Voroshilov, who retired. This seems to have marked a further weakening of Khrushchev's grip on the party machine. However, it is plainly no final victory for any definite anti-Khrushchev line, as two of the three newly promoted members of the party Presidium, Nikolai Podgorny and Dmitry Polyansky, were as closely associated with Khrushchev as the two who had been dismissed.

The Struggle Goes On

All the indications point to an important political crisis which developed at least not later than during the initial downgrading of Belyaev and Kirichenko in January of this year. There is nothing to connect the fall of these two with foreign policy, and the available evidence suggests that the disputes pertained to internal matters. The sudden switch in the foreign policy line came only with the inflation of the U-2 incident and the torpedoing of the summit conference. Yet this shift was so violent that it is inconceivable that it could have been made by a simultaneous and unanimous change of mind on the part of the members of the Presidium. No objective change of any substance had come over the international situation. The U-2 incident was, of course, eminently exploitable and conceivably provided ammunition for proponents of a tougher line, but it did not in itself provide any real motive for a change in Soviet policy.

The changes announced on May 4th did not affect anybody concerned particularly with foreign policy matters. And Khrushchev's original attitude to the Paris Conference, though uncooperative, was yet not consistent with the idea of wrecking it before it started. The basic change on this issue seems to have taken place after the May plenum. It may well be that at this point the partially victorious *apparatchiks* decided to intensify their offensive against Khrushchev, by an assault on his concept of "summitry" in general. It can also be reasonably assumed that there may be a connection between internal troubles in Kazakhstan and the development of peaceful relations with foreign countries. That this is not far-fetched is borne out by what we know about the

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deleterious influence of the "Geneva spirit" five years ago—an influence that resulted in a distinct drop of the "ideological morale" of the Soviet population. The very same thing may well have resulted in the wake of the "Camp David spirit."

ALL IN ALL, while Khrushchev seems not to have seized full personal power and defeated his opponents, the fact remains that the *apparatchiks* are not in a position to remove him either. It is possible, therefore, that they will attempt to hold the line, using his talents as far as possible for their own ends. Moreover, there would be no obvious advantage in removing him if, as seems probable, any successor would be prompted by the logic of his position to seek the same supremacy that Khrushchev has been striving for in the past few years.

By the same token, the dynamics of the situation will obviously impel Khrushchev to make further efforts to gain control. The 22nd Congress, due in 1961, will presumably be empowered to elect a new Central Committee. For this reason, it may well become a critical point in the struggle. But this is true only from the public point of view. In practice whoever controls a decisive majority of the Central Committee, the Presidium, and the Secretariat can control the composition of the congress, and in any case dictate the resolutions and the list of candidates which go before it. The removal of Kirichenko appears as a precaution taken in good time to deny Khrushchev the ability to dictate, and hence at least to force him into compromise. However, precisely what will happen cannot, of course, be foretold. All we can say is that the struggle for power—the hallmark of Soviet politics—is bound to go on.

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Yugoslavia: A Political Glimpse

By Immanuel Birnbaum

TO DIRECT ATTENTION to Yugoslavia at a time when all eyes are again fastened on the conflicts between the opposing blocs of Great Powers may seem whimsical. Admittedly, from the military-political standpoint, a country without its own nuclear capability does not count for much nowadays; nor is the Yugoslav market of major interest economically, except to a few nearby exporting countries. Finally, in the ideological sphere, it is readily apparent that the ideas and policies enunciated from Belgrade are no longer exerting the strong influence in the countries of the Soviet East European orbit that they did during the great ferment of 1956.

Nevertheless, three facts lend international significance to the recent development of Yugoslav policy. Firstly, Yugoslavia's own distinctive type of Communist system has continued to function in spite of all difficulties. Secondly, its forms have moved still farther away from the Soviet model in many details. Thirdly and most importantly, Yugoslav policies have won new friendships abroad which, in many respects, serve to take the place of the now waning ideological influence of Belgrade in Eastern Europe.

The very name that the Communist organization in Yugoslavia bears today is symbolic of the regime's determination to preserve Yugoslavia's individuality and independence as a Communist state. In the early 1950's the Yugoslav Communists defied Moscow by casting aside the standard "Communist Party" label and have since called themselves officially the "League of Communists of Yugoslavia." It is interesting to note that this change reflected the early influence of the ideas of Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav Communist ideologist whose subsequent total break with communism has resulted in his imprisonment by the Tito regime. Djilas, extending to a critical appraisal of Yugoslav development under communism the same logic which underlay Yugoslav Communist charges of the "degeneration" of Soviet communism into "rule by bureaucrats," urged that bureaucratic tendencies in Yugoslavia be curbed, and even that the functions of the party be reduced. In deference to this point of view, the 1952 change in the name of the Yugoslav Communist organization was supposed to signify that its future role would become more that of political educator than of wielder of ruling power. In practice, however, the titular change did not lead to any significant curtailment of the League's authority. The veteran party theoretician Moshe Pijade (since deceased) —Tito's ideological preceptor during their prison days together before World War II, and translator of Marx's works into Serbian—intimated the reason for this with the remark that "we [the party organization] have no intention of committing political suicide."

Mr. Birnbaum's earlier report on Yugoslavia, "Whither Tito?" appeared in the January-February 1958 issue of this journal. Soviet and East European analyst for the Munich newspaper, Süd-Deutsche Zeitung, *he is a frequent visitor to Yugoslavia and is personally acquainted with some of its foremost political leaders.*

Political Division of Labor

Nevertheless, the Communist League has since turned over some important political functions to the Socialist Alliance of Yugoslav Working People (SAYWP), the successor organization to the pre-1953 People's Front. Not only is the Alliance the largest and most important mass organization in Yugoslavia, but it also differs somewhat in character from similarly-named organizations in other Communist countries. According to reports presented at its Fifth Congress in Belgrade last April,[1] the SAYWP now boasts approximately six million individual members, in addition to the labor unions, women's and youth organizations, and other groups which are

[1] The author was then in Belgrade and observed the proceedings of the congress. The present article records some of the impressions gained during this visit to Yugoslavia.

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affiliated with it *en bloc*. This means that just about every third citizen of the country, whose present total population numbers something over 18 million, is an individual member of the SAYWP, though the majority of Yugoslavs commonly belong to two or three overlapping organizations. On the other hand, the non-Communist left-wing parties which at first were allowed to coexist alongside the Communists—the Croatian Peasants' League, the Serbian Democrats, *etc.*—have atrophied and no longer play any role in Yugoslav political life.

A distinctive feature of the SAYWP is that, to join it, one need make no formal profession of political faith, but merely declare his willingness to collaborate in the "socialist construction of the country." Consequently, its membership takes in many citizens who never could bring themselves to embrace communism and who would, in any case, have had no prospect of being accepted into the Communist party organization—such, for instance, as clergymen of all denominations, former high-ranking officials of non-Marxist political parties, and members of the bourgeois professional class.

Even though the Communists firmly control the SAYWP leadership, where the role of the non-Communist members is largely ornamental, it is noteworthy that this broadly representative mass organization is entrusted with important political functions. It plays a significant and active part, for example, in the conduct of elections to Yugoslav organs of self-government, in many cases putting forward its own candidates. It also fills a highly useful role in certain areas of the regime's external contacts, the reason for this being that many workers' organizations in the West which would shy away from direct contacts with the Yugoslav Communist League find it less objectionable to send delegates, or at least observers, to the congresses of the SAYWP. At the last congress, for instance, representatives of such moderate Western parties as the Swiss Social Democrats appeared alongside Left Socialist delegates from Italy, France and elsewhere, and there was even a silent observer from the German Social Democratic Party, in the person of a member of the Bundestag.

But if there is a division of organizational functions between the Communist League and the Socialist Alliance of Yugoslav Working People, no division is possible when it comes to political goals. The goals of the SAYWP are necessarily identical with those of the Communist League, which determines them. In contrast to the mass character of the SAYWP, the League is a political elite organization of only about 900,000 members, who nevertheless virtually monopolize all key public offices in Yugoslavia, including the leading positions in the SAYWP.

Communist direction of the SAYWP was readily apparent at its April congress, where the speakers' table was occupied by practically the same personalities as would preside at a regular congress of the party organization. Seated in the highest place of honor on the dais above his faithtful subordinates was Marshal Tito himself, who—as chief of state, Secretary General of the Communist League, Chairman of the SAYWP, and last but not least as Commander-in-Chief of the Army—firmly grasps in his own hands all the key reins of power. Now sixty-eight, Marshal Tito has to some extent relieved himself of day-to-day political duties and spends most of the year far from the capital, at his island retreat of Brioni off the Adriatic coast. This has resulted in the transfer from Belgrade to Brioni of some state functions and top-level poltical business. Thus, for example, when Indonesia's President Sukarno paid his state visit to Yugoslavia in the spring of this year, his official reception took place entirely at Brioni and he did not go to the capital at all. It is noteworthy in this connection that Tito has chosen as his chief executive aide, who goes wherever he goes, the experienced diplomat Dr. Leo Mates—former Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and onetime Ambassador to Washington and the UN.

Tito's Adjutants

Flanking President Tito to left and right at the SAYWP congress were Vice-Presidents Edvard Kardelj and Aleksander Rankovic, who sometimes alternated with him in the chair. (Two other party officials also hold vice-presidential rank but play only minor roles in the Communist League leadership compared to the two just mentioned.) Both men are quite a bit younger than Tito—Kardelj barely 50, Rankovic just past 49—and each represents an entirely different type of Communist political leader.

Kardelj, a Slovene, started his career as a public school teacher and later served as a professor at the training center for foreign Communist officials in Moscow, a background which gave him a strong predilection toward doctrinal interests. As the principal author of the comprehensive program adopted by the Communist League of Yugoslavia at its Seventh Congress at Ljubljana in April 1958,[2] Kardelj became the chief spokes-

[2] The text of the program was published in Belgrade as an official document in 1958, also in English, French and German translation.

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man for the Yugoslav party in the ideological debate with Moscow and Peking that grew out of this document—and he proved himself fully capable of meeting his Soviet and Chinese Communist adversaries on their own ground. However, this sober-minded Slovene is not just a learned expounder of Leninist doctrine; he also is keenly perceptive of social and economic facts, and he lets them speak for themselves. His most recent book, dealing with the agrarian question, is illustrative of his way of thinking.[3]

The Serbian Rankovic is a totally different kind of Communist. He originally joined the movement as a young mechanic and forged his way to the top level of the leadership via practical party and administrative work. After 1945 he held key posts in the state security organization, but more recently has divested himself of direct responsibility for these unpopular tasks. Even during the years when he occupied a cabinet post, Rankovic worked assiduously to round out his own education and only recently passed the bar examination. One of his current responsibilities is to oversee the development of Yugoslavia's as yet embryonic atomic industry. At the SAYWP Congress last April, he was elevated to the post of Secretary General of the organization in place of Kardelj, who was said to be overburdened with political duties.

Kardelj enjoys his greatest popularity among the Communists of his native Slovenia, while at the same time he is respected throughout the party as its foremost doctrinal authority. Similarly, Rankovic's strongest support comes from the Serbian branch of the party, though he also controls important segments of the political organization for the country as a whole. In Croatia, the most popular party leader—after Tito, of course—is Dr. Vladimir Bakaric, who heads the Communist organization of that republic within the Yugoslav federal state.

Son of a highly-placed member of the prewar Yugoslav judiciary and himself a trained lawyer, Bakaric has in recent years acted as spokesman for the moderate viewpoint in various clashes of opinion within the Communist leadership. For example, on behalf of his Croatian party adherents, he opposed the policies of radical experimentation in agriculture which were advocated by some Serbian functionaries. Again, in regard to the regulation of state-church relations, Bakaric fully recognized the need to guard against the exercise of political influence by the Roman Catholic hierarchy, but coupled this with advocacy of a governmental policy of passive tolerance toward the various churches in order to achieve peaceful relations.

Peace with the Church

The crux of the religious problem in Yugoslavia lies in relations with the Roman Catholic Church. The Tito regime has had no serious difficulties with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which is accustomed to subordinating itself to the secular authority of Belgrade; nor has it had any problem in dealing with the Mohammedan clergy, who nowhere in Yugoslavia command the spiritual allegiance of more than a minority of the population. The Roman Catholic Church, on the other hand, embraces the great majority of the population of

[3] Besides publication in Yugoslavia in Serbian and Croatian, the book has also appeared in French translation under the title, *Les problemes de la politique socialiste dans les campagnes* (Problems of Socialist Agrarian Policy), Editions La Nef de Paris.

KAKVU BISTE NACRTALI KARIKATURU KAD BI JEDNOG DANA SVIJET BIO MIRAN I RAZORUŽAN?



A YUGOSLAV COMMENT

Caption: What sort of cartoon would you draw if the world became one day peaceful and disarmed?

—From Oslobodenjo (Belgrade), May 1-3, 1960.

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Croatia and Slovenia, and it has been a source of tension if for no other reason than that the recently deceased Primate of Yugoslavia, Archbishop Stepinac of Zagreb, was accused by the Tito regime of having collaborated with the Croatian puppet state set up during the war by Ante Pavelic with the blessings of Hitler and Mussolini. There is little doubt that the Communist charges of collaboration against Archbishop Stepinac, of which he was found guilty in a postwar political trial, were greatly exaggerated. Stepinac belonged to that wing of the Croatian clergy which before the war accepted the principle of a united Yugoslav state, albeit under a monarchy as it was at that time; furthermore, to the extent that this was possible during the war, he spoke out against the fascist methods of the Ustashi, whose leader Pavelic was. The Communist regime was unwilling to relent, however, and the severe prison sentence imposed on Stepinac for his alleged collaboration with the Croatian separatists made him a martyr in the eyes of many of his co-religionists, as well as of the Papal See.

Although released from prison a few years ago (before the expiration of his term), Stepinac was restricted to his native village until his recent death. The more intransigent among the Croatian Communists did not even wish to permit his mortal remains to be brought back to the archepiscopal see of Zagreb for interment, but this was made possible through the last-minute personal intervention of Dr. Bakaric. Consequently, visitors to the medieval cathedral in Zagreb can see pious worshippers lighting votive candles and praying at the tomb of the archbishop who suffered martyrdom at the hands of the Communist state. His successor, appointed by the Pope, received a formal expression of good wishes from Bakaric upon his installation in office, and has been permitted to journey to Rome on several occasions in recent years. These developments leave little doubt of the regime's desire to place its relations with the Roman Catholics, as well as with the other churches, on a peaceable basis.

Experimentation in Agriculture

While the regime's conciliation efforts toward the Catholic Church indicate some liberalization of its cultural policies, they are not the product of any basically new decision. Such a decision, however, cannot be sidestepped by the Tito regime as far as its future agricultural policy is concerned. To be sure, Yugoslavia today is no longer the predominantly agricultural country that it was ten years ago. Nearly half of its gainfully employed population is now engaged in work other than agriculture. Industry, wholesale trade and the bulk of retail trade, banking, and transportation were completely nationalized immediately after the Communists seized power, and subsequent economic reforms only loosened the operational structure without modifying public ownership in these areas. The greater part of agriculture, on the contrary, remains in the hands of peasants who privately own their land.

By a law adopted in 1953, private land ownership was limited to a maximum of 10 hectares (24 acres) of useful land. Moreover, shortly before this date, the peasants were permitted to withdraw from production cooperatives, with the result that small, primitive farms, incapable of development by their own resources, now predominate throughout most of the country. The former Serbian and Croatian big farmers, who possessed well-developed technological knowledge as well as the necessary capital to improve their farms, have been supplanted by much less experienced former agricultural workers and impoverished cottagers, while the large farms formerly owned by Hungarian landed proprietors and wealthy German farmers in the important agricultural regions of northern Serbia and Croatia have been replaced by state-operated enterprises which, in the beginning, often suffered from untrained management.

Thus a number of basic problems remain unsolved in Yugoslav agriculture, and wide-ranging experimentation in this field is still continuing. (This, incidentally, is no longer true of Yugoslav industry where the period of experimentation, begun around 1950 with administrative decentralization and measures for associating workers in plant management, already ended a few years ago. The new system has found its level of adjustment,[4] and production is now rising rapidly, both quantitatively and qualitatively, with minimal fluctuations; in fact, during the last few years, Yugoslavia's rate of industrial growth has exceeded that of the Soviet Union.)

It is now hoped that progress can also be made in agriculture by replacing the tightly organized production cooperatives, which the peasants view with deep suspicion, with specialized, functional cooperatives such as credit unions, purchasing and marketing cooperatives, stock raising cooperatives, and so forth. But it is the so-called "general cooperatives" that the regime is pro-

[4] See M. Bogosavljevic and M. Pesakovic, *La gestion ouvriere d'une usine* (Workers' Management of a Factory), Editions Jugoslavija, Belgrade, 1960. This excellent monograph (also published in English translation) describes the model system at the Rade Koncar electrical engineering plant and gives a good idea of the functioning of worker self-management in Yugoslavia.

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moting most assiduously. These combine a number of tasks in their scope of activity, and at the same time their members are allowed to retain private ownership of their land, animals, buildings and hand implements. The general cooperatives receive generous financial assistance from the state for the procurement of expensive equipment, thus resulting in special benefits for peasants who accept the government's agricultural program.

This compromise solution between agrarian socialism and private farm ownership is similar to the approach now practiced in Poland, and the Yugoslav general cooperatives may be compared in some of their basic features, though not in all details, with the Polish "agricultural circles." This path toward modern forms of agricultural production is in any case more humane than the forced socialization just recently completed in the Communist-ruled part of Germany and soon to be concluded in Czechoslovakia also. It remains an open question, however, how successful the Yugoslav formula will prove in terms of production technology. Vice-President Kardelj sounded a warning note in this regard when he pointed out that the Soviet Union at present has about five tractors for each 1,000 hectares of land, and Czechoslovakia about six, as compared to barely more than two for an equivalent land area in Yugoslavia. It is true, of course, that many parts of Yugoslavia—such, for example, as the Alpine region of Slovenia or the narrow cultivable strips of coastline between the arid limestone mountains of Dalmatia and the sea—present very limited, if any, opportunities for large-scale farming. Also, the attitude of the agricultural population toward collectivism varies greatly, and usually inversely to the suitability of their land for large-scale farming. Thus it is the poor peasants of mountainous Macedonia, rather than the relatively rich farmers tilling the fertile plains of the Voyvodina and Croatian Slavonia, who are more willing to work within a cooperative framework. Thanks to unusually favorable weather conditions, the 1959 growing and harvesting season produced record crops, which temporarily eased Yugoslavia's agricultural problem. But such felicitous circumstances cannot be counted upon always.

Better External Relations

Thanks to the gratifying progress of recent years in the development of its domestic economy, Yugoslavia's economic dependence on foreign countries—and hence its vulnerability to external political pressures—have been reduced. The Soviet bloc has not renewed the economic blockade that was enforced against Yugoslavia from the time of Stalin's 1948 rupture with Tito until the Khrushchev-Tito reconciliation of 1955; however, since the new cooling-off of relations between Moscow and Belgrade, Yugoslavia has not been receiving very friendly economic treatment at the hands of most of the bloc countries, particularly the Soviet Union, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, and even—for some time now—Poland. (Belgrade has not been permitted to send even an observer to meetings of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, the chief Soviet bloc organ for economic cooperation.) Nevertheless, between 25 and 28 percent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade is still carried on with East European countries, while Western Europe accounts for 50 percent, and North and South American countries for 10-12 percent.

Yugoslavia's international financial position is also improved. The government has managed to repay most of the economic assistance loans which were extended by the West during the period of the country's greatest difficulties, and it now experiences no trouble in obtaining medium-term trade credits when new orders for goods are placed abroad. Yugoslavia even maintains normal trade, payments and travel relations with the German Federal Republic despite Bonn's action three years ago severing diplomatic relations with Belgrade because of Tito's decision to exchange ambassadors with East Germany. In fact, tourists from West Germany top the numerical list of foreign visitors to Yugoslavia.

Relations with Yugoslavia's immediate neighbors have recently been marked by a continued strengthening of economic contacts and an easing of political tensions. The adjacent "People's Democracies" of Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria have avoided any new incidents along their borders with Yugoslavia, and commercial traffic across these frontiers is fairly normal; only with Communist Albania have there been continued sharp differences. Yugoslavia is also on better terms than formerly with its non-Communist neighbors. Since the settlement of the conflict over Trieste, Italy has entered into lively trade relations with Yugoslavia and hopes shortly to win first place in the Yugoslav import market. With Austria, the few remaining points of dispute in regard to outstanding financial claims dating from an earlier period and the legal status of the small Slovenian minority in the Austrian province of Carinthia are now on the way to an amicable settlement. Yugoslavia and the NATO country of Greece are today linked in a truly close friendship, their collaboration being in part a residue of the former Balkan Pact, and in part inspired, probably, by their mutual antagonism toward troublesome Albania. (The Balkan Pact, which included

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Turkey, has lost its military significance and practically ceased to be effective as a consequence of the Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus.)

Despite these generally smooth relations with neighboring countries, Yugoslavia, ostracized by the Sino-Soviet bloc and yet separated from the Atlantic community of Western powers by a gap which can hardly be bridged by a Communist power, would feel its political isolation much more keenly were it not for the number of new friendships that have been built up abroad. In the main, Yugoslavia has won these new friends among the uncommitted, newly independent nations of the former colonial world. Tito himself has visited the capitals of a number of Asian countries, including India, Burma and Indonesia. He has also exchanged state visits with President Nasser of the United Arab Republic, and has initiated close economic and technical cooperation with Abyssinia. There have been reciprocal manifestations of friendship from many scattered countries: at the April congress of the SAYWP, for instance, goodwill delegations from Algeria and Ghana, Guinea and Morocco, Cuba and Venezuela, were conspicuous among the foreign attendants. Commercially speaking, these new ties do not mean much to Yugoslavia at the present time, and experts doubt that exports to the underdeveloped countries, even in the next few years, will attain a level as high as 10 percent of Yugoslavia's total export trade. However, from the political standpoint, Belgrade finds it in its own interest to continue to develop these relationships, even at the cost of some economic sacrifice.

Mentor to the New Nations

In fact, various motives underlie the budding friendships between Yugoslavia and the underdeveloped or newly-emergent nations. Most of the ex-colonial countries are inclined toward some kind of planned economic system, in some cases toward a socialist or semi-socialistic form of national socio-economic reconstruction; and they see in Yugoslavia's "socialist market economy" —combining public ownership with competition between socialized enterprises—useful lessons for their own reconstruction plans. Thus, even if Belgrade has not become a third Mecca for the Communist world after Moscow and Peking, as seemed possible following Krushchev's 1955 recognition of the Yugoslav "way to socialism," it can now take consolation in its newfound prestige as respected mentor to the growing company of emergent states.

Most of these countries have far less qualms about seeking advice and assistance from a lesser power like Yugoslavia, which is tied to neither of the opposing world blocs, than from the Soviet Union, a world power with expansive political ambitions. Consequently, Tito can still compete successfully with Khrushchev, or with Mao, for the friendship of the underdeveloped nations, and by winning their sympathies he stands to derive a certain degree of moral support in facing up to the Kremlin's massive power politics. Finally, Yugoslavia's new friendships in Asia and Africa can be expected to augment the effectiveness of its role in the United Nations as well.

Thus far, Belgrade's policy has been to cultivate these relationships bilaterally and to eschew any attempt at the formation of a "third bloc" between the Western democratic and Sino-Soviet camps. Yugoslavia evidently does not regard such an effort as very promising, and also wishes to avoid putting too much strain on existing relationships, either with the Soviet bloc or with the Western colonial powers, by unduly flaunting the new friendships in Asia and Africa. For this latter reason, Yugoslav propaganda in the underdeveloped areas refrains from polemics against Moscow; and Belgrade does not carry its support of the Algerian independence movement so far as to jeopardize relations with France. While the visitor to Yugoslavia is apt to encounter wounded Algerian independence fighters who have found refuge there in great numbers, the Tito regime has not recognized (as has Peking, for example) the government of Ferhat Abbas, nor entered into any kind of official relations with it. Belgrade's anxiety to preserve cordial relations with France has obviously been heightened because of the severance of diplomatic connections with Bonn.

Yugoslavia's conduct in connection with the recent collapse of the summit conference has again underlined the determination of the Tito regime to persist on its present independent course. When Khrushchev's bellicosity torpedoed the parley even before it had gotten under way, Belgrade commented on this event in a spirit of neutral objectivity and carefully avoided attributing the blame for what had happened to either side. This restraint promptly called down upon the Yugoslav regime the wrath of Moscow and Peking, whose ensuing propaganda barrage took the theme that "Tito is forsaking his duty in refusing to take sides against the American aggressor."

Indeed, it is precisely the sort of partisanship demanded by Moscow that the Tito regime intends to avoid. And it persists in this course because it firmly believes that only by acting independently of the two opposing world blocs can it continue to play an effective and influential role in the international political arena.

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The "Classless Society" Part II

EDITORS' NOTE: The March-April issue carried two articles on social stratification in the USSR, with particular reference to the changes that have occurred in this area within the past few years. The following articles by Messrs. Barton and Kahan, which complete this journal's survey of equality and inequality in Soviet society, examine the actual status of what are referred to in Communist terminology as the two "non-antagonistic classes"—workers and peasants. Mr. Barton's article deals specifically with recent developments in labor legislation, while Mr. Kahan presents a historical sketch of the relationship between the peasantry and the regime and an analysis of current Soviet agricultural policies.

The Current Status of the Soviet Worker

By Paul Barton

THE CLASS STRUCTURE of Soviet society and its development can, and indeed should, be studied from different vantage points. Thus, for example, one may concentrate on the privileges and burdens of the different social groups, or the relationship between the groups in terms of power as well as of material conditions, the links of the various groups with the ruling apparatus, the degree of social mobility, and so on. Social science now offers complex and often subtle techniques to deal with the various aspects of the problem. But if these studies are to be based on firm ground, it still is essential to proceed in the classical fashion and begin by analyzing the status of each of the important classes. The present article is an inquiry into the present position of the Soviet worker, as it emerges after the many reforms—some more some less important—that it has been undergoing.

Mr. Barton is a sociologist and economist of Czech origin, who now resides in France. He has published numerous works on the Soviet economy and society, the most recent of which is L'Institution concentrationnaire en Russie *(Librairie Plon, Paris, 1959).*

Diffusion of Coercion

On April 25, 1956, with a minimum of publicity, a degree was promulgated in Moscow which produced the most significant changes in the Soviet worker's status since the death of Stalin:[1] prosecution of workers absenting themselves from work without valid reason was discontinued,[2] the prohibition of unauthorized changes of employment was repealed,[3] and the authority to effect

[1] D. S. Karev, ed., *Sbornik zakonodatelnykh aktov o trude* (Collection of Labor Laws), Gosiurizdat, Moscow, 1956, pp. 74-76.

[2] Decree of June 26, 1940, *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR.* (Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), 1940, No. 20.

[3] Decree of July 17, 1940, *Izvestia,* July 18, 1940.

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compulsory transfers of workers from plant to plant was withdrawn.[4]

Soon after it had appeared in print, the new law was exhaustively analyzed in this journal by the late Jerzy Gliksman, an authority on Soviet labor, whose article also succeeded in reconstructing certain unpublished amendments which as early as 1951, had already modified Stalin's oppressive labor decrees of 1940.[5] Gliksman convincingly identified the rising concern of the Soviet rulers with the problem of increasing labor productivity as the underlying motivation for the new trend in Soviet labor policy: with the advance of technological development in the Soviet Union and the emergence of an urban proletariat, the brutally coercive measure of the old labor legislation had become antiquated, and they impeded rather than promoted efficiency. Before that, the element of compulsion in Soviet labor policy had been increasing gradually since 1928, and the periodic disruption of industrial relations that it caused had more than once forced the Soviet government to relax pressure on the wage-earners. It is now clear that toward the end of Stalin's rule labor relations in Soviet Russia had degenerated to the point of complete chaos.[6]

Gliksman also showed that the 1956 decree had by no means put an end to the use of coercion in maintaining labor discipline. He stressed in particular the coercive effect of Soviet seniority rules, of the penalties for unexcused absence from work, of the "labor book," and of the manipulation of social insurance benefits. Subsequent development has fully confirmed this diagnosis: indeed, the network of constraint entangling the Soviet worker today remains, if anything, even tighter than Mr. Gliksman supposed. While the recent changes generally tend to soften the harshest provisions of earlier legislation, they also introduce additional severities.

What, then, is the present position of the Soviet worker who desires to leave his job? According to the 1956 decree, he need only inform the plant management a fortnight in advance, except where he may have been employed for a specified period of time or until completion of a specific work assignment. Nevertheless, there remain various effective means of influencing his decision. First of all, economic pressure. For example, if the worker is cultivating a plot of land, he will lose it upon leaving his job since it is the plants that assign plots to their employees; furthermore, current legislation[7] provides that the wage-earner may use his plot only as long as he is employed by the enterprise which assigned it to him. Thus, the worker who leaves his job automatically loses a substantial portion of his food supply.[8] Furthermore, most social security benefits, particularly paid leave, sick-pay, pregnancy, and maternity benefits are scaled according to the length of uninterrupted employment in the same enterprise.[9] With every change in jobs, moreover, the wage-earner loses his right to sick-pay for a period of six months.

In addition to these economic pressures, a number of administrative measures remain in force. Specifically, these are connected with the labor book, the interior passport, and the recruitment of labor for industries in which working conditions are particularly hard and the pay is low. Every wage-earner must possess a labor book which contains information about himself, his successive jobs, the distinctions he has been awarded, and the reasons for any separation from his work. The plant management keeps the book for every worker in its employ until he is paid off.[10] In view of the official attitude which condemns labor turnover as a symptom of demoralization, the wage-earner whose book shows several job changes will encounter serious difficulties when he tries to find better-paid work.

All Soviet citizens must also have a passport issued by the police, and police permission must be asked for every change of residence, which is then entered in the document.[11] Without this passport a Soviet worker cannot be hired; and in coal mines, armament factories, banks and savings banks, the management is even obliged to take it away from him for the duration of his employment. It is significant that on March 23, 1956, just one month before the repeal of the prohibition to change employment, the Moscow City Soviet passed a special decree to enforce strict observance of the passport regulations, and that further similar decrees were promulgated

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[4] Decree of October 19, 1940, *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR*, 1940, No. 42.

[5] Jerzy Gliksman, "Recent Trends in Soviet Labor Policy," *Problems of Communism*, July-August, 1956, p. 20.

[6] *Cf.* Paul Barton, "La législation du travail en URSS" and "Les rapports de travail en URSS," *Le Contrat Social*, Nos. 5 and 6, September and November, 1958.

[7] P. I. Kudryatsev, ed., *Yuridichesky slovar* (Dictionary of Law), Gosiurizdat, Moscow, 1956, Vol. II, pp. 34-35 and 351-352.

[8] *Cf.* Serge N. Prokopovicz, *Histoire économique de l'URSS*, Le Portulan, Paris 1952, pp. 422-423; *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR. Statisticheski sbornik*, (The economy of the USSR. Statistical Handbook) Gosstatidzat, Moscow, 1956, pp. 111, 119 and 120; Solomon M. Schwarz, *Labor in the Soviet Union*, Praeger, New York, 1952, p. 217.

[9] D. S. Karev, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-355.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-23; A. I. Denissov, ed., *Trudovoe pravo, Entsiklopedicheski slovar* (Labor law, Encyclopedic Dictionary), BSE, Moscow, 1959, pp. 442-443.

[11] P. I. Kudriavtsev, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 102-103.

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in April and August of 1958.[12] Thus the worker who has left his job, especially if he did so against the wishes of the plant management, may meet with a refusal when he presents his passport to the police for permission to move elsewhere.

Even if he finds work in the locality where he lives, he runs the risk of not being able to keep it long, thanks to the system of organized recruitment, known as *orgnabor*. A government body especially established for this purpose is charged with procuring a given number of workers every year for assignment to enterprises with a low supply of manpower. To do this, it can direct a plant to release some of its workers for reassignment, and the plant thus tapped must surrender the number of workers requested. It stands to reason that it will select those who have least seniority or are otherwise considered undesirable. The men recruited in this way must usually sign a contract for two or three years and are often transferred over great distances to unskilled labor jobs.[13] The number of such labor conscripts has grown considerably in recent years, with most of them being sent to the remote eastern and northern regions where until not very long ago the corrective labor camps were the principal suppliers of labor.

Thus, the constraints on the mobility of labor are being diffused rather than significantly relaxed. During the 1930's and 1940's, Soviet labor policy aimed at concentrating the apparatus of coercion as much as possible. In the 1950's, however, the tendency has been to disperse the means of compulsion, exposing the wage-earner to a variety of pressures which can be applied with greater flexibility.

Labor Discipline

A similar trend can be observed in the modifications of labor disciplinary regulations. Gliksman's research shows that after the enactment of the unpublished 1951 decree, only those guilty of prolonged or repeated absences from work were brought to court. The decree of 1956 went even farther in the direction of moderation in that it reserved even such cases for discretionary action by the plant managers, who are authorized to impose such disciplinary measures as temporary reduction or suspension of seniority bonuses and dismissal from work with notation in the labor book that the employee has been "dismissed for absence without valid reason." The workers, as we shall see later, can still be taken to court; but instead of being automatic, this measure is now restricted to particularly serious infractions and has become procedurally more complicated.

At the same time, the authority of factory managers,[14] as well as of supervisors at various levels of responsibility,[15] has been significantly increased in many other respects. The Soviet leadership quite clearly attaches a good deal of importance to this decentralization of disciplinary authority, and the process can be expected to be carried still farther in the future, particularly if the system proves efficient in practice. The following extract from an article published by an official Soviet review may be indicative of the future trend:

> **The consolidation of the principle of unified command, the extension of the rights not only of plant managers but also of superintendents, foremen and group-chiefs is of immense importance for the strengthening of labor discipline since it enables them better to stimulate the workers and to deal with those who violate discipline. If a certain member of a group has infringed labor discipline, if he has been absent without valid reason, if he has come late or has not carried out his task, the group-chief, according to the procedure in force, cannot punish him, just as he cannot reward a good worker. Real life demands that such rights should be given to leaders at lower levels also. This will increase their authority and have a good influence on . . . labor discipline.[16]**

It would be well to bear in mind, however, that respect for the managers and supervisors as competent technicians and organizers of production could easily be undermined if, in the eyes of the workers, they should become watch-dogs primarily preoccupied with discipline. In view of the extraordinary rigor with which labor discipline is enforced in the Soviet Union, this could indeed become a real danger, and it is unlikely that either the government or the managers are oblivious to it. The managerial and supervisory personnel are thus likely to be circumspect in asserting their disciplinary authority, and this may well have entered into the policy-makers' calculations. Viewed in this light, the recent reforms assume yet another aspect: in newly articulating the system of labor constraints, the Soviet leadership may be trying not only to put an end to the

[12] *Biulleten Ispolnitelnovo Komiteta Moskovskovo gorodskovo soveta.* (Bulletin of the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Soviet), 1956, No. 8, and 1958, Nos. 11 and 19.

[13] N. G. Alexandrov, *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo* (Soviet Labor Law), Gosiurizdat, Moscow, 1954, pp. 158-161; A. I. Denissov, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 237-238, V. Moskalenko, 'Problems of the Organised Recruitment of Workers," *Sotsialisticheski Trud,* 1960, No. 4.

[14] D. S. Karev, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-180.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 10-14.

[16] G. Podorov, "The Strengthening of Labor Discipline, an Important Factor of the Growth of Productivity," *Sotsialisticheski Trud.* 1957, No. 5

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clumsiness and red tape which habitually result from excessive concentration of authority, but also to develop a system of discipline enforcement that would be flexible and resilient and would avoid violent shocks to labor morale and productivity.

The Shock Absorbers

To ease the managers' task of enforcing discipline, so-called "comrades courts" have been set up in enterprises employing 100 persons or more.[17] Regulations concerning the organization of these "courts", their jurisdiction and rules of procedure, were adopted—though not published—in 1951, very probably in conjunction with the abolition of the regular courts' jurisdiction in the field of labor discipline. In most enterprises, however they did not actually appear until after the promulgation of the decree of April 25, 1956.[18]

Comrades' courts have an old tradition in the Soviet Union. First established in units of the Red Army after the Bolshevik Revolution,[19] they were transplanted by a decree of November 14, 1919, to industrial enterprises in order to punish non-compliance with labor laws, wage agreements, factory rules, and the like. The "workers' disciplinary courts", as they were then known, were attached to trade union bodies and were composed of three members representing the factory administration, the trade union, and the general workers' meeting. The punishments they were authorized to impose included public reprimand, suspension from trade union elections for a period not exceeding six months, demotion and

[17] According to new regulations now in preparation this limit is to be reduced to 50 persons. I. I. Yankin, "Comrades' Courts at the Present Stage of Their Development," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo,* 1959, No. 11.

[18] *Cf.* article by G. Anashkin, Deputy Minister of Justice of the RSFSR, *Izvestia,* December 14, 1956; and I. Zherebtsov, "The Comrades' Court in Action," *Sovietskaia Yustitsia* (Soviet Justice), 1957, No. 1.

[19] *Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii RSFSR,* (Collection of Statutes and Decrees of the RSFSR), 1918, No. 55.

THE ARITHMETIC OF PRODUCTIVITY

("Index Board" shows percent of worker's fulfillment of production quota.)

—From Krokodil, (Moskow), February 28, 1959.

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reduced pay for a maximum of one month, and subjection to "socially useful hard labor" with corresponding pay; and particularly obstructive workers could be dismissed and sent to concentration camps (*kontsentratsionnye lageri*).[20] A decree published in April 1921, just after the inauguration of the NEP (New Economic Policy), specified that workers could be summoned before these courts either by the trade union or by the management. It also enumerated a number of offenses which were made actionable before the courts, and extended the range of punishments.[21] With the launching of the five-year plans, a series of new provisions was promulgated which systematized the institution.[22]

For some twenty years the comrades' courts were an important instrument in the perpetual Soviet campaign to "strengthen discipline". Judging from the description of a session held in 1937, the procedure gave the accused little chance to defend himself. At the end of a trade union meeting, the president read the charge against a worker who, without having received any previous notice, had to improvise his own defense; all those present, even if they knew nothing about the case under examination, had the right to intervene in the discussion, and after half an hour a conclusion was reached which the accused was compelled to accept.[23] A few years later, probably as a result of the 1940 decrees which fixed regular court penalties for infringement of labor discipline, the comrades' courts fell into temporary disuse.

As constituted at present, the comrades' courts are composed of 5-7 members in small plants, and 11-15 in larger establishments. The members are "elected" in a single-list election by secret ballot, and they in turn, by a show of hands, "choose" the president of the court, who at every session is assisted by two members of the "court" panel, selected by himself. This collegium is called upon to punish the following offenses: absence without valid reason, late arrival at work, early departure, arriving in a state of intoxication, non-compliance with orders of superiors, unsatisfactory performance and interruption of work due to a worker's negligence, careless attitude toward plant property, neglect of safety regulations, and other infringements of labor discipline. The punishments it can impose include public reprimand, public disgrace, recommendation to the plant manager to demote or dismiss the culprit, or to submit the case to investigating or judicial bodies for possible prosecution. Regulations now being prepared would also empower the comrades' courts to impose fines up to 100 rubles and make recommendations to managers that offenders be switched to lower-paid work for periods not exceeding three months.[24]

It is the plant manager alone, however, who can bring a case before a comrades' court, and this is a most important point. He can, by his own authority, punish all the infractions mentioned above by disciplinary sanctions; he resorts to the comrades' courts merely in cases where he finds it more convenient not to act on his own authority.[25] Moreover, if the decision adopted by the "court" displeases him, he can send the case back for reexamination.[26] The managers have probably had little need so far to resort to such action, as the comrades' courts are, according to the official Soviet trade union daily, *Trud*, "mainly composed of members of the factory administration".[27] Since the packing of the comrades' courts with administrative personnel has been alluded to, and recently even criticized, elsewhere in the Soviet official press,[28] it is not unlikely that some changes in this respect may take place in the near future. But even if the "judges" should be chosen mainly from among the workers, there is little doubt that the comrades' courts would still have to help the management enforce discipline. The institution would simply be better adapted to its function as shock-absorber.

The advantages, for a manager, of being able to act through a comrades' court rather than act himself to punish workers under his command are obvious. Responsibility for decisions injurious to the workers' dignity is thus shifted from his shoulders to the trade union. Moreover recalcitrant workers tend to be intimidated by the spectacular procedure of the comrades' courts even more than by the penalties themselves. It is in fact stipulated that hearings should take place in the factory itself,[29] at a time when the personnel can "be present and take an active part in the discussion of the cases investigated", and that "the decision should be announced to all those present at the hearing and should be made known to all the personnel".[30] Recently it has

[20] *Ibid.*, 1919, No. 56.
[21] *Ibid.*, 1921, No. 23/24.
[22] *Ibid.*, 1928, No. 114; 1930, No. 4; 1931, No. 114.
[23] Harold J. Berman, *Justice in Russia*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1950, pp. 266-269.
[24] I. I. Yankin, *op. cit.*
[25] A. Denissov, *op. cit.*, pp. 437-438.
[26] *Pravda Ukrainy*, February 15, 1959.
[27] February 4, 1959.
[28] T. N. Dobrovolskaia, "New Regulations Concerning the Most Important Problems of the Organization and Activity of the Comrades' Courts," *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, 1959, No. 11.
[29] *Pravda Ukrainy*, February 15, 1959.
[30] A. I. Denissov, *op. cit.*, p. 438.

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even been proposed that the sentence should be made known to the condemned worker's neighbors.[31]

Intimidation and a continued lack of procedural safeguards thus seem to characterize the comrades' courts now as they did in the 1930's. Perhaps the most eloquent indication of the Soviet workers' confidence in this "socialist" institution is the comment of a "court" president in a large chemical concern:

> From our experience of the work in a comrades' court, we know that many transgressors would prefer to be absent while the comrades' court judges their case.[32]

The Role of Trade Unions

The renewal of certain rights, which had once been granted to the factory committees but had later fallen into disuse, points to the same tendency to use trade union bodies as shock absorbers between management and labor. Thus in 1958 the regulation requiring the approval of the factory committee before any worker could be dismissed was reintroduced. These committees are so subservient to management, however, that it is hard to see how they could protect workers from arbitrary hiring and firing, especially since the committees have more than once proved their impotence in this respect.[33] On the other hand, in view of this additional opportunity to place the responsibility for objectionable practices at the door of the trade unions, the usefulness of the regulation to the regime becomes apparent.

Another example of this type of exploitation of trade unions is the reintroduction of certain old provisions concerning the fixing and revision of output norms. During the Stalin era, management had gradually assumed full control in these matters and made its decisions on a completely unilateral basis. In 1956 the government issued new regulations which specified that management could change output norms only in agreement with the factory committee and also outlined the procedure for settling conflicts between management and the committees in such cases.[34] It is characteristic, however, that a decree of the Central Trade Union Council quickly asserted that in exercising this new prerogative the factory committees should regard themselves as the managers' auxiliaries and should make every effort to increase output.[35] Under these circumstances the intent of the new regulations seems to be little more than to make the factory committees responsible for dealing with workers irritated by the manipulation of norms.

Nevertheless, trade union co-responsibility for fixing norms does have its dangers. As they cannot hide behind a wall of bureaucratic indifference, the unions, especially those on the lower levels, sometimes find it difficult to resist pressures put on them by aggrieved workers. Dissatisfaction provoked by revisions of the norms occasionally contaminates the union organizations themselves. Here, for example, is what *Sotsialisticheski Trud*, a monthly journal of the State Commission on Labor and Wages, had to say on the subject:

> Some trade union committees have declared themselves in an unprincipled manner against the revision of output norms which no longer correspond to changed technical and organizational conditions. A wrong attitude of this kind was taken, for example, by the factory committee of the Leningrad electric clock factory and later by the Leningrad Regional Committee of the Machine Builders' Union.[36]

On another occasion the same paper complained again:

> Some plant directors claim that no preparation for a revision of output norms are being made because the factory committees do not agree to revisions planned by the management.[37]

Under somewhat similar circumstances, it was reported later, the Central Committee of the Machine Builders' Union had to step in and discipline the factory committee of the Luben Machine Factory Kommunard, which obstinately refused to give its consent to a revision of output norms.[38] Even where the trade unions do not actually adopt the workers' attitude, the union officials are obliged to step rather warily. Thus the author of a recent article on labor discipline deplored the comrades' courts' want of diligence and explained ironically that "some trade union and party officials" seemed unable to find time "to deal with this necessary but embarrassing and stormy business."[39]

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[31] "Social Courts, an Important Form of the Struggle Against the Survivals of the Past" (editorial), *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, (Soviet State and Law), 1959, No. 5.

[32] I. I. Yankin, *op. cit.*

[33] *Cf.* the articles by M. A. Yakimenko, vice-president of the Supreme Court of the Ukrainian SSR, *Trud*, September 22, 1956, and by V. M. Ostorukhov and M. M. Koldovskaia, respectively vice-president and chief counsel of the court of the city of Moscow, *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo*, 1956, No. 7.

[34] *Cf.* N. Alexandrov, "The Present Stage of Soviet Labor Law," *Sotsialisticheski Trud*, 1958, No. 5.

[35] *Cf.* B. Shuruyev, "Strict Observance of the New Procedure for the Revision of Output Norms," *Sotsialisticheski Trud*, 1957, No. 12.

[36] V. Shuruyev, *op. cit.*

[37] Z. Lukashin, "Some Lessons of the Revision of Norms," *Sotsialisticheski Trud*, 1957, No.

[38] V. Retivoy, "To Profit from the Advantages of the New Procedure for the Revision of Norms," *Sotsialisticheski Trud*, 1958, No. 3.

[39] G. Podorov, *op. cit.*

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The comrades' court is only one of the new organs recently introduced in the Soviet factory in order to increase efficiency of production. In 1955 the Scientific and Technical Societies, composed of engineers and technicians, were integrated into the trade unions and transformed into a "mass organization". Their membership rose from about 200,000-300,000 in 1955 to 600,000 in 1957, 800,000 in 1958, and 1,000,000 in 1959. By 1957, 17,000 units of the Scientific and Technical Societies were established inside the Soviet plants, and at the beginning of 1959 their number had risen to 24,000. A national congress of these societies met in October 1959.

Simultaneously, another "mass organization", grouping together the "rationalizators" and inventors, was founded under the trade unions' guidance. The purpose of this association—which also has set up units within the plants and already boasts a membership of two million—is to improve the training of its members, help them out in their projects, and protect their copyrights. The association held its first national congress in September 1959.

While both these organizations are intended to protect the privileges of their members, recruited mostly from the industrial bureaucracy, they also play an auxiliary part in the organization of production. Thus, in 1958, "permanent production conferences" were inaugurated in plants employing not less than 100 persons. These conferences are partly elected by the employees and partly appointed by management and the plant organizations of the party, the Komsomol, and the Scientific and Technical Societies. Within the limits of the initiative allowed the plants, they are expected to take part in working out plans and investment schemes, examine the organization of labor and production, submit suggestions bearing on these matters to the management, and so forth.

At the same time, the functions of the factory committee, *i.e.* the trade union organ which to some extent patronizes all these bodies, have been redefined. Some of its prerogatives have been transferred to one or the other of the new organizations. Thus, for example, most of the factory commitees' functions in the fields of organization of labor and industrial relations, such as control of wage scales and output norms, drives for improvement in the quality of production and reduction of prime costs, checking the application of inventions, *etc.*, have been assigned to the permanent production conference. In some respects, indeed, the powers of this body are greater than were those of the factory committee:

[The production conference] examines plans for industrial, residential and cultural buildings, as well as the projected measures for the actual utilization of investment funds; it puts forward suggestions for perfecting the utilization of investment funds; it puts forward suggestions for perfecting the administration within the plant and for improving the working of its apparatus.[40]

On the other hand, the factory committees have been granted some new rights which they did not enjoy before. Thus they are now to take part, apparently in an advisory capacity, in the working out of production programs, and to give their opinion of candidates for a large number of executive jobs.[41] Even though they have no voice in the appointment of top management officials who are not designated by the plant manager,[42] this new role considerably increases the trade union committees' influence in plant management.

All these measures tending to give the trade unions a larger share in the organization of production are indicative of an attempt to counterbalance the economic bureaucracy and keep its aspirations for independence in check. It is significant that the decree establishing the permanent production conference provides for direct communication between this body and the plant manager's superior authorities. "The *sovnarkhozy*, ministries and other high economic bodies are expected to assist the production conferences in every possible way in their work and in carrying out the decisions adopted by them", reads the relevant provision of the decree.[43]

The government thus tries to make use of friction between the workers and the executives in order to uncover shortcomings in plant management. Much stress is laid on the fact that "the worker knows what hinders improvement in the productivity of labor" and, to stimulate him to expose the faults of his bosses, he is insistently told that "he personally suffers from the consequences of the various kinds of disorganization in production."[44] This trend, which recalls the operation of Mussolini's state corporations, is not new in the Soviet Union. As early as 1947, when collective agreements (designed in the USSR not to protect the interests of the wage or salary earners, but to guarantee "the fulfillment or overfulfillment of the state production plan for the given establishment")[45] were reintroduced, the

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[40] *Trud*, July 18, 1958.
[41] *Trud*, December 19, 1957.
[42] *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta*, 1958, No. 15; "We Answer Our Readers," *Sovietskie Profsoyuzy*, 1960, No. 8.
[43] *Trud*, July 18, 1958.
[44] I. Mishin, "Increase in the Trade Unions' Role in the Factory," *Partiinaia Zhizn*, No. 24, 195 .
[45] *Trud*, February 19, 1947.

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Soviet authorities endeavored to use workers and trade unions as sources for obtaining facts and data which the managers were wont to hide from them. "The conclusion of collective agreements and the trade union bodies' systematic endeavors to bring them into effect", wrote a trade union officer at the time, "will help to expose the intolerable anti-state practice by which various factories set themselves targets which fall short of their capacity." [46]

On the other hand, the government makes sure that the trade unions and associated organizations do not undermine the management's authority over its employees, and they are called to order whenever they overreach their competence. Thus *Partiinaia Zhizn,* contradicting somewhat the decree which had established the permanent production conference, wrote:

It is necessary to examine some errors in the work of the production conferences. Sometimes they exceed their powers. There have been cases where the production conference has applied directly to the sovnarkhoz, over the heads of the management, for raw materials, equipment, *etc.* needed by the factory. This is wrong. A production conference operates within the limits of its factory, plant or complex." [47]

Nor is it permissible, according to *Trud,* that a production conference question regulations and orders from above:

After studying the problems, the production conference adopts resolutions in strict conformity with the legislation in force and with the plans approved for the plant or site and for the workshops.[48]

The Channelization of Discontent

The Soviet effort to use trade union organizations as brakes on the power of the industrial bureaucracy is, however, only a secondary aspect of the extension of union responsibilities in the managerial field. The main purpose of the policy is to keep in check the centrifugal tendencies of labor and direct them into channels profitable to the government.

For several years now the workers in Soviet industry have demanded that the barracks regime should be abolished; that the relations between management and employees should be based on agreement and that workers should no longer be forced, in the name of planning and discipline, to accept without discussion orders which it is not in their power to carry out. As early as 1955 the official handbook of labor law laboriously attempted to refute this agitation on ideological grounds.[49] Nevertheless, the demands continued to be voiced and became particularly insistent after the 20th Congress and the emergence of workers' councils in Poland and Hungary; indeed, in many places they were even openly discussed at factory meetings.[50] It is within this context that the measures discussed here must be considered. While they serve to increase productivity, the trade unions' new responsibilities are meant to make the worker feel that he is no longer a tool carrying out decisions in which he has no say.

But while the trade unions are assigned greater responsibilities, steps are being taken to increase the obligations of each of their members. The first attempt to transform all union members into stooges of the management was made at the 11th Trade Union Congress in 1954 when the article of the statutes imposing on each union member the duty to "observe strictly state and labor discipline" was amended to read that union members would henceforth be obliged to "fight against every manifestation of indiscipline in production." [51] In March 1959 a new amendment was voted by the 12th Congress, which declared that it is the duty of each member to "carry out the social orders of the trade union organs." [52] What "social orders" means was not explained, but there is little doubt that this grotesque expression was used to camouflage the full implications of a provision which authorizes the union bodies to give the workers whatever orders the party may deem necessary. Nor are the broader motives of the amendment hard to interpret. In the past unions have been invited to take part in the organization of production; and every time they were simply used to transmit to the workers such orders as the managers preferred not to impose directly for fear of antagonizing the workers. The extension of the union's responsibility in production, insofar as it affects the position of the worker, thus tends to amplify their function as shock absorbers between management and labor.

At the same time, with the trade unions' increasing share of authority in plant management, their concern

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[46] M. Kaganovich, "An Important Arm in the Struggle for the Fulfillment and Over-Fulfillment of State Plans," *Profesionalnye Soyuzy,* 1947, No. 2; *cf.* this author's book *Conventions collectives et réalities ouvrières en Europe de l'Est.* Les Editions Ouvrières, Paris, 1947, p. 99.

[47] I. Mishin, *op cit.*

[48] July 18, 1958.

[49] N. G. Alexandrov, *Sovetskoe trudovoe pravo* (Soviet Labor Law), Gosiurizdat, Moscow, 1955, p. 200.

[50] *Pravda,* September 3, 1956 (V. Titov's article).

[51] *Trud,* June 19, 1954; *cf.* Solomon M. Schwarz: "Soviet Trade Unions Today," *Problems of Communism,* 1954, No. 6.

[52] *Trud.* April 2, 1959.

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Рисунок Е. ШУКАЕВА.

Потерянные часы.

WASTED HOURS

("Chasy" in Russians means both "hours" and "watches." Crate is labeled "urgent order.")

—From Krokodil (Moscow), June 10, 1959.

for the social welfare of the workers seems to be vanishing altogether. At the 12th Congress in March 1959, the workers' interests were discussed even less than at previous congresses. At the 10th Trade Union Congress, in 1949, there had at least been some serious criticism of the housing and food deficiencies, and at the 11th, in 1954, of the chaos in wages. But the 12th Congress dealt almost exclusively with the fulfillment of the current seven-year plan. The immediate reason for this is clearly discernible in the following passage of the message addressed to the congress by the party Central Committee:

> At present, the most fundamental, the most essential task of Soviet trade unions lies in mobilizing the efforts of the great working masses in view of the struggle for the carrying out of the historic decisions of the 21st Congress of the party, for the timely fulfillment of the seven-year plan and the targets fixed for 1959, the first year of this plan.[53]

The 12th Congress followed up the party's instructions by inserting into the statutes a new definition of the purposes of Soviet trade unionism:

> "The central task of the trade unions is the mobilization of the masses in view of the struggle for a further powerful expansion in all branches of the national economy, for the further strengthening of the economic and defensive power of the Soviet state, for the fulfillment and over-fulfillment of the economic plans, for technical progress, for an uninterrupted increase in the productivity of labor, for stricter economy and parsimony in all sectors of the national economy, for the maximum exploitation of all resources and possibilities with the aim of a rapid increase in industrial and agricultural production and an uninterrupted rise in the material and cultural standards of the workers' well-being.[54]

The order in which the union tasks are enumerated speaks for itself; it is quite clear that the party is in no mood to heed the criticisms which Soviet workers have been directing in recent years at the attitude of the unions and particularly the fact that they neither represent nor defend the workers' interests.[55]

As far as the practical effect of the union's participation in management is concerned, published information, particularly on the subject of the permanent production conferences, indicates that the experiment is a failure. It appears notably that the factory committees show little inclination to take part in the study and elaboration of production plans; that the production conferences meet rarely and some not at all; that they tend to become the business of engineers and technicians since the workers ignore them; that in those cases where they take their work seriously they frequently exceed the scope of their authority and have to be called to order; that the managers and the economic administration still generally disregard proposals put forward by the unions.[56] By the same token, it is very unlikely that the new efforts to transform the workers into tools of the management will prove successful. The institutional devices used to bring about this aim are too transparent to achieve now what the Soviet state over the past several decades has variously attempted and always failed to accomplish.

Though it is true that the power of the unions has recently been increased in some respects, nothing has been done to enable them to fulfill the primary function

[53] *Trud,* March 24, 1959.

[54] *Trud,* April 2, 1959.

[55] *Cf. Trud,* November 30, 1956; *Pravda,* December 8, 1956; *Pravda Ukrainy,* January 6, 1957.

[56] I. Mishin *op. cit; Trud,* March 24, 1959 (V. V. Grishin's report) "The Production Conferences and the Creative Initiative of the Masses," *Sotsialisticheski Trud,* 1959, No. 6; V. Arkhiponko, "When the Direction is Not up to It," *Sovetskie Profsoyuzy,* 1959, No. 22 "Rights and Duties of the Works, Factory and Local Committees of the Trade Unions," *Sovetskie Profsoyuzy.* 1960, No. 8.

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of genuine trade unions: the protection of workers' rights. Yet, this is a task which, as even the Soviet authorities know, cannot remain altogether neglected. It is quite apparent, however, that in the USSR the unions are not expected to perform it; instead, the protection of workers' rights is being increasingly entrusted to the judiciary. Accordingly, steps have been taken to improve the examination of workers' complaints in the courts, and the role of the judiciary in settling individual labor conflicts has been considerably enlarged.[57]

Judges and attorneys are thus called upon to fill the gap left open by the unions in controlling the observance of labor laws by plant managers and other bodies of the economic administration.[58] Unfortunately, the judicial process is in its very nature clumsy and slow, and virtually all industrial countries have therefore established special procedures to ensure flexible and speedy enforcement of workers' rights. The Soviet decision to relegate the settlement of industrial conflicts to the regular court system neglects social reality.

To sum up, the status of the worker in Soviet society remains largely unchanged. The exercise of repressive discipline, which has always been a barrier to a rational regulation of industrial relations in the USSR, is still the predominant factor in labor policy. On balance, the recent labor reforms are an improvement to the extent that they moderate the pressures weighing on the shoulders of the worker; but they clearly do not go far enough. Now as before, he performs manual work under conditions which only constraint can impose on him, and for a wage arbitrarily fixed by the employer, the state. The reforms favoring social mobility may perhaps permit his son to raise himself to a higher position,[59] but their effect on the class structure is inevitably very restricted since the worker remains unable to assert his interests and truly improve his lot.

[57] D. S. Karev, ed.: *op. cit.*, pp. 446-452.

[58] *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta*, June 20, 1955; E. N. Korshunova and Y. D. Yanovski, *Prokuroskii nadzor po grazhdanskim trudovym delam* (Supervision of the Public Ministry over Civil Affairs in the Sphere of Labor), Gosiurizdat, Moscow, 1956; M. Yakolev, "Supervision by the Public Ministry of the Observance of Labor Laws," *Sotsialisticheski Trud*, 1958, No. 1.

[59] *Cf.* Robert A. Feldmesser, "Equality and Inequality Under Khrushchev," *Problems of Communism*, 1960, No. 2.

The Peasant, the Party and the System

By Arcadius Kahan

THE PREOCCUPATION OF top Soviet policy-makers with problems of agriculture in recent years has been one of numerous interesting facets of the post-Stalin era. The significance of this concern in terms of further Soviet development makes it important to scrutinize closely what attitudes and policies have been adopted by the new leadership, in what sense they show continuity with past policies, and to what degree they depart from the past.

Such an examination requires an understanding of the initial basic relationship between the Soviet state and the peasantry. In spite of the fact that Russia had always been a predominantly agrarian country, few of the early Bolshevik leaders understood the "mystery" that was the Russian peasant. Among them, Lenin came closest to grasping the problem, but was very often blinded by doctrines which he believed to be true and self-evident and which he passed on to his followers. Primarily concerned with the strategy of seizing and maintaining power, Lenin viewed the peasants in terms of a potential political force that he wanted either to control or at least to neutralize. Although he recognized the peasants' deep-seated conservatism, it was apparently beyond his comprehension that they might constitute an unrelenting or permanent adversary.

In line with this attitude, he invented (or used) an explanation of peasant social behavior that was typically

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Russian—one, in fact, that could well have been originated by Dostoevsky. According to this theory the peasant was possessed of a split personality: on the one hand, he harbored a "diabolic" soul, characterized by attachment to private property, resistance to trends of social change, and hope for personal advancement through command over an increasing volume of resources. But there was also an "angelic" side to the peasant's soul that would accept social transformation; this side was associated with the small proprietor who could not protect himself from exploitation in the market by profit-seeking capitalists. In Lenin's view, the latter side of the peasant's nature made it possible and indeed imperative for the industrial proletariat to seek the peasants' cooperation before and during the "bourgeois-democratic" revolution. One of Lenin's contributions to Marxist literature concerned the means of achieving such an alliance; noting the social stratification within the peasantry, he pointed out how a skillful policy making use of differences of interest at various levels could prevent the peasants as a whole from taking concerted action during the transformation of the bourgeois-democratic into the proletarian revolution.[1]

This strategy was not of course aimed at a permanent alliance with a section of the peasantry but was simply part of Lenin's blueprint for power, designed to neutralize the resistance he expected to develop, though in what form or to what degree he would not calculate. As early as 1905 he had written:

> Class antagonism between the rural proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie is inevitable, and we reveal it in advance, explain it and prepare for the struggle. . . . At first we [will] support to the end, by all means including confiscation, the peasantry generally against the landlords, and then (or rather, not "then" but at the same time) we [will] support the proletariat against the peasantry in general. To try now to calculate the combination of forces among the peasantry on "the morrow" of the (democratic) revolution is sheer utopia.[2]

Leninism in Practice

Thus fortified with a political strategy and rules for tactical maneuvering, Lenin did not stop to analyze the socio-economic role of the peasant as a producer in the market, involving such problems as commodity prices, incomes, profits, investment opportunities, taxation, and so on. Indeed in his various writings he never exhibited a genuine interest in devising solutions for major economic problems, concentrating instead on the political expression of those problems. Thus he launched the revolution and stepped over the threshhold of power without any clear notion of what ought to be the long-run objectives of his agrarian policy. The language of his speech accompanying the "Decree on Land," issued immediately after the November 7 *coup,* aptly reveal his state of mind in this respect:

> Russia is great, and local conditions vary. We believe that the peasants will be able to solve the problem [of agrarian adjustment] correctly better than we could ourselves. Whether in our spirit, or in the spirit of the program of the Socialist-Revolutionaries is not the point. The point is that the peasants should be firmly assured that there are no more landlords in the countryside, that they must themselves arrange their own lives.[3]

After embarking on the tragic (in terms of consequences) experiment of war communism, Lenin proceeded with his divide-and-rule tactics among the peasants, again in an effort to neutralize their political reaction. Specifically, he tried to foment an intra-village struggle between the poor and the rich peasants, with the medium stratum as spectators. Unmindful of the economic consequences of such conflict, he created his *"Kombiedy"* (Committees of the Poor Peasants), which acted as agents of government policy in each village in the suppression of the richer landholders. This tactic contributed to the general chaos created by "war communism," characterized on the economic side by food requisitioning, galloping inflation and the return to a virtual barter economy. Under these conditions the peasants obstinately refused to produce any agricultural surplus, leading to a catastrophic decrease in output.

Agriculture in the 1920's

In 1921 the outbreak of peasant rebellions, along with the Kronstadt uprising, signalled the imminent political dangers of the situation confronting the regime. Unable to admit that the Kronstadt uprising represented his moral defeat by workers and sailors—the alleged pillars of his authority—Lenin hastily admitted defeat at the hands of the peasants and sounded the horn for retreat. He acknowledged this failure in plain words: "The peasants are not content with our attitude toward them, and they will not tolerate it any longer."[4] The first

[1] See Lenin, "Otnosheniie Sotsial-Demokratii k Krestianskomu Dvizheniiu" (The Attitude of Social-Democracy toward the Peasant Movement), *Sochineniia* (Works), Vol. VIII.

[2] Lenin, *Selected Works,* International Publishers, New York, Vol. III. pp. 145-56.

[3] *Ibid.,* Vol. VI, p. 409.

[4] Lenin, speech to the 10th CPSU Congress, March 15, 1921; *Sochinenia,* IV ed., Moscow, 1952, Vol. XXXII, pp. 192-93.

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battle between the Soviet state and the peasants thus ended with a victory for the peasants, and the era of the NEP (New Economic Policy) began.

The NEP's comparatively liberal policies toward the agricultural sector and internal trade demonstrated the possibilities of some sort of a symbiosis between a largely nationalized industry and a relatively free peasant agriculture, as had been visualized and advocated by the Populists in the 19th century. Simple agricultural cooperation (later used as a stepping-stone to collectivization) and an essentially free market for agricultural products proved beneficial to the task of reconstruction and recovery, the major goal of the NEP period. For the peasants themselves, the first years of NEP represented in a sense a "golden era" in their history, with incomes on the rise and investment outlays in agriculture increasing.

Yet new troubles were not long in arising. "Scissors crises"—a widening discrepancy between industrial and agricultural prices, or between peasant purchasing power and available consumer goods—in combination with faulty government price and procurement policies, led to a curtailment of the peasants' incentive to produce and thus to a decrease in the agricultural output available for the market. A major dilemma arose over conflicting demands on the short agricultural supply, for home consumption of the peasants on the one hand, urban consumption and exports on the other. Concomitantly, the regime faced the problem of deriving sources for and minimizing costs of rapid industrialization without access to foreign investment markets.

This situation led to the regime's attempts in 1928 to shift the burden of industrialization onto the peasants, by decreasing their home consumption and by procuring grain at prices below the market rate. Stalin himself best described the effect of these measures, in a speech of July 1928:

> The way matters stand with the peasantry in this respect is as follows: it not only pays the state the usual taxes, direct and indirect; it also *overpays*—in the relatively high prices for manufactured goods . . . in the first place, and it is more or unless *underpaid* in the prices for agricultural produce . . . in the second place. This is an additional tax levied on the peasantry for the sake of promoting industry, which caters to the whole country, the peasantry included. It is something in the nature of a "tribute" of a supertax, which we are compelled to levy for the time being in order to preserve and accelerate our present rate of industrial development . . . to raise further the well-being of the village and then to abolish altogether this additional tax, these "scissors" between town and country.[5]

[5] I. V. Stalin, *Works*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, Vol. XI, p. 167.

It is worth noting that Stalin's avowed intention of eventually abolishing the supertax was never acted upon in his lifetime; it remained a pious wish for the record, fulfilled only recently and only partially by the successor regime.

The Onset of Collectivization

The squeeze put on the peasants naturally met with resistance. The government forced a showdown by launching the brutal campaign against the *kulaks* and then initiating the collectivization of agriculture. Thus in the process of trying to find a short-run remedy for economic ills, the regime created a new institutional set-up for agriculture—one which from an administrative point of view solved both of its major problems, by curtailing the peasants' home consumption and procuring the required surplus at terms dictated by and favorable to the state.

Collectivization did have other important effects and purposes: the political scientist, for example, is apt to see as its main aim the tightening of control over the peasantry; the sociologist analyzes it as the preparatory stage for increased social mobility and occupational shifts from agriculture to industry, while a student of legal institutions is most interested in it as a form of landholding. But the economist's viewpoint on collectivization comes closest to its primary purpose—the acquisition of a larger part of agricultural output at a low monopsonist price, thereby decreasing the costs borne by the state in the industrialization process. In the implementation of the program, the chief criterion of success became the effectiveness of techniques for siphoning off the volume of output desired by the state.

The policy-makers also hoped that a change in the attitude of the peasants toward their labor, to result from the Marxian mechanics of a changing relationship between the base and the superstructure, would accompany the reorganization—in short, that the "diabolical" side of the peasant nature would disintegrate. This doctrinal supposition was combined with a strong conviction that higher efficiency in farming could be achieved more rapidly through forced collectivization than through the gradual process of eliminating marginal producers. That the institutional revamping of the farm unit would create both an optimum size, with economies of scale, and attitudes favorable to the interest of society as a whole, was a prevailing belief among many planners. Where they were mistaken is that such processes do not take place automatically, and that the impact of a particular organizational form on agricultural output itself

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Рисунок С. КУЗЬМИНА.



— Все люди в поле, только ты один дома лежишь!

—Everybody's in the field; only you lie home!

is only incidental. In short, to collect taxes in kind efficiently and to compel or induce peasants to work harder to increase production are two entirely different tasks.

With regard to the latter, the brutal methods used to enforce the collective form of agriculture in fact produced just the opposite effect than that desired. Being motivated in part by political considerations, the regime frequently disregarded the economic rationale altogether. In the preliminary campaign to liquidate the *kulaks*, for example, it set up ostensibly economic criteria of property and income for the purpose of classifying peasant households, yet these criteria were kept vague enough to allow discrimination on political grounds when deemed expedient or necessary.[6] Unable to muster sufficient support in the rural milieu, the party simply sent thousands of its trusted urban followers to the villages to act as its agents in carrying out its policy. These agents operated through the political departments of the Machine Tractor Stations; as vigilant political overseers, they were charged with the function of crushing not only actual but potential resistance—in effect, a *carte blanche* for the enormous brutalities which ensued. The peasants' reaction to these tactics was to destroy, in Samsonian fashion, the most readily destructible production assets—the livestock—during the years 1930-32. The longer-range effect of regime policies was a drastic decline in agricultural output—in fact, the precollectivization level was not reached again until about 1955.

Throughout the 1930's and 1940's the Stalin regime continued in a silent wrangle with the peasantry, mainly over their relative share in total agricultural output. The fact that the peasants resorted to passive forms of resistance, defying the spirit of the law rather than the law itself, has been erroneously interpreted in some quarters as an indication that the regime made solid inroads toward their "conversion." Yet the peasants never gave up their tacit efforts to enlarge their private garden-plots at the expense of collective farmland (leading twice—in 1939 and again in 1946—to government decrees to reduce the size of peasant landholdings).[7] The same tenacious resistance was apparent in the "battle for the cow"—the peasants' stubborn effort to keep hold of their farm animals, in many cases a single cow, despite an enormous burden of taxation placed upon privately-owned livestock.[8]

Stalinist policy persisted in its orientation, inherited from the 1920's, toward concern with distributing

[6] For details see party and government decrees of Feb. 20 and May 21, 1929, in *Kollektivizatsia Selskoro Khoziaistva* (The Collectivization of Agriculture). USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1957, pp. 127-30, 163-64. Also Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, pp. 238-51.

[7] See party-government decrees of May 27, 1939, and Sept. 19, 1946, in *Direktivy KPSS i Sovietskoro Pravitelstva po Khoziaistvennym Voprosam* (Party and State Directives on Agriculture), Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1957-58, Vol. II, pp. 589-94, Vol. III, pp. 91-97.

[8] For a discussion of peasant resistance, see Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR*. Stanford University Press, Stanford, Cal., 1949, pp. 363-88. Among Soviet publications which are illuminating in this respect, see the various editions of *Vazhnieishie Reshenia po Selskomu Khoziaistvu* (Most Important Decisions on Agriculture).

— Пожалуйста, могу и в поле...

—All right, I can lie in the field . . .

—From Krokodil (Moscow), August 20, 1957.

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agricultural output rather than with devising means to increase production. As earlier, it was the size of the procurement and the efficiency of the collection apparatus which occupied most of the attention of the planners and the government bureaucracy, rather than the size of output or measures to increase it. In fact, the dictatorship kept investment in agriculture to a minimum, while at the same time imposing a standard of living on both the peasants and the urban workers below the precollectivization level.[9]

Several factors (aside from the existence of a coercive apparatus) contributed to the regime's ability to pursue its course of economic expansion without promoting any growth of agriculture. The transfer of labor from agriculture to industry, while decreasing the food requirements of the countryside, also facilitated the maintenance of urban consumption at a level to which the transplanted former peasants were accustomed. Drawing millions of women into the labor force, thus converting them from consumers into producers, in a real sense resulted in an increase of the national product without any appreciable increase in food consumption. The gradual rise in the educational level and in labor productivity also played an important role in sustaining industrial growth without a corresponding growth in agriculture. Finally, the planners were greatly "aided" by the very slow rate of population growth during the 1930's and then the grave loss of life during World War II, easing the pressures of population against the available food supply.

That such a situation could not continue indefinitely was clear, however, even to the most naive observers of the Soviet scene. The state of stagnation in agriculture toward the last years of Stalin's rule caused it to come "into conflict with the productive forces of the society," to borrow a familiar phrase from the Marxist lexicon: from being an asset in the process of economic growth, it became a definite liability. In strictly economic terms, it was unable to meet either the increasing demand for agricultural raw materials for industry or the demand for food on the part of a population which was again on the increase and could make its demands more vocal. The need for a change in agricultural policies—not to mention other spheres of Soviet life—was only too obvious. Yet Stalin was unwilling or constitutionally unable to cope at this point in his life with problems requiring a deviation from the established pattern. It fell to his successors to meet these problems and to introduce changes which, although affecting all aspects of the national life, have had a particularly pronounced effect upon Soviet agriculture.

[9] For details see D. Gale Johnson and Arcadius Kahan, "Soviet Agriculture, Structure and Growth," *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies*, Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, D. C., 1959, Part I, pp. 209-10.

The Social Bases of Post-Stalin Policy

There is need for caution in defining the areas and scope of post-Stalin changes. Observers generally agree that there has been no basic shift in the priority scale of the Soviet economic planners, nor any far-reaching democratization of the political decision-making process. Where then has the change occurred? Answering this question requires a deviation from the major topic here to discuss briefly the existing relationships between the party and the rest of society in the Soviet Union.

Traditionally, the party has required from the Soviet citizen (1) acknowledgment of the supremacy of party judgment over individual judgment; (2) identification of party policies with such advantages as derive from the system; (3) dissociation of negative features of the society from party policies, and their attribution instead to imperfect execution by individuals or to outside factors; (4) acceptance of the basic doctrinal assumptions on which Soviet society and the political system are based; (5) readiness to execute party orders regardless of the effect upon individual welfare. Popular acquiescence in these requirements—doubly insured by the existence of the secret police—was taken for granted during the Stalin period, yet there is no doubt that resistance to them was on the increase. The basic change in the post-Stalin leadership's approach has been an awareness that submission on the part of the populace could not be assumed matter-of-factly and that something had to be done in order to create favorable attitudes toward the party. Two of the party's requirements seem to have come under particular question from a fairly large and influential stratum of the citizenry—namely, acceptance of the excessive and arbitrary terrorism of the political system, and obedience to party orders regardless of personal welfare. Only in the light of this changed popular attitude can one properly interpret the post-Stalin demotion of the secret police, Khrushchev's famous speech to the 20th CPSU Congress (shifting the blame for oppression from the party as such to Stalin personally), and the regime's various moves to appeal to the citizen's self-interest.

The changes in popular attitude were probably the inevitable result of the changes which had occurred in Soviet society. The Soviet industrialization period was marked by a buildup not only of physical capital but of

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human capital, possessing particular qualities. Of utmost importance in this process was the acceleration of upward mobility, encouraging traits of leadership. During this period there were two major channels of upward mobility. One—the rise through party ranks—emphasized loyalty, acceptance of discipline, and organizational ability as the tests of performance, qualities essential in a totalitarian system of administration and control. The other—the rise through professional (mainly technological) ranks—required education and special technical competence in the fields related to the urgent problems of the economy. Both channels have provided Soviet society with a steady stream of trained leadership, but one which, with the passage of time, has changed in quality and in the demands it makes.

The generation born and raised under the Soviet regime has taken for granted the existing channels of social mobility and has utilized them to the best of its abilities. While some of its forebears may have viewed the state or party in an aureate glow as their liberator from capitalist slavery, the newer generation tends much more to expect a relationship of give and take, "*do ut des*," with the regime, such as the relationship that exists between a seller and buyer of services. Any excessive "monopsonistic" tendencies on the part of the buyer are bound to be resented. It seems apparent that this fundamental change in attitude toward the party and state was sensed by Khrushchev and his associates—something which the old Stalinist guard was unable or unwilling to accept. The policies which in recent years have led to such trends as higher income for the farmers, increased social services for the workers, decreases in wage differentials and the like, by no means imply that Khrushchev feels greater concern for the welfare of Soviet subjects than did, say, a Molotov or a Kaganovich, but only that he is less inhibited in recognizing that the real Soviet "man in the street" is far removed from the former model of what a Soviet man ought to be.

The new course has made the Communist Party more competitively oriented with respect to other channels of upward mobility, forcing it to focus attention on ways either of attracting new leadership to itself or of controlling the alternative channels more effectively, yet without resort to former coercive methods. Toward the end of safeguarding its supremacy—without endangering the efficient operation of the economic system—the party has placed increasing emphasis on controls located closer to the local scene. The creation of the *Sovnarkhozi* (regional Councils of the National Economy), organized under a system of effective political checks, as well as the strengthening of the command position of area party secretaries, have reflected this tendency.

The trend of Khrushchev's policies has given rise to two basic questions: How far is the present party leadership willing (or able) to go in meeting the people's demands? Is there a possibility of retreat to formerly held positions? The total evidence of regime attitudes seems to suggest that it will yield only to the extent necessary to maintain the stability of the system and a sense of personal security among the citizenry. It will stop short of any real political concessions, and it will not change the basic priorities established for economic development. Political freedom and consumers' choice in the broadest sense are still incompatible with the Soviet system. On the other hand, though a retreat to Stalinist positions would probably be feasible under conditions of dictatorship, it is very unlikely that the regime would resort to such a course except in a dire situation of international or domestic unrest.

Against this background, let us turn to the changes of attitude on the part of the present policy-makers toward agriculture and the peasants.

Incentives and Organizational Reforms

Without question, the most important policy shift has been the regime's emphasis on the need for a substantial increase in agricultural output and its professed willingness to direct new resources toward the achievement of this goal. For the first time since collectivization was instituted, Soviet policy-makers have taken stock of their agricultural resources, openly admitted their failures, and initiated a series of measures to rescue agriculture from the dead end in which Stalin had left it.

As a preliminary step, the policy-makers showed a long overdue realization of the importance of the human element in the success or failure of any economic program or policy. Recognition of this factor—virtually ignored since the early industrialization period—led, among other early moves of the regime, to the granting of major price increases for agricultural products (since raised further, though now, under consideration for downward revision as we shall see). By raising incomes of the collective farms, the Soviet government provided the means both for a higher volume of capital investment and for a rise in individual peasant incomes, obviously designed as an incentive to raise productivity.[10]

[10] See *Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie SSSR: Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1958 godu* (Central Statistical Administration of the USSR: Soviet Agriculture in 1958), Moscow, 1959, p. 567.

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The regime's next step was to provide a proving ground for the "new look" in agriculture which would catch the imagination of the country as a whole—the result was the campaign for the development of the so-called "new lands," glamorized as a pioneering effort on virgin soil. There were of course practical considerations involved in this project: it was hoped that the plowing up of over 30 million hectares to create a new grain region in Kazakhstan and Siberia would augment the total food and feed supply, while mitigating the fluctuations in output caused by the periodic droughts in the principal existing grain regions. These potential gains apparently outweighed considerations of the complex technical problems and risks involved in bringing vast semi-arid areas under cultivation. What the long-range outcome of this program will be is as yet difficult to tell.

Both in the "new lands" project and in agriculture generally, one of the most interesting facets of post-Stalin policy has been the regime's attitude with regard to the optimal size of farm units and to the relative advantages of state-farm as against collective-farm organization.

Soviet agricultural experts and planners have taken various positions at various times with respect to the optimal size of farms. The notion that economies of scale could be achieved almost indefinitely by increasing the size of farms was very popular at the beginning of collectivization, but was later discarded in the face of mounting deficits and inefficiencies on the gigantic state farms that had been created. Nonetheless the idea again took hold after World War II, leading to an amalgamation of the collective farms in 1950 which reduced their number by two-thirds and increased the size of individual units correspondingly.

The post-Stalin period has seen a definite trend toward the further amalgamation of the collectives and, since 1957, toward the conversion of collective farms into state farms. These moves have been accompanied by much debate and a series of inquiries into the most efficient size of farms in specific regions and into the relative costs of output in the collective and state-owned units. In the "new lands" project, the planners have put heavy preferential stress on the formation of state farms of huge acreage, on the basis that they would be easier to administer and would show greater labor productivity, particularly in view of the need for the large-scale use of machinery on the flat-lands.[11] The recent conversion of collectives into state farms in other areas is explained by the regime as a move to help out poorer farms which were unable to effect improvements on their own, despite the increased prices decreed for agricultural products. In such cases it is probable that the farmers indeed preferred the guaranteed money wage of state-farm workers (while retaining their own livestock and a part of their garden plot) to eking out a meager income from inferior farms.

With regard to the amalgamation of collectives, a main argument put forward in its favor has been the possibility of a more efficient utilization of skilled managers and agricultural experts, who prior to 1950 were spread sparsely over many farms. It has also been predicted that amalgamation would result in decreased administrative expenditures, though there is little indication to date that such economies have been achieved.

Income and Investment Policies

The continued emphasis on amalgamation has been accompanied by a new focussing of attention on the deficient quality and low productivity of the agricultural labor force. As noted, it has been recognized that the relative scarcity of capital in conjunction with the relative abundance of agricultural labor (causing the more ambitious or semi-skilled workers to be attracted to better-paid industrial work) have been major factors in preventing the rise of productivity. Accordingly, in the process of amalgamation attempts have been made to keep the more skilled farmers and tractor drivers on the farms through increasing their incomes and through other incentives. At the same time the regime has applied pressure and devised special inducements to supply agriculture with skilled manpower from the urban areas. Moreover, there has been a rapid increase in the quantity and quality of machinery made available to agriculture, paralleled by the transfer of existing machinery from the Machine Tractor Stations to the collective farms themselves.

The rise in the prices for agricultural commodities paid by the state to the farms has resulted in a rapid increase in the farms' money receipts.[12] A part of this increment has been paid out to the collective farm members, and attempts are now being made to recompense them more frequently, in the form of advance payments on a quarterly or monthly basis, with some guarantee of a minimum income. One of the results of this incen-

[11] For relevant data, see *ibid.*, pp. 518-9. The total number of state farms in the USSR has increased during 1953-58 from 4,857 to 6,002, with an increase in sown area from 15.1 to 52.4 million hectares.

[12] Major price increases were announced in September 1953 (see *Pravda*, Sept. 26, 29), February 1956 (*ibid.*, Feb. 2), and July 1958 (*ibid.*, July 1).

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tive policy has been an increase in the number of days the farmers have worked on the collective land. Incentives—including price differentials—have also been used to supplement administrative measures in the regime's efforts to introduce changes in the output mix.

Out of the greater money income of the collectives, the farm administrations are ordered to reserve a share for investment, the proportion of which has been raised in recent years—though there are signs the government has had to apply pressure on this score to counter the peasants' desire for more labor payments. The demand for increased investment funds was attributed to the transfer of farm machinery to the collectives' charge, necessitating expenditures for repair, maintenance and new equipment, as well as to the need for funds for a massive program of farm-building construction. The present seven-year plan envisages a further broadening of the scope of such investments.

In addition to their direct investment in physical plant and equipment, the collective farms have been charged since 1955 with the responsibility for investment in what is termed social overhead and services—the expenditures necessary for building and maintaining rural roads, providing small power plants, constructing schools and other cultural facilities, setting up bakeries, laundries, *etc.* The regime was probably correct in assuming that these forms of expenditure would meet with the approval of the rural population, however grudging. While the peasants are anxious for a larger share of farm income, these investment demands must seem preferable to the previous regime's indirect discriminatory taxation of agricultural producers based on vague promises of services which generally were not forthcoming.

It is difficult to measure the precise economic effect of any of the various policies outlined above—indeed, any effort to do so would be the subject of an entire paper in itself. It seems clear, however, that the collective impact of these policies has been responsible in large part for the significant increases in agricultural production and labor productivity in recent years.

Social Aims of the Agricultural Course

Turning from the economic and technical aspects of recent policy to the broader issue of the present leadership's socio-political attitudes toward the peasants, it is possible to distinguish three trends of importance: the first is the party's tighter control over the execution of its agricultural program; the second, already touched upon, is the move toward a further socialization of agriculture; the third is the attempt to raise the social status of the peasantry, conditioned upon the success of the first two objectives.

One of the major weaknesses of the party throughout its history has been its comparatively small membership in the rural areas. At the farm level, the collective chairman and possibly a few lesser administrators have been the only party members—and it is difficult to tell whether their party membership led to their farm positions or vice versa. This situation was caused by the old regime's preference for controlling agriculture through a hierarchical line of command from above. An elaborate system of party as well as government supervision was established, operating through various channels and institutions. The cumbersome functioning of this control apparatus was resented both because of its alien nature—i.e., its imposition of orders from without —and because its bureaucratic actions were often detrimental to the interests of efficiency on a particular farm.

By contrast, the present tightening of party control has had the effect of moving the center of authority closer to the farms. The new collective amalgamations, the influx of agricultural specialists and former MTS personnel (often party members) into the farm organizations, along with a drive for new party recruits in rural areas, have made it possible to organize regular party cells on most collective and state farms. The consequent opportunity to exercise control from within, and to present the party to the mass of peasants as a local rather than an alien force, has undoubtedly increased the party's influence over the behavior of the farm population. The existence of local party cells may well lead to the increased autonomy of the collectives with respect to minor internal decisions, but will also insure that major decisions are carried out in accordance with party recommendations.

An interesting indication of the party's emphasis on control at the local level—and with this condition met, its positive preference for preserving an atomized society—was provided by a recent debate during the December 1959 Plenum of the party's Central Committee. The subject of the debate was the desirability of establishing an inter-collective organization to help implement investment and construction projects involving more than one farm, particularly to represent the farms in dealings with construction agencies and other industrial branches. Although many of the speakers recommended an all-union organization of the collectives for these purposes, the final resolution—which must be presumed to have reflected the high authorities' wishes—called for organizing the farms at the county or district level. Inevitably one is reminded of the

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difficulties the Soviet government had in controlling the *"Kolkhoz-Tsentr"* of the late 1920's, a similar organization of the collectives which became a forum for the expression of "non-conformist" ideas against regime policies. It would seem that the party policy-makers of 1959 are mindful of this experience, and entirely unwilling to take the chance that history might repeat itself.

The March toward Socialization

With regard to the second trend specified above, the fact that policies aimed at the further socialization of agriculture—meaning in effect a further "proletarianization" of the peasantry—were being tried out could be surmised from the following tendencies: (1) the decline of payments in kind and the increased use of money payments for the collective farmers' labor; (2) the decrease in the size of the private garden plots left to the peasantry, and in certain places their elimination; (3) the further conversion of a number of collectives into state farms. Some of the economic problems involved in these policies were discussed earlier, but their non-economic aspects are just as interesting. The trend of regime thinking is reflected in two frequently repeated slogans. The first declares that the differences between the collective and state forms of ownership are diminishing. By implication, the basis for this claim is that collective farmers are being transformed into money-wage earners and that a part of the collective's profits is being appropriated directly to tasks of a social nature, *i.e.*, beyond the interests of a single farm.

The second slogan proclaims the disappearance of differences between town and country; the implication here is that there will be a further equalization of industrial and agricultural income, along with an increase of social services and cultural facilities (still largely restricted to urban areas) in the countryside. There is no doubt that certain policies of the regime have been directed up to now toward narrowing the differential between urban and farm income, but the gap is still very substantial. The effort represents only the dimmest hint of a start toward Khrushchev's long-professed dreams of establishing "agro-cities," his descriptions of which have raised up the vision of a modernized countryside peopled by educated, skilled and prosperous agricultural workers participating as equals in a smoothly-functioning utopia.

It is absolutely clear—even to the most optimistic Soviet planner—that many years will have to elapse and a very large volume of investment will have to be committed before Khrushchev's version of Fourier's "phalansteries" becomes reality. The question to be asked, then, is why Soviet politicians are talking in terms which imply that this town-country equalization is just around the corner. One explanation is that they really believe in equalization as an ultimate goal of social policy, and that they want to enlist the peasants' aid by presenting them with a dream world, the achievement of which will depend on hard work, the sacrifice of certain tangible assets for the present, and above all faith in the guidance of the party and the state. Another explanation—which may supplement rather than exclude the first—is that the regime is attempting to condition the peasants to "proletarianization" and to make its consequences more acceptable to them by visions of future rewards.

Yet at the same time—in virtual contradiction of the talk that has gone on—there have been signs of late that the start toward town-and-country equalization may be slowed down. The most crucial indication in this respect has been the paving of the way for a cut in the commodity prices paid to agricultural producers, thus reversing the trend of previous policy. Ironically, the "demand" for such a cut has been put forward by agricultural planners and executives who claim to be expressing the wishes and speaking in the name of the peas-

Чтобы приукрасить положение дел в сельском хозяйстве, в некоторых районах Актюбинской области составляли очковтирательские отчеты. (Из газет.)



Оптический обман.

Caption above: "In order to make the agricultural situation look better, distorted reports were prepared in some of the districts of the Aktiubinski region." Glasses labeled: "Report." Caption below: "Optical illusion."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), February 29, 1960.

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ants. It is clear, of course, that the regime has instigated such talk, with an eye to immediate needs or gains and in neglect of whatever long-run plans may exist. To understand such an inconsistent and contradictory measure—as well as the tactics by which it was initiated—one must take into account the deep-rooted paternalistic attitude of the Soviet leaders toward the peasantry, their conviction that superior knowledge is a monopoly of the party and that the peasant is deficient in outlook and judgment. Changes such as the price-cut must be introduced from above, but the peasants must be cajoled along by subterfuge, by the sham impression that their opinions and "endorsement" have been taken into consideration. This paternalism, which Khrushchev apparently believes should be constantly exhibited (Stalin did not think it necessary) is in a sense the substitute for the individual freedom which is denied the peasants and indeed the whole population.

Peasant Viewpoints

In considering the peasants' attitude toward regime policies for further socialization, one is forced to cross over the boundary from facts to educated guesses. It is probably correct to assume that the idea of a return to private ownership has much less psychological appeal for the new generation on the collective farms than for its predecessor. For many of the new generation, farm work has become simply a matter of employment opportunities and income needs, rather than a preference for what used to be a "way of life." The peasants' garden plots and private cows undoubtedly still have symbolic meaning for them as the last bastion of proprietorship, but their deep attachment is also rooted in hard economic fact, since the plot is a dependable source of income in contrast to the uncertain and inadequate supply of money or income in kind from the collective farms. Not before the peasants' share in the product of their labor ceases to constitute a residual will they change their suspicious attitude toward the benefits bestowed upon them by the state. To state this in positive form, a change in their attitude will require substantial acts on the part of the regime to provide them with what they consider a fair return for their toil.

Another element in the peasants' attitude toward the state is their deep-rooted resentment over the long-professed supremacy of industrial workers in Soviet society. The innate superiority of the industrial working class over other classes of the population is a cornerstone of Bolshevik ideology—witness the basic concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Until recently the distinction between the industrial worker and the peasant was often emphasized in the regime's dealings with the peasants, and in fact provided the Soviet leaders with a self-made justification for many of their policies.

A consistent policy committed to raising both the income and the social status of the agricultural population might, with time, mollify much of the existing resentment of the peasants. The rise in the status of a particular group depends much more upon government policy in the Soviet Union than in other countries, so the choice in this respect is really up to the regime—and there are signs that a change of approach is under consideration. Whereas in the past, a peasant desiring higher social status had to join the urban working force and work his way up through the ranks of industry (or, of course, rise through the party), there are now a number of indications that greater social prestige may be accorded to the upper layers of the agricultural labor force, eliminating the intermediate step of urbanization.

* * *

The present paper has only scratched the surface in its attempt to review the new features of Soviet agricultural policy and to compare them with former attitudes and policies. A few basic observations should perhaps be summarized. The underlying assumption here has been that post-Stalin policies make sense primarily in terms of the evolutionary social changes going on in Soviet society, changes to which the Soviet state and party, as well as the peasants themselves, are seeking to adjust. In this process the relationship between the state and the agricultural sector of the population has increasingly exhibited elements of rationality, although both sides are showing caution with respect to firm policy commitments or behavior.

If, however, the regime persists in its present course, the likelihood certainly exists that some of its policies will have a socially desirable effect upon the way of life of the peasantry. It is even possible that this course will tend to transform peasant attitudes toward the regime over a long period. To say this is not to imply by any means that the peasants could become a zealous and enthusiastic "proletariat" of the countryside. However much the regime might improve the peasants' economic lot, it will continue to deny them other rights. It would be degrading to the Russian tradition of *zemlia i volia* (land and freedom) to accept the view that the desire for material well-being could permanently displace the desire for personal freedom—though how, when, or whether the urge for greater freedom will be able to assert itself in Soviet society are questions for a distant future.

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Sense and Nonsense about Soviet Aggression

Protracted Conflict,
by Robert Strausz-Hupé, William R. Kintner, James E. Dougherty, and Alvin J. Cottrell.
Harper & Brothers, New York, 1959.

The Question of National Defense,
by Oskar Morgenstern.
Random House, New York, 1959.

Reviewed by Alfred G. Meyer

NOT LONG AGO the Soviet government conducted a public opinion poll which revealed that the overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens questioned were confident that war with the Western powers was not, for various reasons, a present threat. They were apparently not asked to assess the Soviet world's chances for success in the non-violent competition that has been going on between the rival blocs since the end of World War II, but it is reasonable to assume, from what little we know about Soviet public opinion, that an even greater majority would have been optimistic on this count as well. I do not know whether any similar surveys have recently been made in the United States. My guess would be that the man in the street would be in general agreement with his Soviet counterpart on the improbability of nuclear war, albeit for completely different reasons. But regarding the West's prospects of "winning the cold war," the American public might prove to be far less sanguine. To judge from many scattered impressions, not a few people in the United States seem to be troubled by the difficulties and reverses—real or imagined—suffered in recent years, and by the successes and ominous threats of the Communist world. More and more people seem to believe that the Western powers are losing the cold war; and this apprehension is more bluntly and ominously stated in the two books under review than perhaps anywhere else.

The central thesis of *Protracted Conflict* is that the Western powers—and principally, of course, the United States—are, without knowing it, engaged in a global war against communism which the Communists, having developed a masterfully cunning strategy of "conflict management" (defined by the authors as "a conscious, managed struggle, the goals of which are mutually incompatible") and being favored by the "forces of history," are bound to win—unless, and only unless, the West learns "to counter the strategy of protracted conflict—to manage conflict in space and in time" (p. 27). The authors' description of the Communist strategy, which they claim to have been successful thus far, forms the main body of the book.

The authors redefine communism so as to strip it of all ideological meaning. It is simply a technique, a master plan for world conquest conceived by a "central intelligence." It is the most modern and effective synthesis of age-tested Machiavellian principles, an operational code having nothing to do with Marx or Lenin, but only with "conflict management." Yet the strategic devices it employs turn out to be no more than common-sense strategy, such as Mao's injunction to shun a head-on clash with the enemy so long as the latter enjoys a clear advantage (p. 154). In fact, most of the devices attributed to communism are practiced by every sensible politician and general.

According to the authors' interpretation, the single object of Communist doctrine is the pursuit of absolute power. For this reason, the prospects of peaceful coexistence are nil—as the Soviet leaders themselves "long have realized" (p. 147). Since the Communists also realize that the West is deterred by moral scruples from

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launching a preventive war (p. 127), they find themselves free to operate without any inhibitions whatsoever, moral, political, or otherwise. The Kremlin's "conflict managers" are thus held responsible for having "either instigated or aggravated almost every international dispute which has gripped the postwar world" (p. 22). They are blamed for all the dissent and dissatisfaction rife within the Western camp; for all the dilemmas and contradictions of US foreign policy (such as the dilemma of deciding whether to support colonial revolutions or to back the European colonial powers); for the parliamentary squabbles among the non-Communist parties in France and Italy; and for the anti-Western sentiments of underdeveloped nations in Asia and Africa. In brief, communism is portrayed as the satanic power of the 20th century, a conspiracy guided by diabolic intelligence and with unlimited means at its disposal. Needless to say, it is hardly worthwhile to refute such a remarkably naive and simplistic notion.

COMMUNISM FURTHER EMERGES in the book as an utterly undifferentiated monolith in which no variations exist, either of ideology or of policy. In fact, the reader never knows precisely who is meant by the term "Communists." It would even seem that there is really no such thing as Titoism, for according to the authors the squabbles among the "Titoists," the "Stalinists" and the "Khrushchevists" (authors' quotation marks) have all been concocted by the Kremlin for the purpose of masking "the weakness of its position in Eastern Europe" (pp. 81-82). Likewise, many strategic shifts and policy changes, which the authors themselves recognize as having been "prompted largely by the deep-seated ills of Soviet society," are nevertheless slyly turned "into stratagems of deception" (p. 68). As examples of such "stratagems" the authors list the New Economic Policy of the early 1920's, the resurgence of Russian nationalism in the 1930's, and Khrushchev's destalinization program. By this sleight of hand, every shift in Soviet policy becomes *ipso facto* a major Communist achievement, retreats and defeats are turned into victories, and lame rationalizations of these retreats are depicted as clever theoretical advances.

The key to this fanciful interpretation is the authors' inordinate emphasis on deception as one of the most important devices of Communist "conflict management." In their words, "to deceive the opponent as regards the method is part of the method." Now, while it is true that no modern state practices deception as flagrantly and uninhibitedly as the USSR (or, for that matter, any other Communist state), it is a patent oversimplification to maintain that *all* Communist policies contain an element of deception. Yet this is precisely what the authors assert, and this is why their interpretation of Communist pronouncements and actions is not merely arbitrary and misleading, but even dangerous. . For if Communist actions are calculated to "dupe" the West, then it follows that any attempt to negotiate with the Soviets is bound to end in a fiasco. Indeed, it would mean that there is no rational way of dealing with the Communists save one predicated ultimately on force.

The authors' examples of Communist deception are as fantastic as they are numerous. Thus, they assert that the USSR *pretends* to have a powerful force of strategic bombers; consequently the US is wasting its resources in building a matching force. Again, the USSR *pretends* (sic!) to be ahead of the US in ballistic missile development; as a consequence, the West is plunged into despair. In both cases, the results are said to be precisely what the Kremlin planned. The implication is that the Communist world is actually weaker in material terms than it pretends to be and outdoes the West only through its mastery of "conflict management." If communism should win, say the authors, it will be because it has avoided war in favor of the "psychopolitical modes of protracted conflict."

At the same time, the authors assert that the West will win, provided that it can hold out for another decade or two (p. 150)—a curious resurrection of the very theory of containment which the authors hold in such contempt. Their appraisal of the United States is phrased in such naively rhetorical terms as "high-minded devotion to moral principle," "forward thrust of American society," and "the American dream." Displaying a deplorable inability to make intellectual—or political—distinctions, they claim that the "American way of life" is far more attractive to the uncommitted nations than any other (p. 148)—even though there is a good deal of evidence to show that while these nations do indeed wish to combine "bread with freedom," their specific political ideals and programs do not necessarily correspond to those of the United States. If the United States should lose the protracted struggle in spite of these claimed advantages, the authors go on, this will be because it lacks a theory of "conflict management"—a lack that is explained in turn by moral scruples as well as the ingrained habits of parliamentary democracy.

BECAUSE THEIR EYES are fixed with morbid fascination on the Communist conspiracy, the authors of *Protracted Conflict* have little worthwhile to say about the revolution that is taking place in the formerly dependent

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nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Their only concern is with the Communists' exploitation of this "systematic revolution," as they call it, and the danger that the Communist effort, if successful (though nowhere do the authors discuss the successes and failures to date), will cause "the forces of systemic change" to "engulf" the West (p. 121). Yet the authors insist that it would be folly to meet the Communists on this battleground since the West is incapable of winning in Asia and in Africa (the "gray areas"), whatever resources it may expend there. Instead, the Western powers are called upon to stem the "systemic revolution" by concentrating their attention on the Soviet Union's weakest area—Eastern Europe. "So long as the West passively accepts the *status quo* in Eastern Europe, it can expect to encounter increasing Communist pressure in the 'gray areas'" (p. 83). What a momentous misunderstanding of a revolutionary process that is virtually independent of, and perhaps even more important than, the cold war between the Western and the Communist worlds!

THUS AFRICA and Asia do not count. Rather than accede to threats by former colonial nations to go Communist unless they get Western economic aid, let them go ahead if they want, say the authors. The cold war will be won in Europe. And how will it be won? By projecting the image of the open society to the people behind the Iron Curtain, and by taking advantage of the inner contradictions of communism, which suddenly ceases to be a master plan of devilish cunning and becomes instead an intellectually and ideologically bankrupt system (p. 135).

But whatever the nature of communism (system? strategy? conspiracy?), the authors' whole implication is that it is open neither to rational analysis nor to rational *quid pro quos;* negotiation with the Communists can only be negotiation for Western surrender. The ultimate safeguard against Communist aggression, they say, is the formation of a *pax americana*—"a universal political-legal order under Western leadership" (p. 150). Their book is thus calculated to arouse sufficient fear of communism to bring about Western unity (even though it warns against over-estimating Communist strength). This purpose is accomplished, in part, by word-magic, that is, by reiterating that all Western dilemmas are unreal and meaningless, and that all disunity is the result of Communist guile. All in all, the book is full of dubious generalizations and contradictory statements. Its explanation of current history is simplistic; its prescriptions, devoid of practical meaning. Its style and temper reflect political hysteria rather than sober analysis.

AFTER ONE HAS labored through the addled thinking of *Protracted Conflict,* the clear, icy logic of Oskar Morgenstern's *The Question of National Defense* comes as a welcome relief. To be sure, the author shares one simplistic assumption with Messrs. Strausz-Hupé *et al:* he, too, strips communism of all ideological content and presents it essentially as a conspiracy to rule the world. Yet this assumption is incidental to the main arguments, which are based on the hypothesis that it is Soviet capabilities, and not Soviet dreams or intentions, which matter. Moreover, in contrast to *Protracted Conflict,* Morgenstern's pages have the neatness and crispness, the irony and the impatience with stupidity in high places, which delight us in the writings of Hobbes and Machiavelli. Last but not least, the author manages to combine hard-headed military professionalism with the warm humanitarianism of the Western heritage.

Morgenstern's thesis is that modern weapons development has created a dangerously unstable world situation. The two principal powers have the ability to destroy all earthly civilization; and there is no possible defense against all-out nuclear warfare. While the attitude of the two powers toward each other approaches reciprocal paranoia, hostile intent on the part of any statesman need not even be assumed. Universal disarmament, although most desirable, "remains unattainable." Hence, there is no alternative to the balance of terror, and because the position of the United States has been deteriorating at an alarming pace, the balance has become precarious. Accidental nuclear self-destruction is also a distinct possibility.

Professor Morgenstern deplores all this. Yet, in contrast to Strausz-Hupé and associates, he is in favor of negotiating with the USSR inasmuch as it is the duty of the statesman to discover bases for agreement. War, he asserts, is the breakdown, not the continuation, of politics; and the military should prepare only for the eventuality that all other methods may fail. Our ultimate aim, says Morgenstern—and this, indeed, is what his book seeks to achieve—should be to refine or restructure the balance of nuclear terror in such a way that no nation would dare resort to total war, and also to balance limited war capabilities so as to discourage even conventional war, thus creating a better basis for fruitful negotiation between the major antagonists. The concrete proposals he makes for this purpose are presented with the compelling logic of mathematical game theory and are based on the axiom that destruction of the enemy's retaliatory power is the crux of modern warfare.

Professor Morgenstern proposes in addition that a mobile, dispersed retaliatory force (which he terms

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"the oceanic system") be created, and that it be deployed at a considerable distance from the Zone of Interior. In addition, he calls for systematic drives to advance scientific endeavor and to promote the build-up of diversified limited-war capabilities, the construction of fall-out shelters, and the creation of a well-protected sub-economy designed to function even after nuclear attacks. He also has sharp and cogent things to say about the baneful influence of veto groups on military planning, about harmful publicity as well as harmful tendencies toward secrecy.

Whereas Strausz-Hupé *et al.* complain about the excessive amount of discussion in democratic societies, Morgenstern deplores demands for the suppression of frank speech and criticism. While the former are unhappy about the West's preoccupation with non-violent political means and economic welfare (for which the Communists are presumably responsible), Morgenstern believes this to be in the best interest not only of the Western powers, but of the world at large (pp. 144, 215). Strausz-Hupé and his co-authors would like the Western powers to abandon Asia and Africa; Morgenstern, on the other hand, calls for competition between the two blocs in the underdeveloped countries (p. 220). In contrast to the one-sided rhetoric of *Protracted Conflict,* Morgenstern comes out against supporting "the governing classes, the tax-evading rich, cruel dictatorial regimes, colonial masters" (p. 278). The world, in his conception, is not divided into two parts, one wholly virtuous and the other wholly evil (a view held as much by the Communists as, indeed, by the authors of *Protracted Conflict*); and its problems, he fully recognizes, will not be solved through rhetoric or obfuscation.

One might disagree with Morgenstern on sundry details, such as his summary dismissal of the possibility of disarmament. It is doubtful whether any statesman on either side of the Iron Curtain plays the game of military planning with Morgenstern's mathematical precision. He very probably underestimates the forces of ideology, tradition, ingrained habits, and the like—in the Soviet as well as in the Western bloc. Indeed, apart from incidental generalizations of dubious value, Professor Morgenstern has nothing at all to say about the nature of communism or, say, Soviet foreign policy. However, since he intentionally excluded these topics from consideration, he cannot be criticized on this score. Withal, his book remains one of the most thought-provoking contributions to the subject of Soviet-Western relations, a "must" for anyone seeking clarity where so much dark prevails.

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A History of Post-Stalin Russia

Kreml ohne Stalin,
by Wolfgang Leonhard.
Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, Cologne, 1959.

Reviewed by George Denicke

THIS BOOK IS the product of a prodigious intellect, a wealth of experience, and thorough homework. It is a historical work in the true sense of the term, and a good deal more than an "invaluable reference book," as one review put it in only partial appreciation. It comes closest, indeed, to what at present might be considered a "definitive" history of the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin era.

Wolfgang Leonhard has brought to his task an uncommon store of knowledge. As a boy of thirteen he was taken by his mother, a German Communist, to the Soviet Union, where only a few months later, at the end of 1936, she vanished in the Great Purge. (She reappeared alive 13 years later.) Young Leonhard was nevertheless given a rigorous Communist education that culminated in his graduation in 1943 at the Comintern School in Ufa. He was then sent back to Moscow and put at the disposal of the German Communist Party which employed him in various capacities in the Soviet-sponsored National Committee for Free Germany. In April 1945 he returned to Germany, accompanying the first contingent of German Communists dispatched, under Walter Ulbricht's leadership, to establish the Communist administration of Berlin. He rose during the following years to a number of important positions in the East German party's Central Committee until, in 1949, as a privileged party functionary at twenty-seven, Leonhard broke with his masters under the impact of the Soviet denunciation of Yugoslavia. He fled to Belgrade and in 1950 moved on to West Germany where he now lives as a writer and publicist.[1]

If Leonhard's experience imparts to his work acuity and insight, his scholarship gives it solidity and an impressive breadth of vision. The massive physical dimensions of *Kreml ohne Stalin*—518 pages of text plus a 54-page bibliography—fully reflect the amount of thoughtful research that Leonhard put into this second work. As a result, his hazardous attempt to write the history of a period which is still more of the present than of the past succeeded brilliantly.

"Russia is a difficult problem, but it is not an enigma any more," concludes Leonhard in the first chapter after a review of the sources—almost exclusively Soviet—used in the preparation of his book. If the contents of the succeeding chapters tend to justify this encouraging statement, it is due not only to the increased flow of information from the USSR since Stalin's death, but in at least equal measure to the author's ability to extract significant information from the usually tendentious and sometimes downright mendacious official data. This crucial research problem Leonhard solved by a method that was simple in principle. He surveyed a huge bulk of Soviet documentation covering the period with which he was concerned, and, as he read, he carefully weighed every piece of information given at one date against what had been said on the same subject earlier and what was said later—an approach which has been used by other students of Soviet affairs, but rarely so systematically, so thoroughly, and with so much critical insight.

AT THE MOMENT a political event takes place, there usually are no means of finding out the true explanation for it. This often applies to democratic countries, but it almost invariably holds true for the Soviet Union, where

Born and educated in Russia, Mr. Denicke was Professor of History at Moscow University until 1922, then co-editor, with Rudolf Hilferding, of Die Gesellschaft *in Berlin. With Hitler's advent to power, he moved to France, and thence to the United States. His essays frequently appear in* Sotsialisticheski Vestnik *(Socialist Courier), published in New York.*

[1] Leonhard's experiences in the Soviet Union and his career as a party functionary in East Berlin are perceptively described in his autobiographical work *Child of the Revolution*, Regnery, New York, 1958 (originally published in German as *Die Revolution entlässt ihre Kinder*, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Cologne, 1955). The book was reviewed in the July-August 1956 issue of this journal.

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official interpretations generally obscure rather than illuminate the facts. Nor is it usually very useful to compare various comments appearing at the same moment in the Soviet press. But with the lapse of time, new information and new interpretations concerning the same event gradually appear, not because the truth always prevails, but because the intervention of new political developments necessitates new official interpretations. As a result, the earlier event begins to emerge in clearer perspective. Thus, we know much more today about the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party than we could learn at the time by reading the minutes of the proceedings. Now, from Leonhard's book, we learn still more, for he succeeds in presenting the congress as a crucial link in a relatively long chain of events of dramatic significance. For the first time, as far as this reviewer is aware, we have been given a relatively clear picture of the struggle which broke out in the Kremlin immediately after Stalin's death—a struggle which was not merely a personal contest for power among several personalities, but also a tug-of-war between alternative political lines, especially regarding the degree to which Stalin's political heritage should be renounced.

WE ALL know that out of this struggle Khrushchev emerged the victor. We also know that his path to victory was not a straight or easy one, and in his book Leonhard illuminates the ups and downs of the First Secretary's progress. Take, for instance, the developments of the first quarter of 1955. On January 8, having previously assured himself of majority support in the party leadership, Khrushchev went before the Central Committee plenum and accused the advocates of the consumer goods program—i.e., Malenkov—of rightist deviationism. Malenkov resigned as Premier and was replaced by Bulganin, who was generally regarded as "Khrushchev's man." The development was promptly viewed as a complete victory for Khrushchev; yet the victory was not as definitive as was assumed at the time, and Leonhard shows this by reference to articles which appeared the following April in *Pravda* and in *Kommunist*. Invoking Lenin's words, *Pravda* reminded its readers that "all members of the Politbureau have equal rights and that the Secretary is elected to carry out the decisions of the Central Committee." (p. 144) A few days later *Kommunist* made the same point with even stronger emphasis:

> Lenin stressed repeatedly the importance of collectivity in the leadership of the party and the country. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, said Lenin, . . . only the decisions of the Central Committee, arrived at in comradely fashion, and approved by the Orgbureau, the Politbureau or the plenum of the Central Committee, are to be implemented by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the party, and only these. Otherwise the work of the Central Committee cannot proceed correctly. (pp. 144-145).

There is little doubt that these articles were intended as a public reminder to Khrushchev that the principle of collective leadership was still the order of the day and that he had only the same rights as all other members of the Presidium. They appear very revealing today and help us to understand the developments which led to the crisis of 1957 and the condemnation of the "anti-party" group, and still later on to the disgrace of Bulganin.

Leonhard inquires in this manner into post-Stalin developments in all fields, and just to enumerate the topics treated in his book would take too much space: the table of contents is three and a half pages long. Leonhard summarizes his general conclusions in a final chapter entitled "Ten Theses on the Deveolpment After Stalin's Death." These theses, which the reviewer accepts almost without reservation, deserve a scrutiny which would again go far beyond the scope of this review. It is necessary, however, to single out at least the first of Leonhard's conclusions, for it is of really crucial importance:

> The internal political changes in the USSR since Stalin's death are so incisive that they can no longer be dismissed as tactical maneuvers. On the other hand, they do not represent—thus far at least—democratization or liberalization, but signify rather a modernization of the system under control of the party apparatus. (p. 504).

This statement contradicts the very common view that the political development of a highly industrialized country must lead toward democracy. In the reviewer's opinion, Leonhard is right in maintaining that Soviet development has until now failed to justify such an optimistic opinion. Indeed, not even a further softening of the regime and the gradual establishment of the rule of law would mean liberalization as long as the state continues to deny freedom of thought and expression. The Soviet system remains a one-party state admitting of only one system of ideas—a truism which is amply demonstrated in Leonhard's masterful history of Russia's post-Stalin era.

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"A Party of a New Type"

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
by Leonard Schapiro.
Random House, New York,
Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, 1960.

Reviewed by Bertram D. Wolfe

NO ONE WHO LOOKS at Russia can fail to be impressed by the changes which its rulers have made in its life during the 43 years of their rule. Yet there are certain key institutions which do not seem to change, or which change mainly in the direction of becoming more firmly rooted and all-embracing. The state continues to direct and control all aspects of life. A single party continues to dominate and rule the state, and to act as the core of all organizations. It brooks no rival parties, no organized factions or dissenting views in its own ranks. Since there are no checks on the flow of power to the top, this infallible party with an infallible doctrine has begotten now, for a third time, an infallible spokesman and leader. When Lenin was building the party, he rightly called it a "party of a new type," and he and his successors used it as an instrument for shaping a society of a new type. Though one can understand the United States without knowing the history of the Democratic or the Republican Party, and England without tracing the history of the Conservative, Liberal and Labor parties, one cannot understand the Soviet Union without studying the history of that unique institution—really not a party at all—which calls itself the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet leaders have tried to be helpful in this regard. Even the overburdened Lenin did several sketches of the history of his party. Zinoviev, Trotsky and Stalin, contending for the succession, wrote voluminously—and in direct contradiction with one another—on party history. After Stalin won, he appointed a succession of historians to give fixed form to the party's past in conformity with the requirements of his rule. But even the Stalinist histories suffered from a high mortality rate. Yaroslavsky, Volosevich, Popov, Bubnov, Knorin—each in turn became "official," and each in turn was condemned and scrapped. Clio seemed to have taken to chain-smoking, lighting each new history with the embers of the last. In 1938, Stalin became his own historian, writing or dictating the most fantastic version of all, which lasted, with minor changes, until his death. Then, some 50,000,000 copies were pulped or burned, and the party remained history-less until Khrushchev had sufficiently stabilized his regime and his version of the past to rewrite it once more.[1]

All that the scholar could do during this "historical" flux was to examine each official history, check the warring versions against each other and with fragmentary archives, and thus endeavor to extricate some bits and pieces of the truth. It is a measure of the importance of Leonard Schapiro's *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* that now at last we have a comprehensive history of that party, written according to the standards of historical scholarship which prevail in the Western world.

PROFESSOR SCHAPIRO was born in Glasgow and got his university training in England, but he lived from early childhood until 1920 in Russia, thus gaining a first-hand acquaintance with both the regime of the last Tsar and the age of Lenin. A Queen's Barrister and Reader in Russian Government and Politics at the University of London, he earlier showed his impressive powers as a historian and student of political theory in his *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy*.

In the present work, Professor Schapiro received the support of the Research Program in the History of the CPSU, at Columbia University, which granted him access to books, archives, and memoirs, but wisely left to him, as every "collective" historical enterprise should, the lonely travail necessary to creative work.

Mr. Wolfe, who last appeared in these pages as a contributor to the symposium, "Toward a Communist Welfare State?" (January-February 1960) is currently at work on a successor volume to his Three Who Made a Revolution *(Dial Press, New York, 1948).*

[1] See the writer's "New Gospel According to Khrushchev," in *Foreign Affairs*, Summer, 1960.

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No historian can write with bloodless dispassion of the most overpowering and passion-wracked events of his time. Mr. Schapiro makes no pretense of doing so. In his introduction he confesses a "predilection for respect for human life and dignity, freedom of thought and speech, justice, truth, and peace between man and man." So much of the story he has to record represents a frightful violation of all these values. But, as the good scholar must, he puts himself as well as his readers on guard. He restrains the temptation to step outside of the story and lecture its participants, striving steadily to ascertain the facts, to portray the events, to give the motives of the participants in their own words. Only rarely does he feel called upon to speak in his own character, in a compassionate, ironical, or thoughtful side remark. Mostly he lets the actors and events speak for themselves. It is this mastery of himself and his materials that gives the work its quiet yet powerful impact.

One of the defects of much of the writings of Western scholars on Russian Communist Party history lies in the fact that their authors have succumbed to the danger of viewing bolshevism's opponents—liberals, democratic socialists, and opposition Communists, not to mention conservatives and monarchists—through the distorting lens of the victors' appraisals of the vanquished. The truth about the defeated is indeed hard to come by; to enter sympathetically into an understanding of their ineffectual struggles and lost causes is harder still. In the present volume, however, Professor Schapiro performs a brilliant work of reconstruction. Through it, the lost worlds of the "Economists," the "Liquidators," the Russian democratic or semi-democratic socialists and defeated Communist oppositionists, are brought to life again.

Thus, though Mr. Schapiro would seem to have no sympathy for the Mensheviks and makes explicit criticism of their errors, the criticism is not based on unconscious acceptance of Lenin's statements of their positions. Always he is careful to reconstruct those positions as the Mensheviks themselves saw them. When he is critical, it is from the standpoint of his own liberal and democratic, non-socialist criteria, and most often comes at those points where he finds the Mensheviks prisoners of doctrines that were so close to Lenin's as to paralyze their fight against him and, willynilly, help him sow the dragon's teeth that would bring the harvest they feared.

BECAUSE OF THIS USE of historical imagination in order to enter into the essence of a view before appraising it, Professor Schapiro sheds fresh light on all the currents of Russian thought that were opposed to bolshevism. Menshevism, for example, appears not as a unified doctrine or faction, but as a complex of four or more differing approaches which intermittently united but still remained internally at war. In treating the controversies among Russian political leaders, he has managed to give due scope to the personal element in their quarrels without losing sight of the objective consequences of the victory of one person and viewpoint over another. Moreover, unlike his countrymen, Messrs. Deutscher and Carr, who have written much in this field, he does not start out from the viewpoint that Stalin's tempo and methods of forced industrialization and collectivization were inevitable. Thus, he supplies the first serious account of the Bukharin alternative of gentler planning, less ruthless "socialist accumulation," and a better balance between consumer goods and those designed to increase the might and power of the owner-state.

One defect must be noted. The reviewer missed a systematic exposition of the nature of totalitarianism, that system of a new type which Lenin's "party of a new type" has engendered. Instead, the author offers a variety of labels that might be considered applicable to the Soviet system—"autocracies, dictatorships, despotisms, autocratic democracies, or whatever one likes to call them"—and leaves the reader to take his choice. But the absence of a clear terminology and definite exposition of the nature of the Soviet system is offset in large measure by the penetrating criticisms which this barrister-turned-historian makes of a system of government in which there is no rule of law and law exercises no restraints upon the rulers. Moreover, the book is rich in *obiter dicta* which suggest, as the author says, that although the problems the Soviet government faces are similar to those of other modern industrial lands, "the structure of this government" and its methods of solving these problems are "unique."

A definition of the features that make the Soviet structure unique might easily be added at the point where the author portrays the machine as it existed when Khrushchev inherited it from Stalin. Professor Schapiro will have ample opportunity to make this or any other revision he may have a mind to, for in the reviewer's opinion this history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is destined to go through many editions and to have a long and useful life. We have long needed an unofficial and non-apologetic history of this sort. Not only does Mr. Schapiro's volume fill the need; it is in addition a work of solid erudition, great clarity in exposition, and literary grace, the product of a ripe and humane mind, a worthy companion to the same author's brilliant *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy.*

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The "Thaw" and After in Eastern Europe

The Revolt of the Mind,
by Tamas Aczel and Tibor Meray.
F. A. Praeger, New York, 1959.

The Warsaw Heresy,
by S. L. Schneiderman,
Horizon Press, New York, 1959.

The Reluctant Satellites,
by Leslie B. Bain.
Macmillan, New York, 1960.

The Soviet Bloc—Unity and Conflict,
by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960.

Reviewed by Paul Willen

NEARLY FOUR YEARS have passed since the Polish and Hungarian upheavals of 1956, and in the relative calm which has ensued it may seem as if the October outbreaks were only isolated outbursts of passion which momentarily interrupted the smooth flow of Communist policy in Eastern Europe. Indeed, when one recalls the hopes and expectations of that period, this conception appears not altogether unjustified. And yet, to take the current placidity in Eastern Europe at face value would be clearly unwarranted. The four books here under review are powerful reminders of the political trauma which Eastern Europe experienced in 1956, and which has had a long-range impact far deeper than may be evident to the casual observer.

The Revolt of the Mind, by the Hungarian writers Aczel and Meray, demonstrates clearly that the Hungarian revolution was not a sudden spasm of national rage, but rather the final act in the complete breakdown of a social and political order. Leslie Bain's *The Reluctant Satellites* reminds us once again of the broad sweep of the Hungarian uprising, its massive hatreds and ambitions. L. S. Schneiderman's *The Polish Heresy* recalls the fiery intellectual atmosphere of Warsaw between 1955 and 1957—far from extinguished even today. The most important of the four books, Zbigniew Brzezinski's *The Soviet Bloc,* provides the first precise outline of the basic changes that have taken place in intra-bloc relations as a direct outgrowth of the "agonizing reappraisal" of 1955-57. It may well be said that, if the revolutions of 1956 seem to be in some measure forgotten, it is only because in daily practice so many of their lessons have not been.

BOTH TAMAS ACZEL and Tibor Meray are former Hungarian Communists who played leading roles in the writers' revolt against Rakosi's order and were eyewitnesses to everything they describe. Their book is the first substantial effort to describe the revolution in terms of its intellectual and moral origins rather than in terms of its final physical expression. Indeed, it is their claim that too much attention has been paid to the climactic events of 1956, and not enough to the complex and painful process by which the intellectuals slowly prepared themselves, and the country, for the final blows. In their own words,

> **Those who investigate the history of the Hungarian revolution usually describe and analyze the events of the spring and summer of 1956. True, that spring and that summer were like a succession of fiestas, complete with fireworks and with sensational events and heroic struggles. But the autumn and winter 1955, with their quasi-hopeless efforts and churning passions and feats of real courage, had already inflicted deep wounds on the clay-footed giant.**

The fact is that the October 1956 uprising, far from being a sudden and unpremeditated outburst, was only the final culmination of the earlier revolt of Hungarian writers and intellectuals, signifying the destruction of the regime's "transmission belt" without which the collapse of its moral authority and the alienation of its major sources of popular support became almost inevitable.

Formerly a political analyst for Radio Free Europe, Mr. Willen has published numerous articles on Soviet and East European affairs in this journal as well as in other American publications such as Commentary, The New Republic, Dissent, *and* The New Leader.

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The heroic street fighting of October, which drew the attention of the world, was but the visible end result of this process.

The revolt of the mind in Hungary did not take on any of the sophisticated intellectual forms which it assumed in Poland, where writers wrestled endlessly with their own complex psyches, frequently with brilliant literary results. In Hungary, the writers' revolt was direct, blunt, and thoroughly political in character, with no literary or intellectual pretensions. Little effort was made to evolve a compromise philosophy of diluted Marxism ("revisionism"), and there was little interest in winning philosophic points or engaging in subtle doctrinal debate. On the contrary, the issues were quickly reduced to either/or terms, and the question of state power promptly posed.

For this reason, the fundamental discussions of 1953-55 in Hungary were not carried on in public forums as was later the case in Poland. Rather they took the form of a series of direct confrontations, generally over party conference tables, between the eager and united writers, perhaps defending a secret manifesto which they were circulating, and regime officials, who vacillated between threats and entreaties.

The exchanges at these conferences were sharp and vigorous—and fraught with incalculable personal risk for the writers. The latter, as Aczel and Meray stress, stood almost alone in their opposition to the regime and had no assurance that their acts of defiance would not result in permanent loss of their personal liberty. "This," the authors proudly write, "was the heroic age of the Hungarian writers' resistance movement."

WHAT WAS PERHAPS the decisive turning point in the writers' struggle came in the spring of 1955, when Rakosi regained power after the first premiership of Imre Nagy. Summoned to attend a disciplinary meeting with the party leaders, the writers were by no means sure what was in store for them. Rakosi delivered a sharp harangue, followed by several hours of discussion. Then, Gerö turned to each of the writers, one by one, and demanded a statement unequivocally approving a proposed resolution for strict party controls on literature. The replies were nearly all to the same effect: "As a member of the party I am obliged to obey. But I cannot agree with the resolution."

In the face of the near-unanimity of the writers, the party leadership could not apply the severe punishment the situation demanded. Party membership could, in certain cases, be revoked or suspended, but for the moment little else was possible, and the writers had won their gamble. After the meeting, Rakosi called Aczel aside and said to him:

"Tell me, what do you want? Haven't we given you everything? Kossuth prize, Stalin prize? You have a nice car, a beautiful flat . . . What else do you want? Tell me!"

Aczel did not reply, and Rakosi stared at him incredulously, "like a tired old man," recalls the author.

The efforts of Aczel and Meray to explain the origins of the Hungarian writers' resistance unfortunately do not add much to our still meager insight into the basic causes of their revolt. The authors treat their own "awakening" as a natural response to Stalinist horrors, but they are unable to explain how and why it occurred when it did or, for that matter, why it was the Hungarian writers—and not the Czech, for instance—who broke so decisively through the intellectual structure of communism.

Yet this is only a minor flaw in the book, which is essentially narrative rather than philosophical in character. In piecing together the breathtaking struggle of the Hungarian writers, Aczel and Meray have done much not only to correct the popular identification of this group with the "freedom fighters" who commanded the headlines in October, but also to explain why the mere physical defeat of the freedom fighters at the hands of the Soviet Army could not, and did not, result in the restoration of Rakosi's Hungary. An armed uprising can be forgotten, but a moral collapse cannot. The real revolution—consisting exactly in this collapse—had started well before the streets of Budapest were taken over by the freedom fighters, whose role it then became to insure and complete the triumph of the Hungarian writers. This is by no means to minimize the heroism of October, but only to place in proper perspective the deeper origins of the Hungarian revolution.

THE SITUATION IN POLAND was, of course, quite different. There, as Mr. Schneiderman and others have pointed out, the intellectuals did not form, as in Hungary, an isolated and self-contained social stratum waging a largely single-handed, behind-the-scenes struggle against a tyrannical party leadership. Rather, the movement to effect a change in Poland was almost from the start—*i.e.*, September 1955—national in character, drawing support from cadres as well as intellectuals within the party. Its spokesmen were able to address the nation at large, and their demands found a ready echo within the highest state and party councils.

Revisionism in Poland could thus become a practical program for the future instead of remaining, as in Hun-

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gary, an essentially subversive anti-party ideology. Divisions were blunted, and there were many shades of opinion in between the extreme opposing viewpoints, making possible an atmosphere of genuine debate in which each side could answer the other. In Hungary, where the position of either side virtually excluded that of the other, such honest debate had become impossible as early as the spring of 1955, and had existed earlier only because of direct Soviet intervention.

Schneiderman reviews many of the debates that took place in Poland—such as the famous one in the winter of 1955-56 between the revisionist philosopher Chalasinski and the "dogmatist" Schaff—and thus gives an idea of the intellectual ebb and flow which characterized the period. The door was always kept slightly ajar to permit either side to make an orderly and dignified retreat if necessary. If the party was flexible enough to retreat in 1956, the Church was flexible enough to modify some of its claims in 1958.

Schneiderman writes as a journalist, and his book is neither profound in its analysis nor particularly novel in the material it presents. In common with many other efforts to define the exact character of Poland's "heresy," it relies excessively on such conventional political categories as "Stalinism" and "democracy" whereas Polish developments seem constantly to defy this kind of categorical nomenclature.

Leslie Bain's *The Reluctant Satellites* suffers even more from the shortcomings of a quick journalistic survey, a fault compounded by the author's immensely exaggerated notion of his own personal role in the events he describes. The sole merit of his account lies perhaps in its effort to probe into the nature and role of some of the disparate elements which played a part in the Hungarian revolution. Contrary to the popular impression, the authors of the uprising did not represent an altogether homogeneous body of political opinion. Bain distinguishes between four different groups: first, the writers, journalists, and artists (mostly Communists) who dominated the struggle prior to October 1956; second, the students and younger workers who spearheaded the October outburst itself; third, the "masses" in general, who spontaneously reacted to the first Soviet intervention; and fourth, the "nondescript groups of Tommy gun-wielding 'heroes' . . . 'hunting' AVH personnel," somehow controlled by General Pal Maleter, Defense Minister in Imre Nagy's short-lived government, and influenced in some vague way by "reactionary" ideas and hopes.

In recognizing the role of this last element, Bain by no means implies that there was justification for the second Soviet intervention of November 4, of which he paints a bloody picture. On the contrary, he is firmly convinced that this element represented only a small minority within the revolutionary camp, and that at no time was there any danger of its gaining control of the revolution. Yet its emergence cannot be overlooked in any objective appraisal of the Hungarian October; indeed, the temporary appearance of the street gangs may be taken as a reflection of the turbulent emotions of revenge which so sharply distinguished the events in Hungary from those in Poland.

EXACTLY WHICH GROUPS would have assumed control in Hungary had the Soviet Army not intervened remains, of course, a subject of tantalizing conjecture. The intellectuals who formed the vanguard of the revolution—such as Aczel and Meray—lacked that type of positive program which is demanded of a revolutionary government. Aczel and Meray themselves acknowledge this fact when they write: "The most regrettable characteristic of the writers' movement was its almost entirely negative objectives: *i.e.,* it was anti-Stalinist, anti-Rakosist. The positive program that should have inspired the whole movement was still lacking." In Poland, the new "revisionism," though vague and evasive, lent itself to a measure of realizable action; but in Hungary, where Rakosi had effectively cut off all channels of legitimate reform, the sudden and total collapse of the regime's authority created a vacuum which could hardly be filled by a program of temperance and moderation. "The formulation of a comprehensive program," Aczel and Meray observe somewhat pathetically, "required time and reflection." For this the Hungarian intellectuals showed little inclination, and the Soviet Army gave them no time.

As a result of Soviet suppression of the revolution, the problem of a "comprehensive program" for Hungary became academic. Aczel and Meray—and a quarter of a million other Hungarians—escaped to the West, where their whole spiritual development had, in fact, been propelling them. In the course of time and in varying degrees, Poland and Hungary have since been reabsorbed into the framework of the Soviet bloc. However, this framework is no longer the same as it was when Poland and Hungary temporarily broke away from it in 1956; and it is this metamorphosis which forms the subject of Zbigniew Brzezinski's ground-breaking study, *The Soviet Bloc.*

The task Mr. Brzezinski has undertaken—a definition of the new intra-bloc relationships that have evolved in the last five years—is as hazardous as that of describing the anomalous position of communism in Poland. Not-

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withstanding many internal contradictions and ambiguities—almost inevitable in this nether world—his book represents the first incisive and methodical treatment of this extremely complex problem.

If "national communism" as developed in Yugoslavia has been clearly repudiated by current official Communist ideology, it is equally plain that the doctrine of Moscow's primacy no longer means quite what it did a decade ago. Above all, the terms "satellite" and "colony" have lost some of their former appropriateness. Writes Mr. Brzezinski:

In the new situation the Soviet regime had to be more responsive to the dominant views prevailing in the Communist world. Soviet power had not declined; in fact, it had grown in every respect. But the new element in the situation was that the power of Communist regimes elsewhere had also grown. The Politburos in Prague and Sofia were no longer staffed by cowed *apparatchiki* intently detecting the significance of the latest Soviet pronouncement . . .

PRIOR TO 1956, the study of communism in Eastern Europe consisted largely in an examination of evolving Soviet policies directed toward the control of essentially pliable and inert governments and parties. Since 1956, on the other hand, the configurations of policy in individual East European countries have been the product of an as yet unsystematized interaction between the visibly differing regimes and the dominant Soviet authority. East European leaders no longer owe their positions exclusively to Soviet selection and favor, but also to the authority they enjoy in their own countries as the architects and directors of the massive state and industrial machinery built up in the last 15 years. Brzezinski points out:

The very fact that the (1953-54) New Course did take into consideration the peculiar domestic facts existing in each case is a reflection of the change that had taken place in the Soviet world since Stalin's death.

Between 1953 and 1956, the Soviet leadership experimented with various formulas looking toward a new approach to intra-bloc relations. Its policies vacillated between the traditional conservatism represented by Molotov and the new pragmatism advocated by Mikoyan and subsequently taken up by Khrushchev. This vacillation culminated in the erratic Soviet decisions of October 1956—*i.e.*, the initial move to intervene by force in Poland to block Gomulka's assumption of power, followed by the sudden switch to a policy of concessions; and Moscow's enunciation of the concept of a "socialist commonwealth," contradicted five days later by the Red Army's intervention in Hungary.

IT IS DIFFICULT to perceive any orderly line of policy development in these chaotic events. The Kremlin was clearly "playing it by ear," moving ahead one day in an apparently genuine effort to explore the possibilities of a more flexible, give-and-take relationship with the bloc countries, and retreating the next in terror of the possible consequences of such a change. One can understand these erratic actions only if one assumes, as Brzezinski does, that the Kremlin leaders were indeed gripped by genuine confusion and keenly-felt dilemmas. They should have been prepared for the events of October 1956; but they were not, and hasty efforts were made to restore minimal order in the chaos that had broken out. The slowly evolving doctrines of intra-bloc diversity had to be modified, tightened up, codified; and yet the necessity for new formulas remained as great as before October. Says the author:

The method employed to reconstruct the center testified to the new times. Unlike the period of Stalinism, Soviet leadership in the bloc was no longer an autonomous fact due entirely to Soviet power and monopoly of ideological experience. Soviet leadership in November 1957 was contingent *in considerable measure* on the backing that it had received from Communist regimes much weaker than itself but strong enough to be needed. . . . (Italics added)

If Mr. Brzezinski hedges a little, interjecting the qualifying "in considerable measure," the reader must excuse him: the situation was, and remains, of course, too fluid to permit any definitive and categorical conclusions.

At best we can discern the faint beginnings of an as yet unsystematized interplay between the center and the periphery, an ever-expanding area of domestic competence and autonomy, and a growing diversity of practice based on local circumstance and predilection. If Budapest and Warsaw continue to flirt with limited "revisionist" ideas, Sofia and Prague are allowed to stamp out such ideas even more fiercely perhaps than Moscow might deem advisable. That these new relations based on a measure of autonomy will ultimately be codified into a genuine social contract seems unlikely, but it remains a remote possibility.

In conclusion, Brzezinski rightly recognizes that the "new diversity," by imparting a degree of "elasticity" to intra-bloc relationships, may have the ultimate effect of giving the system "a more stable condition not unlike the transformation of the papacy." On the other hand, he also sees a possibility that the dispersal of Moscow's authority might be accompanied by a serious erosion of ideological cohesion, which could result in a disastrous weakening of bloc unity. In short, if force is no longer to be relied on to cement the Soviet empire together, a

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general congruence of ideas and objectives, freely arrived at, must be evolved to take its place.

In offering these speculations, the author has broached a problem which is crucial to a long-range evaluation of communism as a system of organized states, and in the ultimate analysis it is precisely as such a system of nations that communism will have to prove its viability. There can be no question that Brzezinski's speculations on this problem mirror processes of thought that also are engaging the minds of Communist leaders in Moscow, Warsaw, Sofia and other bloc capitals. But above all, his book is to be welcomed as a hopeful sign that, at long last, Western scholarship is abandoning the notion that tolerance of any diversity whatever within the Communist world contradicts the fundamental character of communism. This is a dogma which Stalin's successors are beginning to discard, and which students of the Soviet bloc should abandon as well.

Bulgarian Communism

The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development, 1883-1936,
by Joseph Rothschild.
Columbia University Press, New York, 1959.

Reviewed by Cyril E. Black

PROFESSOR ROTHSCHILD has written what will no doubt be accepted (outside the Soviet orbit, at least), as the definitive account of the origins and development of the Bulgarian party up to the eve of World War II. It should be considered, along with such works as Benjamin I. Schwartz's *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (1951) and M. K. Dziewanowski's *The Communist Party of Poland* (1959), as a worthy example of the application of Western standards of scholarship to a subject which is usually treated by pamphleteers.

Scholarly excavation for little-known facts from Communist and non-Communist sources is an important contribution in these studies of indigenous party movements, but it is also important that the facts be interpreted in terms of the basic issues with which all Communist parties have been concerned. Now that a few such case studies are available—and others are no doubt in preparation—one may properly consider what fundamental questions they should pose and answer. Three suggest themselves as being of particular importance: What were the circumstances that led to the formation of the political movement which became the local Communist party organization after 1917? What were the strategy and tactics which characterized its political activity? And, most important of all, what distinctive social and economic program did it offer?

A considerable section of Professor Rothschild's study is concerned with the history of the so-called "Narrow" wing of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, which became the Communist Party in 1919. The key figure in the early years of the movement was Dimiter Blagoev, who had gone to Russia as a seminary student in 1878 but was soon swept up in the radical populism of the period. Before long he moved on to Marxism, and had the distinction of founding the first Social Democratic group in Russia in 1884. He later returned to his native country and assumed the leadership in establishing the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party in 1891. However, Blagoev's close ties with Russian social democracy, which embodied a characteristic fusion of Marxism with the values peculiar to radical populism, shortly brought him into conflict with the "Broad" wing of the party, which derived its inspiration from Central and Western Europe. The party finally split in 1903. Henceforth the Narrows in Bulgaria, like the Bolsheviks in Russia, went their own way, remaining under Blagoev's leadership until his death in 1924.

The remarkable similarity in the evolution as well as the tactics of the Narrows and the Bolsheviks foreshad-

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owed a period of close cooperation once the latter gained control in Russia. But even before 1917 the Russian influence was considerable. Owing both to the relative isolation of Bulgaria from Western and Central Europe and to its close cultural and political ties with Russia, not only Blagoev but an entire generation of Bulgarian leaders had come under the influence of Russian radicalism

Equally important for an understanding of the Narrows were the circumstances which turned Bulgarian opinion increasingly towards radicalism in the period leading up to World War I. Among these factors, the most critical were the great sacrifices and frustrations resulting from the government's nationalist program which culminated in the wars of 1912-13 and 1915-18, and its relative neglect of the pressing problems of social change and economic development. The defeat of Bulgaria in 1918 decisively enhanced the prestige of the two political movements which had been most critical of the government policies of the preceding decades —the agrarians and the socialists (both Broad and Narrow)—and for the next five years they occupied the center of the Bulgarian political stage.

THE NARROW-COMMUNIST policies between World War I and 1936 may be considered in two stages. The first, which lasted until 1923, was marked by faith in the anticipated "world revolution" and a consequent refusal to cooperate with other radical parties. When offered an opportunity to join with Stambolisky in the short-lived Radomir uprising in 1918, Blagoev argued that his party was too weak to make its influence felt, and that it ran the danger of being swallowed up in an agrarian movement which he regarded as essentially bourgeois. Elections held in August 1919, at the height of postwar popular disillusionment, brought the downfall of the government (dominated by the so-called Liberal Party) and put the Peasant Union in power. Although the Communists proved to be the second largest party in the country, winning 47 out of 236 seats in the National Assembly in 1919, and 50 out of 229 seats in the elections of March 1920, their leaders saw no reason to change their policy. In the next few years they were much more concerned with Stambolisky's petty persecution of their party than they were impressed by his revolutionary potential. Thus they chose to adopt a policy of neutrality during the bloody coup of June 9, 1923, when the Peasant Union was overthrown by an authoritarian coalition led by Tsankov.

This passivity brought down the wrath of the Comintern on the heads of the Bulgarian Communist leaders. Speaking before the Executive Committee of the Communist International, Radek referred to this incident as "the greatest defeat ever suffered by a Communist Party," and intsructions were sent to Sofia ordering a Communist insurrection. The Bulgarians argued their case as best they could, but in the end acceded to higher authority in Moscow and made unenthusiastic preparations for a *coup* of their own against Tsankov. The uprising dragged on intermittently for about ten days, and on September 28 its leaders retreated in full rout into Yugoslavia. In relating these events, the author tends to share the views of the Soviet leaders, or at least he does not give an independent analysis of the existing balance of forces. The evidence suggests, for instance, that despite the electoral successes of the Peasant Union and the Communist Party, reflecting as they did the popular discontent in the wake of the war, the effective power in the country still lay with the traditional instruments of force, of which the most important was the army. Unlike the Russian government in 1917, the Bulgarian government had not disintegrated as a result of the war. It was defeated, and morale was at a low ebb, but under disciplined leadership the army alone had enough influence by 1923 to swing the balance. To assume that the Communists and the Peasant Union could have held power jointly in 1923, divided as they were by fundamental differences in strategy and tactics, does not seem to be supported by the evidence.

The failure of the revolt in September 1923 ushered in the second stage of policy, in which the Communists, with their headquarters now in exile, attempted to repair their position by seeking alliances with the Peasant Union and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, and by engaging in political activity through the trade union movement as well as through the Labor Party, organized in 1927 as a Communist front. During this period the Bulgarian Communists also served as the principal mouthpiece of the Comintern in manipulating the affairs of the other Balkan Communist parties. The only significant deviation from the policy of retrenchment was the bombing of the Sveta Nedelya Cathedral in 1925, perpetrated by what was later acknowledged to be an "ultra-left deviationist" group, and which resulted in further persecutions of the Communists. All of these matters are treated by the author with painstaking attention to detail.

AS DISCIPLES OF LENIN, the leaders of the Bulgarian Communist Party devoted themselves to the seizure of power. But the purpose of seizing power is, after all, to exercise it, and one is justified in asking

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what program the party leaders were proposing for their country. What did they think of the controversies raging within the Communist Party in Russia? Did they have any original ideas about their own country, or were they prepared to put into effect whatever program the Bolsheviks could agree on for Russia?

Mr. Rothschild has provided a full treatment of the political maneuvers of the period, with an abundance of data that overflow into lengthy footnotes and an appendix, but he has not attempted to answer questions such as the above, except in the sketchiest sort of way. The very full discussion of the Macedonian question and the movement for Balkan federation is not matched by a comparable treatment of domestic social and economic problems. Khristo Kabakchiev, Vasil Kolarov, Georgi Dimitrov and their colleagues are mentioned frequently as political agents, but they do not emerge clearly as thinking revolutionaries. There is so little effort at analysis that it is difficult to get perspective even on such important questions as party organization and Bulgarian relations with the Comintern. Politics rather than policies are the principal concern, and the brief concluding chapter is limited to a few trite interpretive remarks.

The author's achievement is nevertheless significant, for he is the first scholar who has had the energy and patience to hack his way through the dense underbrush of Bulgarian politics of the period. What is needed to round out the picture is an understanding of the social and economic problems facing Bulgaria, the efforts made to solve these problems, and the nature of the Communist contributions to these efforts. Such issues can perhaps best be tackled in a second volume dealing with the years after 1936, and Mr. Rothschild is clearly the man who should undertake the task.

The Indian CP

Soviet Russia and Indian Communism, 1917-1947,
By David N. Druhe.
Bookman Associates, New York, 1959.

Reviewed by Myron Weiner

THAT THE SOVIET UNION, as a Communist state, has pursued policies aimed at altering the internal political systems of other countries is a proposition which hardly needs documentation. Indeed, the methods that Moscow has employed in the pursuit of this objective have long provided an engrossing topic of investigation for scholars and others interested in Soviet and Communist affairs, and they now form the subject of a vast and growing body of analytical literature.

There is, of course, nothing historically unique about attempts by one country to change or influence the internal political structure of another. Colonial and occupying powers have traditionally concerned themselves with the political organization of the societies over which they had control. Again, it is a well-known fact of modern diplomacy that states often undertake certain moves with a view to the effects such action will have on the internal politics of the countries with whom they are dealing, or on the internal politics of third powers.

But even though intervention in another country's political life is, in itself, far from being a novelty, the Soviet Union has nonetheless made its own special "contribution" in this area. Specifically, this contribution has been in the development of methods and techniques for the systematic use of indigenous movements to bring about political changes conducive to the realization of Soviet foreign policy goals. Soviet methods and techniques have varied from one country to another. In recent years, particular attention has been paid to the evolution of these techniques in relation to societies that formerly were under colonial rule but now are independent states, or that still remain in colonial status.

On India alone—the largest and clearly the most

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important of the "new" states—there are now at least four major works: M. R. Masani's *The Communist Party of India: A Short History;* J. H. Kautsky's *Moscow and the Communist Party of India;* Gene D. Overstreet's and Marshall Windmiller's *Communism in India;* and the book under review, *Soviet Russia and Indian Communism,* by David N. Druhe.[1] From these four studies it is possible to piece together a comprehensive picture of the basic techniques whereby the Soviet Union sought to achieve its threefold aim of bringing India under the sway of Communist influence, destroying British colonial control, and thereby undermining the foundations of British capitalism.

First and most obviously, Moscow offered India's nationalist revolutionaries an ideology which explained Britain's role in India in terms of capitalist-imperialist exploitation, which placed their struggle against British colonial rule within the broader context of a worldwide struggle for proletarian liberation, and which held forth a messianic vision of colonialism's demise and the ultimate triumph of the working class.

Secondly, the Soviet Union sought to shape the strategy and tactics of the Indian Communist movement. What relations the Indian party should establish with the National Congress and with the Muslim League; whether it should set up fronts "from above" or "from below"; what its stand should be on the demand for a separate Pakistan and on the issue of India's participation in World War II: on all such vital questions of strategic policy, the Indian Communist line was determined—or, at the very least, decisively influenced—by Moscow, acting either directly through the Comintern or *via* the Communist Party of Great Britain. Soviet authority over the movement, it should be noted, gave the Indian Communists a cohesiveness which other left-wing political parties in India have lacked. As Overstreet and Windmiller point out, Moscow's guidance served the same cohesive function in the CPI that charismatic leadership has served in the Indian National Congress: many a controversy within the party was resolved through Soviet intervention.

Thirdly, the Soviet Union provided ideological and organizational training for Indian and other Asian converts to communism. In the early 1920's, some 600 Asians, including 22 Indians, were indoctrinated at the newly-established University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow. Instruction in foreign languages, education in the Communist classics, induction into the esoteric notions of the movement and its organization, development of a sense of identification with a vast network and a vast cause, as well as practical training in the techniques of applying certain strategies and tactics, all were central to the training program.

Fourthly, Moscow gave material support to the Communist movement in India, in the form of money, propaganda literature, and even arms.

Finally, the Soviet Union sought to infiltrate Afghanistan, Iran, Chinese Turkestan and Tibet, partly in order to facilitate the dispatch of Communist agents into India, and partly to open up possibilities for instigating armed insurrections along India's frontiers.

OF THE SEVERAL STUDIES devoted to Soviet relations with the Indian Communist movement, David Druhe's perhaps offers the most detailed historical treatment of the techniques outlined above. Kautsky's analysis confines itself to events since 1945 and hence deals primarily with Soviet "intervention" in Indian politics after the achievement of independence. Masani's study is of greatest value for its treatment of Indian Communist united front tactics in the late 1930's—tactics which Masani, as an Indian socialist leader, directly experienced and bitterly denounced. The work by Overstreet and Windmiller is by far the broadest in scope, for it not only provides a history of the Indian Communist movement from its beginnings, but also deals with the structure of the party, its leadership, its relations with other groups, its parliamentary activities, and its adaptation to Gandhian ideology and to Indian linguistic and ethnic pluralism.

Although Druhe adds little that is substantively new to the account of Indian Communist relations with Moscow as given by Overstreet and Windmiller, his treatment of specific aspects and developments is, in general, more complete and detailed. This is especially true of his delineations of the Cawnpore and Meerut "conspiracy trials" of Indian Communist leaders.[2] Again, his exposition of Soviet activities in Afghanistan and Turkestan—in relation to Moscow's strategy for India—is both detailed and revealing. Indeed, while Druhe's study, like the others mentioned above, focuses primarily on the changing strategy and tactics of the Indian Communist Party as guided by Moscow, it devotes

[1] See Selig S. Harrison's review of the Kautsky and Masani studies in *Problems of Communism*, No. 1 (January-February), 1957, pp. 38-40; and G. S. Bhargava's review of the Overstreet-Windmiller volume in No. 2 (March-April), 1959, pp. 51-4.

[2] In both these trials, the first at Cawnpore in 1924 and the second at Meerut between 1929 and 1933, the Communist defendants were adjudged guilty of "conspiracy" to overthrow British sovereignty in India as instruments of the Moscow Comintern. See Chapters II and IV.

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greater attention than do the other historical accounts to the wider range of Soviet activities in South Asia. On the other hand, the bulk of the book is confined to the period up to Indian independence in 1947, and the reader interested in later developments must turn to Kautsky or Overstreet and Windmiller. In an effort to bring his study up to date, Druhe has appended a 20-page epilogue summarizing the development of Soviet policy in India from 1947 to 1959, but this unfortunately is all too brief, superficial, and marred by several errors.

Reflecting upon Druhe's account of Soviet efforts to promote communism in colonial India, one is struck, not by the occasional successes, but by the enormity of the errors committed. In the early period particularly, Moscow often placed its trust in Indian Communist leaders who were completely detached from. and lacked an understanding of, the realities of the Indian scene. M. N. Roy, for example, with whom the Soviets worked for a considerable period, remained outside India—and largely out of touch with the Indian situation—for some 15 years. As a consequence, while most of India's future political leaders were building their careers on the groundwork of identification with growing nationalist sentiment, the Communists, under Moscow's guidance, tended to remain aloof from the pouplar nationalist movement and from the Indian National Congress. At the same time, Soviet attempts to further their penetration of South Asia by using Afghanistan as a springboard failed to win Afghan support.

Socialist ideologies and movements did, indeed, gain strength in India during the 1930's, but they grew largely outside the Communist Party, in the newly-formed Congress Socialist Party and a host of smaller Marxist groups. As Druhe points out, it was only during the period of united front tactics in the late 1930's, and the period of the party's "People's War" policy following Soviet entry into the Second World War, that the Communists were able to score significant gains. It was ironic that the party should have had its greatest success precisely in these periods when its policies, as dictated by Moscow, were most obviously calculated to strengthen the international position of the Soviet Union, rather than in the earlier years when Moscow had prescribed a sectarian strategy aimed at maximizing Communist strength within India itself.

MUCH THE SAME holds true for the period since Indian independence. When the Indian Communists, again in obedience to the line laid down by Moscow, strove to maximize their power through insurrectionary tactics, the party was almost wiped out. On the other hand, after 1950 when Moscow recognized the advantages of cultivating a "neutralist" Nehru government and consequently "toned down" CPI policy, the party achieved its maximum growth. Thus, one might say that Soviet, or Communist, successes in India have been largely "accidental" in the sense that they did not result from policies consciously aimed at augmenting Communist political influence within India, but were rather the side-effects of policies primarily calculated to strengthen the Soviet Union's international position.

Furthermore, although the more recent Soviet strategy of cultivating friendly relations with the Nehru government has helped the Indian party to win wider popular support, it is equally important to consider the debit side of the ledger—*i.e.,* the limitations its places on Soviet guidance and support of the Indian Communist movement. Obviously, the Soviet Union can no longer employ the full range of techniques which it could use in former years: as long as it wishes to maintain cordial governmental relations with India, it must eschew such practices as the extensive training of Indian Communist personnel in Moscow and threats of military penetration. It must also be circumspect in its tactical advice to the Indian party leadership; in fact, one may surmise that on certain issues Moscow has refrained from giving any advice whatever to the CPI under the aegis of the present strategy.[3]

This is not to argue that the CPI is now a truly "Indianized" party, but only to suggest that it now is probably freer from Soviet control, guidance and support than in any earlier period of its history. As Overstreet and Windmiller stress, this gives the party a great degree of political flexibility. At the same time, however, the party is also freer to become involved in internal factional disputes without the guiding hand of Soviet authority to hold its ranks together. The recent Sino-Indian border conflict (which broke out after the publication of Druhe's book) has provided a striking illustration of this. Moscow's unwillingness to become embroiled in the dispute precluded any guidance to the CPI, and the result was a serious rift within the party as to the line it should pursue. Any further aggravation of Sino-Indian tension is bound to intensify the problems of the Indian party, especially since its internal disagreements cannot be resolved through external intervention—at least so long as Moscow adheres to its present strategy. In short, the blessings of "independence" for the CPI are indeed mixed.

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[3] For a somewhat different view, see G. S. Bhargava, *op. cit.*—*Ed.*

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Britain's "Pink Decade"

Communism and British Intellectuals,
by Neal Wood.
Columbia University Press, New York, 1959.

Reviewed by Stephen Spender

ONE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS of the 20th century is, notoriously, the cult of youth. By now it is taken for granted that each decade will see a new generation reacting against those who were young in the previous decade, and coming forward with ideas that their seniors take with a great show of seriousness. There is even perhaps a feeling, shared by all generations, that one day the young might really hit upon something which would "save" our civilization.

However, when we look back upon the young of previous decades, we have a feeling very much like that of the "morning after," when we wake up with a bad hangover. Such a vicarious, transferred hangover is now beginning to be felt about the "Angry Young Men"—just as it was felt 30 years ago about the "Bright Young Things," and 20 years ago about the 'Pink Decade" of the 1930's.

It is impossible to justify a worship of the young which leads to perpetual disappointment, made inevitable by the simple fact that the young get old. Why, then, do we go on looking expectantly to the youth of each succeeding generation? Various explanations are possible, one being, perhaps, that the youth cult began in the First World War, when the old did indeed force the young into being heroes. After the war, the young of the 1920's staged their revenge against the old by rejecting the concept of social responsibility. From this point of view, the young of the 1930's were voluntarily reliving the "war to end war": they were the volunteers who assumed the place of the young men slaughtered on the Western Front in 1914-1918. The intellectuals of the "Pink Decade" did in fact identify themselves to some extent with the suffering and the poetry of the trenches, expressed in the poems of Wilfred Owen, the novels and memoirs which began to appear ten years after the Treaty of Versailles. Moreover, young Englishmen like John Cornford, Ralph Fox and Julian Bell, who died in Spain, thought that by fighting for the Spanish Republic they might avert a second world war.

These thoughts are brought to mind by Neal Wood's *Communism and British Intellectuals.* But perhaps what strikes one most in reading the book is how remote seems today the period when the British Communist Party was at its intellectual apogee.

Thinking, as we tend to do, in terms of the intellectual fashions afflicting youth in each decade, it is easy enough—and indeed the younger generation today is inclined—to think of the communism and antifascism of the 1930's as such a fashion. That is what is so bad about the cult of youth. It makes every attitude appear like a kind of clothing suitable to the day on the calendar and the age of the wearer.

THE TRUTH IS that the young, far from being free agents who can introduce onto the scene of our lives a completely new idea which might redeem us all, are to a peculiar extent victims of our time. What we take to be their shout of victory is often just a yell of hatred for the old, whom they feel to be the setters of a trap into which they have just fallen. It is true that they care deeply for freedom, but this is because, more than the old who have gained some degree of material independence, they are aware of the constraints of an age which is dominated by money and power.

To see things in this light is not flattering to the young. It does, however, put them back in the situation in which we all live, and thus prevents their attitudes from seeming as completely unreasonable as do those of the 1930's when looked back upon by a new lot of young people who have been flattered by their elders into thinking that the attitude before theirs was but a silly pose.

Poet, novelist, and essayist, Mr. Spender took part for a brief period in the 1930's in the British Communist movement, an experience which he described in his contribution to The God That Failed *(edited by Arthur Koestler, Harpers, New York, 1947).*

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The fellow-travelling anti-fascists of the 1930's were by no means so naive, so deceived, so credulous, or so foolish as they may appear to the young of today, who tend to look back on them simply as supporters of a literary fashion in which certain poems were written, and for which certain people died. Mr. Wood's book is invaluable in that it puts the "intellectuals" of that extraordinary decade back into their own contemporary environment. When they are put there, the problem becomes the opposite of that which arises when one judges them simply by their youthful work: the difficulty now is to understand how any young person with sympathy for his fellow beings and a sense of responsibility could have taken a different attitude.

Anyone who lived through the 1930's himself, or who has examined the thought of that period in the light of the historic situation as it then existed, may well feel that, had the Communists not been what they were, a great many more British intellectuals would have become —and remained—Communists. This may sound paradoxical, but it becomes less so if one examines the three main factors involved: (1) the hard core of revolutionaries in control of the British Communist Party; (2) the situation of the 1930's; and (3) the men of good will, the anti-fascists, and especially the young writers and students of that decade.

The hard-core revolutionaries were already party members before 1930 and were dominated by a few leaders who had participated in the General Strike of 1926 and endured prison sentences, who were doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist-Stalinists, and whose main preoccupation was (and still is) the idea that the lifeline of communism is the party line as laid down by Moscow. The two chief leaders were remarkable men and made a remarkable combination: Harry Pollitt, the likable, warm-blooded, outspoken boiler-maker from Lancaster; and Palme Dutt, the austere, cold, dedicated theoretician.

The situation of the 1930's was really three situations rolled into one. First, there was the mass unemployment which resulted from the disastrous economic policies pursued following the Treaty of Versailles and climaxed by the Wall Street crash of 1929; second, the Nazi seizure of power in Germany in 1933; and third, the Spanish Civil War—dress rehearsal for World War II.

The "men of good will" were mostly young intellectuals of middle-class upbringing who were gripped by a complex of guilt, empathy and resistance as a result of the threefold situation. Guilt, because it was the very social system to which they owed their own social advantages that also had produced the killing disease of unemployment. Empathy, not just for the unemployed, but also for the victims of fascism, intellectuals like themselves. Resistance against the fascists in Spain, where the civil war provided an opportunity to unleash some of their frustrated passion against fascism, and where it also seemed that a determined defense of the Republican cause might avert a second world war.

In these circumstances Europe seemed the stage of a classical revolutionary situation, a crisis of capitalism. The Marxist analysis of the situation had great appeal because its objectivity and completeness, its program for reversing the whole existing system, demanded dedication of the entire interests and personalities of those who supported it in order to produce a change in the entire situation. In the age of a black and cruel totalitarianism, total evil could, it seemed, only be answered with total measures.

THERE REMAINED, however, the problems of freedom and truth. In order to make the changes that were necessary, there could not be liberal freedom. Questions of freedom and truth became the topics most agonizingly debated among the young of the 1930's. And it is a significant fact that the Communists never quite succeeded in inducing more than a few British intellectuals, who supported the Communists' policies, their economics, and their action in Spain, to accept also the way in which they put into practice the famous Marxist formula that "freedom is the recognition of necessity." Why was this?

The extended perspective of Mr. Wood's survey suggests an interesting answer to this question. It is that thinking men and women who care deeply for freedom will accept restrictions on their freedom to say what they know or believe to be the truth, and on their personal liberty, only within the limited circumstances of an action in which they can have a realistic grasp of political necessity. Thus, most supporters of the Spanish Republic accepted—just as patriots in other wars have accepted —the fact that there had to be a certain amount of propaganda surrounding the cause; that one could not admit atrocities committed by one's own side; that, as long as there were soldiers dying for a side which on the whole seemed better than the opposing one, their confidence ought not to be undermined by the insistence of some supporters of the Republic upon carrying on a perpetual inquest into all its doings—especially since a good many of its opponents were already doing just this.

Within the limits of such an unpleasant but perhaps inevitable discipline, restrictions on freedom can be accompanied by an expansion of the human spirit expressing itself in ways which are no less expressions of freedom. Revolutions are in fact like this. There is a

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great deal of *repression,* but there is also a great deal of *expression.* Even the Russian Revolution, in its initial phases, had this dual aspect. Until the mid-1920's, its violence of repression was accompanied by experimentation ranging from the arts and the cinema to the universalization of free love.

The Spanish Republic, in stimulating what was a short-lived intellectual renaissance in Spain, gave outlets to this desire for an expansion of the human spirit. But the British Communists—and, in fact, Communists everywhere—did not. Instead of the limited repression of truth and freedom which men of good will can accept as a voluntary discipline, the Communists sought to impose an ideology of repression which, both in theory and in practice, was almost indistinguishable from fascism. Instead of saying that there are times when one has to be quiet about the truth, they denied that there was such a thing as objective truth. Truth was something manufactured to suit a particular set of interests, and all that mattered was that the interests be those of the proletariat and not of capitalism.

Thus, the Communists confronted their fellow-travellers not just with the necessity of making responsible, if agonizing, decisions about truth and freedom, but with the far more tormenting problem of ends and means. The debate among the young anti-fascists began to take the form of asking one another whether their comrades were entitled to use the means of their opponents in order to achieve ends which were assumed to be quite different.

THE REASON WHY the debate took this form was, of course, because the Communists were determined to superimpose upon the exigencies of socialist revolution in Europe the further exigencies of Stalinism in the Soviet Union. The Communist-sympathizing anti-fascist who wished to oppose the lie of the British government's non-intervention policy in Spain (which provided Mussolini with an excuse for sinking British merchant ships carrying provisions to Spanish Republican ports) was also expected to defend the lie of Stalin's trials of his own comrades. In fact, what was a "lying policy" when practiced by the democratic capitalist powers became pure truth when practiced by Communist Russia. And the British Communists, led by Pollitt and Palme Dutt, were fanatical defenders of the lie become truth by conversion from a capitalist to a Communist context.

It is unfortunate that Mr. Wood does not mention what was surely a turning point in the relations between the intellectuals and the Communists. Perhaps the reason for this omission is that André Gide, who was responsible for it, was French. But the author might have pointed out that Gide's *Retour de l'URSS* (which, incidentally, was translated into English) touched off a crisis in the relations of all Western Communist parties with their fellow travellers.

André Gide went to Russia in the middle of the 1930's, was received with honor, banqueted and feted, and on his return published his journal of the visit. While sympathetic to communism, it told of the absurd idolatry of Stalin and gave some impression of the atmosphere of terror in Russia. Gide was immediately denounced all over the world as a fascist, and the arguments adduced against him were similar to those used during the First World War against anyone who had read German philosophy. It was, I believe, this unconcealed fury against Gide which, more than anything else, made English writers realize the pressures the Communists were exerting on them not to portray the truth, either of fact or of the imagination.

One of Mr. Wood's most interesting chapters deals with scientists who embraced communism, and it suggests some curious conclusions. One—as the chapter title, "Utopians of Science," indicates—is that scientists toy with scientific ideas in their social thinking, either because they tend to assume (as the general public may also do) that all their thinking is objectively scientific, or because they permit themselves, in their thinking about society, a carelessness which they would never allow in the laboratory. Communism appeals to them because it holds forth the picture of a society which is thought about analytically, and in which science will play a leading role. To some scientists, the benefits which a scientifically governed world could bestow on future generations entirely removes from consideration the suffering and injustice which its construction may impose upon the present. Thus, odd as this may seem, the scientists were far less concerned than the poets about Communist distortions of truth.

This is, in sum, an interesting book which performs a very great service for the study of communism. The time has perhaps not yet come to pass final judgment on the historic significance of the British intellectuals in communism, but Mr. Wood's book suggests how important the subject is.

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The CMEA: A Progress Report

IN AN ARTICLE published in these pages a year ago, this writer discussed the problems of economic integration of the Soviet orbit.[1] How have efforts to interlock the economic plans of the East European countries progressed since then, and how much closer has the Russian-sponsored Council of Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA) moved toward implementing supranational long-term planning?

The scope and intensity of the CMEA's activities have increased distinctly over the past year or so. Its functions now reach into virtually every economic sector—industry, agriculture, trade, transport, communications, banking. It has become the central mechanism for intra-bloc coordination of planning techniques, national accounting methods, and even of some areas of economic thought. It has also become an important clearing house for the spread and assimilation of technological "know-how." Yet, for all this broadening of its activities, the CMEA has not proved very successful in achieving an economically efficient coordination of the bloc.

Two major—and partly conflicting—considerations nurture the East European planners' sense of the system's inadequacy. There is, on the one hand, an increasingly articulate recognition that inequalities of size and natural endowment combine with differences in the stage of industrialization to perpetuate or even widen disparities in levels of economic development among the members of the bloc. Thus, recent Soviet calculations (the first of the kind to be revealed) suggest that the industrial output of Rumania and Bulgaria—the two Balkan latecomers to industrialization—equals no more than about one-half and two-fifths, respectively, of the Soviet per capita figure.[2] As for the industrially advanced Central European members of the bloc, the political capability of the Soviet Union to keep real wages at extraordinarily low levels affords the USSR a lasting and increasing advantage over them no less important than its bigness and natural wealth.[3]

The following table compares real wages of industrial workers in the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany as of 1958:[4]

	Average monthly earnings	*Zloty equivalent*	*The same USSR=100*
USSR	785 rub.	1190	100
Poland	1621 zl.	1621	136
Czechoslovakia	1325 Kcs	1740	147
East Germany	436 DM (O)	1820	153

There is also good reason to believe that sheer preponderance of power favors the Soviet Union's bargaining position *vis-à-vis* her small partners.[5] In sum, it must be expected that, under the present rules, some members of the CMEA "family of equals" will continue growing more "equal" than others.

On the other hand, the fundamental inconsistency of attempting to integrate *non-market* economies by means of a *market* has become increasingly obvious. International trade on a crude bilateral basis has remained, in practice, the principal instrument of integration: arrangements for intra-bloc commerce in the period 1961–65 have been or are being made by pairs of CMEA members, more or less on a barter basis. Various attempts to give some degree of multilateral character to bloc trade arrangements have failed, and this is now being frankly admitted.

DISCUSSING THE PROBLEMS of rational planning in his recently published major theoretical study, the Polish economist, Professor Oskar Lange, argues that economic rationality in a socialist society grows by stages, first via national and later via *international*

[1] Alfred Zauberman, "Economic Integration: Problems and Prospects," *Problems of Communism*, No. 4 (July-August), 1959.

[2] *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 1, 1960, p. 24.

[3] See a polemic between M. Rakowski, *Gospodarka Planowa* (Warsaw), No. 6, 1958, pp. 8 ff., A. Bodnar, *ibid.*, No. 8, 1958, pp. 19 ff., and S. Polaczek, *ibid.*, pp. 24 ff.

[4] Figures drawn from national statistics. Soviet earnings estimated. Purchasing power parities taken to be: 1 zl. = 0.66 rub. = 0.78 Kcs = 0.24 DM (E). These were derived from computations based on Polish expenditure structures, carried out by the National Bank of Poland. *Cf.* A. Zwass, *Gospodarka Planowa*, No. 10, 1959, p. 36.

[5] See the examination of intra-bloc terms-of-trade by Horst Mendershausen, *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. XII, No. 2, 1959.

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plans.[6] It is indeed true that as work progresses on the very-long-term (15–20 years) national plans, more and more emphasis is being placed on interlocking them internationally. But the stronger this emphasis, the clearer the obstacles. How can the available planning techniques—primitive as they still are even on the national level—operate effectively on an international scale? At present, for the coordination of national plans, the CMEA relies on a set of "material balances" compiled only for some selected products. These balances are not comprehensive enough to ensure an equilibrium of economic growth; in fact, because they are fragmentary, they themselves become a cause of bottlenecks and strains. Moreover, the "recommendations" which the CMEA makes to individual bloc countries (on the basis of the material balances), specifying the outputs and surpluses they should set for themselves, are not enforceable by any authority, and this inevitably causes uncertainty in intra-bloc transactions. Finally, if prices do not reflect opportunities on a national level (and rates of exchange are divorced from the purchasing power of currencies), how can they possibly be used as indicators of opportunity costs and provide a basis for making sensible choices on an all-bloc plane?

THE SEARCH for some solution to these difficulties has been perhaps the most interesting feature of the bloc's coordinating efforts during the past few months. There has recently been created within the CMEA a Permanent Economic Commission which, under instructions from conferences held last autumn in Moscow and Warsaw, is now engaged in the task of devising basic tools for intra-bloc decision-making. The Commission is known to be working on methods of comparing the efficiency of factors in similar sectors of production in different member countries, and inquiring into questions such as the amount of capital required per unit of output, output per man-hour, and over-all cost per output unit.

Following the present vogue, CMEA planners are also turning to advanced programming methods and computational techniques as a means of overcoming formidable difficulties. (At the Warsaw conference, linear programming and integration of supra-national input-output matrices were advocated for CMEA use.) It will be interesting to watch the progress made along these lines, since quite apart from the technical difficulty of developing effective linear programming schemes, the application of the method to pricing policy faces serious doctrinal hurdles, as has already become sufficiently clear in the USSR in connection with Professor Kantorovich's celebrated book.[7]

Also, deficiencies in intra-CMEA foreign-trade financing severely handicap rational integration. Analyzing the national plans for the first half of the 1960's, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe very pertinently noted that ". . . in most [CMEA member] countries considerations of the relative profitability of different levels and patterns of trade seem to have taken second place . . . to fears of difficulties in expanding exports at a rate sufficient to pay for more than the essential minimum of imports, or to an apparent simple wish to limit import dependence."[8]

There is a peculiar dialectic in the Soviet bloc's economic integration effort. The more exasperating the obstacles to a partial integration, the bolder become the demands for an organic one. It is perhaps not surprising that Soviet experts now appear less concerned with the national sensibilities of junior CMEA partners, and insist with increasing emphasis that the course of bloc economic development inexorably leads "through a number of successive transitional forms to an increasingly close interlocking of these economies and a gradual practical realization of V. I. Lenin's principle of a unified world socialist economy."[9] More and more clearly, then, Lenin's vision of "a single all-world economy controlled by a common plan . . . under socialism"[10] emerges as the central goal of the CMEA's long-range development. Needless to say, the political implications of this development require serious consideration.

[6] Oskar Lange, *Ekonomia Polityczna* (Political economy), Warsaw, Vol. 1.

[7] *Ekonomicheski raschet nailuchshego ispolzovania resursov* (The economic calculation of the optimum utilization of resources), Moscow, 1959. See also J. M. Montias, "Planning and Efficiency in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, No. 3, 1960, pp. 61-4.

[8] *Economic Survey of Europe in 1959*, ECE, Geneva 1960, p. 47.

[9] O. Bogomolov, *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No. 1, 1960.

[10] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Russian ed., Vol. 31, p. 125.

Alfred Zauberman

Mr. Zauberman is a British economist specializing in Soviet and East European economic problems.

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Hungary's Prisoners

IN MY LONG ARTICLE on the state of affairs in Hungary, published in the March-April 1960 issue of *Problems of Communism*, I indicated that there were prospects for the release of seven imprisoned writers, intellectuals and labor-leaders on the then approaching fifteenth anniversary of Hungary's liberation from Nazi oppression, April 4, 1960. This was, indeed, a wish that united all friends of the Hungarian people and all believers in a peace based not on fear and capitulation, but on mutual respect for differing opinions and human rights.

A political amnesty is, of course, always welcome for humanitarian reasons, especially when it affects a nation which underwent so cruel an ordeal as did Hungary. Yet there was a reason even weightier than the humanitarian one. The persons in question were rightly considered the living symbols of Hungary's love for liberty and also of her willingness to live in peace and harmony with the "East" as well as with the "West." For these men not only challenged Soviet domination over Hungary, but frequently expressed the hope that the trends of democratization manifest at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (February 1956) would materialize and enable Hungary to live in close friendship with the Soviet Union. Surely these men were anything but warmongers or reactionaries. Their persecution, therefore, was tantamount in the public eye to punishing peacefulness when not combined with servility; and their hoped-for release was expected to mark the end of an era of brutal repression.

THE DECREE OF amnesty issued by the Hungarian Presidential Council on March 31, 1960, with reference to the approaching anniversary, met these expectations to some extent; nevertheless, it fell short of what the Hungarian people had been hoping for. The most important provisions of the decree were: disbandment of the internment camps by the end of June this year; release of those political prisoners sentenced before May 1, 1957, whose verdict did not exceed six years of imprisonment; and amnesty granted to six persons—Tibor Dery, Ferenc Donath, Mihaly Farkas, Vladimir Farkas, Ferenc Janosi and Gyula Varadi.

In practice, this meant that two intellectual champions of the thaw period—the distinguished novelist Tibor Dery, and the internationally renowned playwright Gyula Hay (the latter included in the "not exceeding six years" category)—were at last set free. It was well known that both of them, and especially Dery, were men of delicate health. Leading authors, scholars, artists and scientists from all over the world had voiced appeals on their behalf. It was a relief to learn that they could leave prison in reasonably good health and that they would presumably be permitted to contribute further to the literary life of their country.

Among those specifically granted amnesty, there were two more noteworthy figures of the thaw period: Ferenc Janosi and Ferenc Donath. The first is the son-in-law of the late Imre Nagy, and the second is a former agricultural expert and high party official, who was imprisoned, ironically, as Kadar's accomplice during Rakosi's reign. Both had been deported to Rumania after the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, together with Imre Nagy.

IN CONTRAST to these people, Mihaly Farkas and his son, Vladimir, both of whom were also amnestied, are neither political deviationists, nor intellectual "revisionists," but outright Stalinists. Next to Rakosi and Gerö, Mihaly Farkas was the most powerful *apparatchik* of the Communist Party, differing from his two seniors mainly through his ignorance. He was second to none, however, in vanity, cynicism, and bloodthirstiness. His son, a colonel of the Security Police, was also a notorious sadist. Both father and son were imprisoned on the eve of the Revolution, in response to public pressure. The fact that they were released did not cause either surprise or resentment among the Hungarians, who are generally far too tired of bloodshed and revenge to become upset about such matters. The question might be raised, however, as to why it was necessary for Kadar to publicize their names along with those of Tibor Dery and the others. Was it done for the sake of providing a public demonstration of the formula, "keeping the line between revisionism and sectarianism"—the local projection of Premier Khrushchev's intermittent outbursts of bellicosity anl "peaceful coexistence"? Most probably so, for it should be noted that other leading figures of the Stalinist era, such as Gabor Peter, former chief of the Security Police, had also been released, albeit without any publicity.

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The fact remains that in view of the approaching summit meeting, the dramatic collapse of which had not, of course, been foreseen by anyone, and in view, too, of the preparations for a spectacular display of "internal consolidation" on April 4, the Hungarians had hoped for a general political amnesty. In this they were disappointed.

Evidently, the Hungarian Government's obsession with "keeping the line" is responsible for the half-heartedness of the amnesty. Among those who still languish in Kadar's jails are many fine men. The most important of them is probably the legal historian, Professor Istvan Bibo. Although a member of the Imre Nagy coalition government, he had always been considered a political scientist rather than a politician. Nevertheless, his "crime"—that of having issued, after the Soviet reoccupation of the country, a manifesto aiming at the restoration of Hungarian independence, yet with firm guarantees both for friendly relations with the USSR and against the resurgence of extreme right-wing elements—cannot be forgiven to this day. Nor is there forgiveness for other sufferers, such as the young playwright Jozsef Gali, the journalist Gyula Obersovszky (both of whom had edited the left-wing paper *Igazsag*—Truth); for Istvan Erdei, a leader of the agrarian socialist movement, the psychologist and educator Professor Ferenc Merei, the economist Professor Gyorgy Adam, the poet Istvan Eörsi, and many other distinguished representatives of Hungarian culture. Yet experience has shown that protests on behalf of communism's prisoners are not in vain; they—and their jailers—must know that the world knows—and remembers.

Paul Ignotus

Mr. Ignotus' autobiography, Political Prisoner, *was published this year by Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, and Macmillan, New York.*

Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to send communications dealing with matters discussed in *Problems of Communism.* Letters should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism,* U.S. Information Agency, 1729 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington 25, D. C.

THE NATURE OF THE NTS

In the March-April issue of *Problems of Communism,* Mr. Leon Gouré used his review of the recently-published book, *In the Name of Conscience,* by N. Khokhlov, as an opportunity for a rather sharp attack upon the anti-Soviet organization NTS.

Although the justification for his charges—specifically, that NTS (1) tends towards fascism by ideology, (2) tends towards fascism by former association, and (3) tends away from truthfulness—must obviously vary with the charge, these are all questions which have been and will continue to be the subject of heated controversy.

He did NTS the disservice of supplying little objective information, other than the fact that NTS collaborated with the Nazis prior to and during World War II (it might be noted that the US government collaborated with the Soviets—an equally unpleasant group of people—over much of the same period), denying NTS the specific issues on which it might defend itself. Such broad, unsubstantiated charges as these seem unpleasantly reminiscent of those used by some misguided American patriots of the early 1950's when commenting upon the state of "communism at Harvard."

I suggest, therefore, that you extend to Mr. Gouré an invitation to clarify his accusations against NTS, in which he might state as much relevant fact as he considers necessary, including references to specific "exaggerated if not wholly false claims" which have been attributed to this organization.

I might add that Mr. Gouré's description of NTS, a "Russian émigré organization in Germany", is not strictly accurate. NTS membership is not limited to

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persons of Russian descent or of former Soviet nationality; its tacit membership inside Russia (whether this amounts to several hundred thousand, or to a few hundred people) cannot correctly be called "émigré"; and many important NTS operations are carried on in countries, *e.g.*, Formosa, quite removed from Germany.

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS — DONALD C. MACDONALD, JR.

MR. GOURE REPLIES: I must admit I have little inclination to debate the sordid political character of the NTS with Mr. MacDonald, Jr., or to repeat the well-known facts about Russian émigré parties. He seems to be familiar with the accusations I have made, since he writes that these charges "have been and will continue to be the subject of heated controversy." It is evident that he has absorbed quite a bit of NTS propaganda, as seen in his equating the NTS' admiration for and collaboration with the Nazis with the US wartime alliance with the Soviet Union.

I also find myself unable to argue with NTS claims of "tacit membership inside Russia." Which émigré organization does not make such claims? The question has been debated and written about so often as to make it unnecessary for me to recapitulate the whole story at this time.

I suggest, instead, that he and those still unfamiliar with the subject matter read the studies by B. Dvinov, *Politics of the Russian Emigration,* and *Documents on the Russian Emigration,* both published by the RAND Corporation, May 1956 (the numbers of the studies are P-768 and P-865). They can be easily located in the Harvard University library. If after reading them Mr. MacDonald still wants to believe in the democratic claims of the NTS, and in the boasts about its following within the Soviet Union (despite Khokhlov's inability to find indications of this in the KGB records), he is welcome to his illusions.

SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES

I should like to express my appreciation to you for the publication of Mr. Donald Zagoria's most interesting "Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance" (May-June 1960). I happen to be among those students who have always been impatient with the thesis that the Soviet Union and Communist China had so many divergent interests that they would come to a parting of the ways. This thesis seemed to derive more from wishful thinking than from any facts. A consequence of the rejection of the extreme and ungrounded view of Sino-Soviet relations has been the tendency to minimize the genuine strains in the alliance. Therefore, we are all indebted to Mr. Zagoria for assembling the evidence and presenting it so cogently. One cannot read his account of Sino-Soviet differences on such a wide range of internal and external affairs without agreeing that the strains in the alliance are important. The evidence presented on the East German-China axis is especially impressive. I hope we shall see more on the subject in *Problems of Communism.*

SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA — HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN, THE RAND CORPORATION

The somewhat controversial article "Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance" by Donald S. Zagoria prompts some thoughts on the methodology applied in the study of Communist contradictions.

The fact that China and the USSR are on different levels of development should be treated as a premise in any attempt to analyze Sino-Soviet relations. This difference, in turn, leads to differences between the internal contradictions in both countries. Therefore, no comparison can be drawn between such contradictions, nor should they be used to formulate conclusions regarding the existence of contradictions between China and the USSR. One must, before speaking of basic contradictions between individual countries of the "world socialist system", first present evidence that these countries have strayed from the path of Marxism-Leninism. *At the moment, there is no evidence that either Mao or the successors of Stalin have strayed from Marxism-Leninism.*

The ability to differentiate between tactics and strategy should be one of the basic skills of research workers who evaluate the foreign or domestic policy of the USSR or that of international communism. The existence of a difference in tactics may be regarded as a factor favorable rather than unfavorable to communism since a difference indicates elasticity and quickness of wit. Citations of contradictory statements made by public figures in China and the USSR are not convincing in this respect: they belong to the realm of tactics and have nothing to do with general strategy. *There is as yet no conclusive evidence of the existence of any divergencies in the strategic line of communism followed either by Mao or by Stalin's successors. . . .*

The slogan "war is inevitable" is a case in point. To maintain that there is a disagreement between the two major Communist powers on this question by quoting individual statements of Chinese and Soviet leaders is to commit a fatal mistake, for the differences—to the extent they exist—stem from purely tactical considerations. Only by showing that Soviet Communists view the Leninist doctrine on the inevitability of war between capitalism and socialism in a manner differing from that of the Chinese, could the existence of such differences be proved. The principles of Leninism as understood by

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Mao and by Stalin's successors are identical, nor are there any basic differences between the ideological tenets as expounded in the USSR and Communist China.

For forty years political observers have based their study of the USSR on an analysis of Soviet internal contradictions and conflicts. This method has led to a situation where, in 1960, we find the Soviet Union to be a greater mystery than it was in the days of Lenin. Such an approach—based on Soviet weaknesses and directed at the possibility of "evolutions" or "internal conflicts"—can be gratifying to the Soviet leaders alone.

WASHINGTON, D. C. RICHARD WRAGA

MR. ZAGORIA REPLIES: Mr. Wraga speaks of "the path of Marxism-Leninism" as if there were a set of immutable and indisputable principles agreed upon by all Communists from Trotsky and Stalin to Mao and Khrushchev. If such basic principles were in existence, there would indeed be no need for any research on the development of Communist theory and practice and on the heresies which have been endemic in this development. The fact of the matter is that there are important, indeed crucial, problems to which the ideology offers no clearcut answers, as well as some, such as nuclear war, which it could not have foreseen. The Russians and Chinese, viewing the ideology through divergent and often conflicting national interests and adapting the ideology to radically different internal circumstances, frequently disagree on these questions. Such disagreements do not magically disappear or become less significant by labelling them, as do the Communists, "contradictions."

If by "general strategy" Mr. Wraga means the world-wide victory of communism, it is by definition true that Sino-Soviet differences are "tactical." But most of the great heresies in Communist history have resulted from "tactical" differences connected with alternative revolutionary conceptions.

The Chinese objections to Soviet views on war and revolutionary strategy have been made abundantly clear in the well publicized Lenin anniversary articles which were published after my article was written and which implicitly accuse Khrushchev of revisionism. The Chinese have now gone to such lengths as to put these Soviet views in quotation marks and then to refute them in their own press. The Russians, for their part, have most recently utilized the 40th anniversary of Lenin's pamphlet *Leftwing Communism, an Infantile Disorder,* to accuse the Chinese implicitly of a left-wing deviation (*Pravda,* June 12, 1960). Short of psychoanalysis of the Chinese and Soviet leaders, I can think of no surer indication of divergent views.

Some, like Mr. Wraga, seem to feel that any publicity given to Sino-Soviet differences may lead to unwarranted conclusions about an imminent open split between the two Communist powers, or that it may encourage an irresponsible optimism about the Communist threat. The manipulation of public attitudes is not, however, the concern of research.

AN AUTHOR'S CRITICISM

It is a matter of concern to me that to the natural shortcomings of my book, *Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party,* your reviewer, R. V. Burks, has added artificial imperfections of his own concoction (March-April 1960). I will limit myself to two examples.

1. The reviewer writes "The author also seems guilty of over-generalization when he claims that the controlling elite is comprised of mediocre people without talent or imagination."

On the contrary, I state in the book on p. 244, "their [i.e., the new cadres'] chief feature as far as work was concerned was a gift for organization combined with obedience and ability to get things done. Provided the political trustworthiness of two candidates was the same, preference was given to men of action and knowledge."

2. The reviewer writes that Mikoyan "was captured along with other 'workers' of the Baku Soviet by the British occupation forces; most of his fellow prisoners were shot, but Mikoyan, according to Avtorkhanov, saved himself by agreeing to work as a British agent. Stalin is alleged to have had a file on the case, which he held against the time when Mikoyan should get out of line. The story is intriguing but this reviewer, for one, wonders how a low-ranking official of the propaganda section of the Central Committee could have had access to such information."

I too "wonder" where the reviewer read in the book that I knew Mikoyan to be a British agent. I would assure the reviewer that I neither know that such a situation existed nor stated this to be a fact. In this case the book reads as follows:

> At the time of the revolution, Mikoyan was living in Baku, where he remained during the subsequent occupation of the city first by the Turks and then by the British . . . The fact remains, however, that although he was arrested with the 26 commissars, he was not shot, whereas some of those executed were non-party office workers of the Baku Soviet. Not only was his life spared, but he was soon released from prison and returned as a free man to British occupied Baku from Krasnovodsk to which the arrested commissars had been removed . . . *If this career had been examined* through Stalin's criminal lens, *it would have been* easy for Vyshinsky, in the course of the Moscow trials, to furnish him with a far more credible biography than any of those which he and Stalin had concocted for the other Old Bolsheviks. It is not too difficult to imagine that *it would have read* as follows: "Mikoyan . . . a German and Turkish spy . . . During the British occupation of Baku he was . . . then an agent provoca-

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teur of the British secret service and it was he who had betrayed the 26 Baku commissars to the British . . ." (pp. 98-299; italics added.)

It seems evident that I am saying, not that Mikoyan was a British spy, but that the events in Baku presented a weakness in his background which could easily have been exploited by Stalin at any time he desired.

I regret that the reviewer got the impression he did, and will appreciate your printing this letter in *Problems of Communism.*

OBERAMMERGAU, GERMANY A. AVTORKHANOV

MR. BURKS REPLIES: I am very sorry indeed if I have been unfair to Mr. Avtorkhanov. Perhaps I was unduly annoyed by his penchant for quoting verbatim conversations from thirty years ago. Perhaps a thorough editing of the manuscript by someone more familiar with English word usage and Western footnoting practices would have made clearer to me what he meant to say.

As to whether or not I was wrong in saying that Mr. Avtorkhanov pictured the controlling elite under Stalin as "mediocre people without talent or imagination," I may quote (also from p. 244) the following sentence: "The chief political feature of the new personnel was that they . . . possessed the quality most valuable under the existing regime, that of being immune to independent thought." Again, Avtorkhanov says of Yudin (p. 43) that he "repeated everything by rote like a parrot," of Molotov (pp. 284-5) that he suffered from "complete vacuity" and "administrative pedantry," of Kaganovich (p. 290) that the secret of his success as an economic administrator was his "wielding the heavy truncheon of the policeman," of Voroshilov (p. 992) that his one ability was that of finding his bearings rapidly, of Mikoyan (p. 301) that the "scale and scope of his commercial transactions was never particularly impressive," and so on. The epitome of the new ruling class was Stalin himself, "a man of mediocre talents" (p. 48), "quite ignorant of Marxism" (p. 132), "as a journalist . . . a mediocrity and as a speaker . . . a bore" (p. 213).

In asserting that it was Mr. Avtorkhanov's view that Mikoyan had saved himself at Baku by becoming a British agent, I erred; Mr. Avtorkhanov only implied this to be the case. To wit:

> There was, however, in Mikoyan's pre-revolutionary life one black spot which provided Stalin with an excuse for blackmailing him throughout the rest of his life. . . . Why had the British and the anti-Bolshevik Trans-Caucasian government, which executed even the non-party members of the Baku Soviet, released Mikoyan, a Bolshevik since 1915? . . . After the execution of the "26", Mikoyan spent some time in prison but again benefited mysteriously from what appears to have been inexplicable magnanimity or even weakness on the part of the British. . . . Although twice more detained by the British in Baku itself, on each occasion he was quickly released . . . This was the black spot in Mikoyan's life which gave Stalin a means of blackmailing him during his entire career. . . . It was quite in keeping with Stalin's character to surround himself with persons whose reputations were blemished or were in some other way vulnerable. . . . Mikoyan served Stalin not from conviction but from fear. The perpetual threat of being exposed as a spy and agent provocateur compelled him to subscribe to all Stalin's crimes, which he would probably not have done under normal circumstances. . . . The real reason was that the Georgian Cheka officials, headed by Beria, had for years besieged Stalin with denunciations of Mikoyan, founded on reports unearthed from former presumably British archives. Stalin had carefully stored them and used them as a means of frightening Mikoyan. . . .

In Communist countries, the past of almost any leading activist can be maliciously reinterpreted if that suits the requirements of the party leadership. Since Mr. Avtorkhanov makes of the Baku incident the touchstone of Mikoyan's career, the inference that the incident really would not bear close examination is strong. This is in addition to Mr. Avtorkhanov's use of such phrases as "benefited mysteriously" and "inexplicable magnanimity."

I might point out further that Mr. Avtorkhanov has not attempted to answer the question I raised in concluding the paragraph he cited; namely, how a low-ranking official of the propaganda section of the Central Committee could have known that Georgian Cheka officials "for years besieged Stalin with denunciations of Mikoyan" and that Stalin "carefully stored them and used them as a means of frightening" him.

INCENTIVES AND COERCION—A REPLY

In the current issue of this journal the reader will find my article "The Nature of Khrushchev's Power," in which I state, inter alia, that the Soviet government has been impelled to grant concessions to the population not because of any *direct* pressure from below, but because it recognizes that incentives are, at the present stage of economic development, more conducive to productivity than coercion. This is a view that I have expressed in all my writing during the last four years, and it comes as a surprise, therefore, to see Mr. Alec Nove in his "A Reply to my Critics" (May-June, 1960, p. 50) attributing a contrary belief to me.

Mr. Nove chooses to interpret my statement that the Soviet government is not "committed" to carry out its promise (as a democratic government would be in a similar case)—a statement made in my contribution to the symposium "Toward A Communist Welfare State?" (January-February 1960)—as meaning that it is "free to reverse its policies". He then proceeds to remind me

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gravely that there are "economic imperatives" behind the shift of the balance between coercive and incentive methods of government. Precisely for this reason I regard a reversion to Stalinist mass terror or living standards in the USSR as no more likely than does Mr. Nove; my contribution to the symposium was based on this same view and contained no criticism of Mr. Nove's original paper ("Social Welfare in the USSR").

It is possible, however, to agree that the transition to an incentive economy is a necessary expression of the stage of industrial maturity reached by Soviet society, and yet be doubtful about Khrushchev's "commitment" to reach American living standards; to regard the arbitrary imposition of a 20 percent wage-cut (Mr. Nove's example) as extremely difficult, and yet insist that the pressure for further wage rises, even in an industrially mature totalitarian society, will be consistently smaller than in a democratic society on the same level. That was the economic point of my discussion of "commitments" and of my comparison with Hitler's Germany—a point which Mr. Nove has not dealt with in either his first article or in his reply, but to which I feel impelled to return, in the light of what I consider the widespread naive acceptance of Khrushchev's "challenge to American living standards."

LONDON, ENGLAND RICHARD LOWENTHAL

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